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How to define, understand and deal with rebellion, terrorism and other violence: some pertinent observations

By Caspar ten Dam

Profile author
Caspar ten Dam (MA political science) is a conflict analyst and terrorism expert, now doing PhD research at Queens University Belfast on the aims and methods of Muslim rebel movements in collapsed Communist states.[1] He has worked for the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) at the University of Leiden between 1998 and 2002. He has been a freelance researcher since then. He specializes in confidential and pioneering research, such as on the Kosovo Liberation Army for the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) during 1999-2000. He has given multiple presentations on terrorism and related topics, such as at the University of Amsterdam in 2003 and Queens University Belfast in 2006. Most recently he has lectured on violence-values of Chechen and Albanian rebels during the 7th annual CESS conference at the University of Michigan (http://cess.fas.harvard.edu) and in Belfast on 15 November 2006.[2] Currently he is writing a book on *Conceptualizing violence: how to combat terrorism and other atrocities in a post 11 September world* (preliminary title), under contract at Cambridge Scholars Press. The author is available to conduct paid research with possible policy recommendations, for projects or in part-time.

Introduction: the impact of September 11
The most destructive act of terrorism to this day took place on 11 September 2001, when a dozen members of Osama Bin Laden's Islamist-fundamentalist network *Al Qaeda* (The Base) hijacked airplanes and plunged them into the Twin Towers in New York and into the Pentagon in Washington DC, killing nearly 3,000 people, almost all civilians.[3] The attack is widely seen as the end of the first post-Cold War period and the beginning of a new, yet more dangerous and chaotic one. Whether or not this perception is valid, 'September 11' led to a new, controversial, and some would say brutalizing 'war on terrorism' led by the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The 'war on terrorism' initiated by the Bush Administration introduced unprecedented pressures across the world on armed non-state actors and on the civil conflicts they are part of. The US and its allies have closely re-scrutinized these rebel groups, to ascertain to what

degrees they are terrorist and allied to *Al Qaeda*. Many authoritarian regimes, like those in Central Asia (particularly Uzbekistan), once more branded their domestic insurgents and civic opponents as terrorists, and try convince the US that these 'terrorists' pose a threat to the West. Until recently the Bush Administration took these assertions at face value so as to gain the support of these regimes for its 'war' against *Al Qaeda*. In our research and coming publications we investigate these new pressures on the rebel groups, and ascertain whether these 'external variables' have altered their characteristics i.e. ideologies and fighting methods. We also scrutinize the aims, methods and possible brutalizations of domestic regimes, Western powers, *Al Qaeda* and other international terrorist organizations against each other in the so-called 'war on terror'.

Conflict trends and relevance of conflict research
In the early post-Cold War years most conflict research centred on rebellion, the 'first scourge' of conflict. Nowadays most attention is riveted on the 'second scourge' of conflict, so-called "catastrophic terrorism" i.e. violence intended to kill as many (civilian) people as possible, the perpetrators happening to be mostly Islamic fundamentalists. Peter Chalk points out that "although there has been a steady decline in the number of [terrorist] attacks over the last decade [1990s], the *number of casualties per incident* has significantly increased"; he refers to a US State Department estimate that between 1995 and 2000 global terrorist violence killed and wounded 19,422 people – amounting to 78% of the total number of fatalities and injured at the hands of terrorists from 1968 to 1989.[4] This trend appears to be one more sign of the perceived 'degeneration' of insurgents and other non-state armed actors into terrorists, criminals and bandits.

Following the end of the Cold War the reputations of rebels across the globe plummeted. The ideals of the 'people's war' argued by revolutionaries like Ché Guevara and Mao tse-Tung lost appeal among the young, and gained ridicule among both young and old when they observed or experienced the atrocities in places like Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Congo. Self-styled insurgents brought with them little or no ideology but plenty of cruelty and crime. These so-called 'freedom fighters' failed to hide their lack of sincerity and humanity. The ideals of Ché and Mao held no sway among them, if they ever had. These days the only ideologues left among the rebels seem to be Islamic terrorists who show little or no regard for human life. If anything their violence is more frightening because of their extreme beliefs. J. Bowyer Bell, the 'maverick' who took "the trouble to go to Ireland, the Middle East, and the Third World to talk to revolutionaries and terrorists"(Schmid & Jongman)[5], expresses the disillusion among many about rebellion as a means to affect radical change: "even the old guerrilla struggles have grown more awful. Increasingly, the rebel - Irish or Arab, urban or rural - has appeared cruel, a new barbarian. ... The romantic rebel is dead and gone".[6] However, have insurgents brutalized into terrorists, bandits and (war) criminals, how should we deal with such armed actors, and how should we circumscribe these phenomena in the first place? Without a good definition of a phenomenon like 'terrorism' there will be no proper diagnosis (understanding) and proscription (resolution) of it.[7]

Why analyze political violence in general and rebellion in particular? We concentrate on the rebel as the primary armed non-state actor rather than on the soldier as the primary armed state actor. We do this for the following reasons:

1. Internal conflicts between state and non-state parties far outnumber conflicts between states, and have always done so, even before the end of the Cold War: "such wars *always have* outnumbered interstate wars".[8] Insurgents and other non-state fighters have been with us since the dawn of human history. Indeed, they have always been more prominent than fighters employed by the modern state. Rebellion is the most frequent and enduring phenomenon of political violence ever since the arrival of the state in its widest sense.

2. The predominant internal armed conflict is the rebellion, which we define as a violent confrontation between rival state and non-state forces (see Appendix). We recognize that *non-rebellion* internal conflicts do occur, such as fighting among non-state actors not targeting the state (eg. warfare between non-political gangs) or fighting in so-called 'failed states', where the absence of (strong) government makes all the warring parties non-state entities – including those who were insurgents and state troopers in preceding conflicts, before the state's collapse. Yet the 'proper' rebellion whereby at least one party fights a functioning regime is still the main form of internal conflict. Though the role of the soldier may be as important in determining the course and outcome of the conflict, it is the rebel that represents the necessary precondition for such a conflict to occur at all: without rebels, no rebellion.

We must keep the rebel phenomenon in perspective. Our focus on non-state violence will not neglect the role of state violence. However true the observation that "civil war has been a far greater scourge than interstate war"[9] with at least 16 million combatant and non-combatant deaths since WWII, and however brutal insurgents may be or become, they are hardly ever the deadliest. In the twentieth century states have killed over 100 million people[10], mainly defenceless civilians through both war and 'peacetime' repression (i.e. with no effective resistance), at least ten times more the number rebels have been guilty of and able to commit.

Old and new theories on old and new conflicts
Our 'degeneration' theory of armed conflict combines elements from the contrasting 'deprivation' and 'depredation' theories of conflict, each of which posit either 'grievance' or 'greed' as prime motivations of violence. Among the most influential conflict theories have been the frustration-leads-to-aggression thesis put forward by John Dollard and others in the late 1930s, and Ted Robert Gurr's deprivation-leads-to-violence proposition in the late '60s and early '70s. Gurr's concept of *relative deprivation*, the perceived discrepancy between resources one feels entitled to and resources one is capable to acquire and hold on to by peaceful means, has shaped most conflict theories to this day.[11] During the Cold War deprivation-cum-grievance theorists dominated the field of conflict studies. After the end of the Cold War and during the apparent rise of criminalized rebellions, a new depredation-cum-greed school of thought developed by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Nicholas Sambanis and others took centre stage.[12] In our research we

discuss these competing conflict theories and assess their theoretical merits and empirical validities. We thus critique the so-called 'new war' theory posited by Martin van Creveld, and Mary Kaldor.[13] This theory distinguishes between 'sincere' ideology-driven rebellions during and prior to the Cold War and 'fake' crime- and terrorism-driven rebellions after the Cold War, whereby each type represents a fundamentally different kind of war. Though this theory – very much a variant of the overall 'depredation' theory – has serious shortcomings, it has helped to lay bare the undeniable increase in the number of criminal(ized) non-state actors destabilizing localities, countries and regions.

Our own conflict theory presumes desperation, rather than greed or even grievance to be the main motivator of most rebellions. In our current research on the nature (ideology and structure) and behaviour (methods of violence) of rebel groups and other non-state armed actors we seek to falsify our own theory i.e. submit it and its hypotheses "to the severest tests we can design"(Popper).[14] Diagram 1 below shows our simplest degeneration model, a cycle of (not endlessly repetitive) violence based on four aggregate variables. In our research we apply more complex models that include countervailing factors like internal and external mediation and intervention.

Diagram 1   Simple model of rebel degeneration

Explanation This model hypothesizes the following basic sequence: intolerant societal and political *values* (variable 1) lead to *grievances* (variable 2) among peoples who are or consider themselves disadvantaged, dispossessed, repressed or targeted for extinction; sooner or latter the aggrieved take up arms, leading to an armed conflict with *chaos* (variable 3) and all its attendant pressures and temptations to commit cruelties; these violations constitute *new grievances* (variable 4) that may bring new atrocities out of frustration, desperation or revenge. These old and new grievances together with brutalization, criminalization and other degenerating trends negatively affect the values held in society. This in turn may lead to a new and more brutal round of conflict if there are no countervailing forces at play.

Defining political violence: separating means from ends
In order to fully understand violence between or against states, regimes, ethnic groups and private organisations, we need to sensibly define – and distinguish – the sorts of violence and the people who perpetrate them. Otherwise it would be futile to address the underlying causes and excesses of any violence. We need to construct concepts that can discriminate between potential and actual phenomena and their characteristics. It is also "advisable to strive for precise, tight definitions of key concepts"[15] to avoid obfuscation and misunderstanding. The definitions of some relevant concepts in the Appendix, particularly those of 'war', 'terrorism' and 'banditry' are essentially our own. In future publications we will defend our concepts and typologies in more detail. Many of our definitions – including that on terrorism – are unusual, counter-intuitive, and will spark debate. Even Al-Qaeda has occasionally resorted to *non*-terrorist violence (this is not to say that Al-Qaeda is not a terrorist organization overall: it generally targets defenceless civilians). Let us give one example. Many analysts define terrorists as "non-state organisations" engaged in (the threat of) violence *in peacetime* for nationalist, extreme-left, extreme-right, or religious (i.e. fundamentalist) purposes against any regime or *status quo* order they oppose.[16] Such definitions excessively limit the term 'terrorism' to non-state violence in 'peacetime', simply serving state interests. The United States "also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel *when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site*".[17] Consequently they label the *Al Qaeda* attack on the American battleship *USS Cole* on 12 October 2000 as a 'terrorist' act. However, we do *not* circumscribe this attack, in which seventeen American sailors were killed, because a) the ship was a military target that was armed and could defend itself;[18] and b) if we call all operations against combatants by non-state actors 'terrorist' because the actors are 'illegal' and attack in 'peacetime' than *all* rebellions are 'terrorist'. Such a viewpoint is absurd, unfair and excessively pro-state. Lastly, we expect all non-state armed actors to operate in a formal state of war. In current international law 'illegal' non-state actors cannot formally declare war. Only sovereign nation-states can declare war against each other.

Our central argument of conceptualization runs as follows: since at least the '60s conflict analysts have formulated the concept the 'terrorism' – like many other concepts of political violence – by looking at empirical regularities of specific, historically bounded, temporary and changeable phenomena of violence. They were inclined to regard these regularities as functional, timeless characteristics that needed be incorporated into their definitions. Many of them sought to include in their concept of terrorism the perpetrators' intentions like the creation of fear and media attention, and objectives like the creation of a free, independent or Islamist state. Yet such motives and goals alter over time. Or later organisations use violence against civilians – one of the few common elements in all definitions of terrorism – for other reasons. This way we are forced to continuously modify our 'empirical' definitions if we wish to include in these any new trends of this type of violence: a time-consuming undertaking. Instead, reserve one's main concepts for the formulation of 'ideal-types' or *Gedankenbilde* (Weber)[19], and classify their real-time, fluctuating manifestations into 'sub-types' of phenomena. To the latter category of 'empirical concepts' we can easily add other concepts that represent brand-new versions of the same (kind of) phenomena in certain periods, and drop other concepts that have

become outdated or virtually extinct in the same periods. We also can present a whole range of concepts in 'time-independent' tables, but even then we must maintain the distinction between main, generally applicable concepts and secondary, impermanent ones. We agree with Raymond D. Duvall and Michael Stohl:

> Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are empirical regularities associated with terrorism. More often, they simply confuse analysis.[20]

The best approach is not to define violent actors by what they believe or want (ideology), but by what they do (behaviour). Fortunately more analysts come to share this view.[21] This debate can be fruitful, even if it involves 'essentially contested concepts' (Gallie).[22] Always strive to separate the universally possible method from the temporarily existing objective. This rule-of-thumb is the first precondition for creating sensible, justifiable and effective policies on and against on phenomena like terrorism, banditry and (war) crimes.

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Appendix   **Definitions of violence**   © Caspar ten Dam, 2007

NB: one can adopt or refer to these definitions, though only when one identifies the author and his copyright, and the location where the original source can be found. When one uses these definitions in any publication, conference or any other setting, the author appreciates it when he is informed of it and/or consulted on it in advance. Be advised that this Appendix (with possible modifications) will be reproduced in the author's final PhD dissertation and several forthcoming publications.

Generic concepts

Aggression: deliberate infliction of physical or psychological pain, other harm or coercion (force) by sentient beings on other sentient beings for whatever end, which may or may not be done through physical force, and may or may not be immoral and illegal i.e. entail the violation of essential, personal and basic human rights in the broad sense (including humanitarian law).

Violence: deliberate infliction of physical pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end which may or may not be lethal, and may or may not entail the violation of essential, personal and basic human rights in the broad sense.

Political violence: deliberate infliction of physical pain, other harm or coercion for whatever end in the public arena beyond the private sphere (yet possibly with private motives) which may or may not be lethal, and may or may not entail violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

Conflict: fundamental disagreement between one or more actors due to opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances that for some reason have been unsolvable, irreconcilable or uncompromisable up to that point in time through either peaceful or forceful means.

Armed conflict: violent confrontation between one or more armed actors with opposite aims, interests, needs or grievances that appear unsolvable, irreconcilable or uncompromisable through non-violent means, or that one or more of the opposing actors have been unwilling to resolve or settle through peaceful means.

Armed actor: any group, party, organisation or entity that for whatever reason carries lethal weaponry for violent use or the threat of violent use.

Armed non-state actor: any private, non-governmental, illegal or unsanctioned group, organisation or entity beyond the control and sphere of the state that carries for whatever reason lethal weaponry for violent use or the threat of violent use.

Armed state actor: any public, governmental, legal or state-sanctioned group, organisation or entity belonging directly or indirectly to the state that carries for whatever reason lethal weaponry for violent use or the threat of violent use, ranging from the police and the military to semi-legitimate and illegitimate groups like pro-government militia's and paramilitaries.

Main types of violent conflict

War: armed conflict with one or more opposing parties fighting in such a way as to achieve complete victory over or utter defeat of the enemy, as evident from the type and scale of fighting methods, tactics and strategies employed.

Interstate or external armed conflict: violent confrontation between the armed forces of two or more states or governments that represent them, due to irreconcilable aims, interests, needs or grievances.

Intrastate, internal, or domestic armed conflict: violent confrontation due to irreconcilable aims, interests, needs or grievances between one or more armed non-state actors and the state, *or* among either state actors in 'civil conflicts' or non-state actors in for instance 'absent states' and 'failed states'.

Civil conflict: intrastate, internal, or domestic conflict in which the main opposing parties represent and control populations, infrastructures and other assets sufficient and large enough to fulfil state(-like) functions, signifying a conflict between state, semi-state, 'partial-state' or 'counter-state' actors regarding their ruling capabilities.

Civil war: civil conflict in which one or more opposing parties capable of state(-like) functions fight in such a way as to achieve complete victory over or utter defeat of their enemies, as evident from the fighting methods employed.

Rebellion or insurgency: armed conflict by one or more non-state, semi-state or alternative-state actors against any entrenched and generally recognized ruler, elite, authority, government, regime or state, for whatever personal reasons (grievance, grudge, greed etc.), particular goal or general ideology.

Revolt or uprising: spontaneous rebellion by individuals or groups of people with little or no planning, instigation or involvement of political parties or other entities (at least not in the initial or early phases), frequently but not necessarily arising from riots and other disturbances.

Insurrection: planned rebellion by individuals or groups of people belonging to political parties or other entities, frequently but not necessarily arising from revolts, riots and other outbursts of violence.

Coup d'état: focused insurrection that attempts to immediately grab and gain control over the reigns of power of the state, frequently but not necessarily characterized by small-scale and speedy operations to capture government buildings and other vital objects.

Main forms of actual or potential violence

Conventional conflict: violent confrontation between state and/or non-state forces whereby at least one side or party attempts to gain physical, visible and stable control of (the enemy's) territory and fixed objects, as evident from the fighting methods employed, such as – usually but not necessarily – heavily armed forces on or across battlefields.

Unconventional conflict: violent confrontation whereby one or more of the parties do not seek or need to hold (the enemy's) territory or fixed objects, as is evident from fighting methods such as sabotage, diversion, interference of communications, and so on.

Guerrilla: particular type of unconventional conflict, based on flexible, irregular fighting with hit-and-run tactics ranging from sabotage to ambush without the need to hold on to territory or fixed objects, frequently but not necessarily carried out by lightly armed individuals or small units.

Terrorism: lethal violence without warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups of) unarmed and thereby defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers, policemen and other defenceless noncombatants.

Liquidation, or 'terrorist assassination': lethal violence without warning for whatever purpose against selected individuals who in principle are unarmed and unprotected, typically ordinary civilians who cannot defend themselves, afford bodyguards or other security personnel.

Assassination: lethal violence without warning for whatever purpose against selected individuals ranging from leading politicians and military to other (leading) members of a community, who in principle are able to defend themselves or are protected by bodyguards or other personnel.

Criminality: any violent or non-violent act or activity prohibited and punishable by law, directed for whatever reason – frequently yet not necessarily out of greed – against persons and properties that result in moneys and valuables being taken or earned.

Gangsterism: violent criminality, i.e. any violent act or activity for illegally and illicitly taking, collecting or earning moneys, goods and properties, out of greed or other purpose.

Banditry: specific type of gangsterism that resorts to robbery, plunder, kidnapping etc. for whatever reason by using rebel-like or guerrilla-type tactics, usually though not necessarily in mountainous or other inhospitable areas as those are suited for such tactics.

Brigandry: banditry in the context of rebellion, i.e. a situation in which rebels act like or operate as bandits, resorting to pillage, ransom and other violently criminal acts through guerrilla(-like) tactics.

ENDNOTES

[1] The current title and focus of the PhD research is "The Ways to Rebel: Comparing Chechen and Albanian Insurgents, 1979-2001". After completion of this research I plan to conduct a broader comparative analysis that includes insurgencies and civil conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

[2] Powerpoint presentations and/or (draft) conference papers are available upon request.

[3] According to the latest numbers 2973 people died on 'September 11', 2749 of them in New York. According to Marianne van Leeuwen, then a terrorism expert at the Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague, the so-called 'September 11 attack' is a typical example of 'catastrophic terrorism' i.e. a form of asymmetrical warfare intended to inflict as many casualties as possible. Yet she emphasizes that this kind terrorism is a not a new trend; it already commenced during the early '80s.
Marianne van Leeuwen, *Trends in terrorisme (Trends in terrorism)* Atlantisch perspectief (Atlantic perspective) Jrg.25 Nr.6, november 2001, pp.4-9. Marianne van Leeuwen, *Catastrofaal terrorisme en niet-conventionele wapens (catastrophic terrorism and non-conventional weapons)* Internationale Spectator jrg.56 nr.1, januari 2002, pp.3-7. Rob de Wijk, *'11 september' en de nieuwe wereldorde ('11 September' and the new world order)* Internationale Spectator Jrg.56 Nr.1, januari 2002, pp.8-11.

[4] Dr. Peter Chalk, *International Terrorism* Militaire Spectator (*Military Spectator*) Jrg.171 Nr.1, 2002, p.12 (quote & estimate); see further Chalk's endnote 2, esp. US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000* Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington D.C. April 2001, Appendix C (see http://www.state.gov). As our definition of terrorism closely follows the State Department's, we can adopt straight away the estimates of casualties by terrorist acts over the periods in question, assuming that the gathered data are correct.

[5] Alex P. Schmid, & Albert J. Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature - Revised, expanded and updated edition* Amsterdam: SWIDOC (Social Science Information- and Documentation Centre); Amsterdam/Oxford/New York: North-Holland Publishing Company; New Brunswick (USA): Transaction Books, Second edition 1988 (first edition 1984), p.182.

[6] J. Bowyer Bell, *The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle* London/Portland (Oregon): Frank Cass, 1998, p.4. Bell has not entirely given up on the idea of rebellion as an at least potentially defensible way to end repression or achieve other laudable ends. In this he pins his hope on the rebel founders and (other) leaders. Yet he observes and seems to lament their diminishing capability to educate (some would say indoctrinate) and discipline the rank-and-file. Thus he points out that "some guerrillas .. are eager to explain the ideal and so too are nearly all of the leaders, who are truly driven to an armed struggle by perceived, often by real, grievances - not the profit motive"(p.102, his note 1). Bell observes that "in the end leaders are those most faithful, most dedicated, the sound and sensible and persistent, those capable of the long haul and largely devoid of the more visible signs of ambition and pretension"(ibid, p.100).

[7] My expression is a paraphrase from (or rather modification of) Boaz Ganor's adage 'no prohibition without a definition'. Boaz Ganor, *Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition* International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 7 October 2001, page 1 of 3 (see ICT's archive at www.ict.org.il).

[8] M.L.R. Smith, *Guerrillas in the mist: reassessing strategy and low intensity warfare* Review of International Studies Vol.29 No.1, January 2003, p.34.

[9] Fearon & Laitin, *Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war* American Political Science Review Vol.97 No.1, 2003, p.75. The estimate of 16.2 million civil-war deaths on and by both sides is theirs (ibid, p.75).

[10] Daniel Chirot, *Modern Tyrants – The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age* New York/Oxford/Toronto etc.: The Free Press/Maxwell Macmillan, 1994, esp. pp.7, 9.

[11] See on John Dollard, Ted Robert Gurr and other pioneers of related frustration and deprivation theories: Sandole, *Paradigm, theories and metaphors in conflict and conflict resolution* Chapter 1 in: Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict resolution theory and practice* Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press/St. Martin's Press, 1993, esp. pp.12-13. See in particular: Ted Robert Gurr, *Why men rebel* Princeton (N.J., US): Princeton University Press, 1970; and John Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

[12] See Paul Collier, *Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity* Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.44 No.6, December 2000, pp.839-853. Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy* Washington D.C.: Worldbank, 15 June 2000 (archive www.worldbank/org/research/conflict). Paul

Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355, 4 January 2001 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000; archive ww.worldbank/org/research/conflict). Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambalis, *Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda* Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.46 No.1, February 2002, pp.3-12. James D Fearon & David D. Laitin, *Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war* American Political Science Review Vol.97 No.1, 2003, pp.75-90.

[13] Martin van Creveld, *Transformation of War* New York: Free Press – Simon & Schuster, 1991. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars – Organized Violence in a Global Era* Cambridge/Oxford: Polity Press/Blackwell Publishers, 1999.

[14] Karl. R. Popper, *Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction* (1971) Chapter 1 in: Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge – An Evolutionary Approach* Oxford/London etc.: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1972, p.16. Popper even prefers the testing of the seemingly most improbable theory: "try to think of cases or situations in which it is likely to fail, if it is false"(ibid, p.14).

[15] Vittorio Bufacchi, *Two Concepts of Violence* Political Studies Review Vol.3 No.2, April 2005, p.197.

[16] Marianne van Leeuwen, *Trends in terrorisme* Atlantisch perspectief Jrg.25 Nr.6, november 2001, pp.6 (definition),7 (attack on USS Cole). See also Marianne van Leeuwen, *Catastrofaal terrorisme en niet-conventionele wapens (catastrophic terrorism and non-conventional weapons)* Internationale Spectator jrg.56 nr.1, januari 2002, p.3 (definition terrorism).

[17] US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Publications 11038 (2002), April 2003, Introduction – Definitions, footnote 1; 2003 [no nr. publication given], April 2004, Introduction – Definitions; footnote 1 (italics quote added). See http://www.state.gov/www/s/ct/rls/. Even if the surroundings or entire country in which the military site is situated are generally peaceful, when any people target this site they introduce a *de facto* if not *de jure* 'state of hostilities'. This we do *not* consider an act of terrorism if the personnel attacked are armed and on active duty.

[18] The strict rules of engagement – 'only fire when shot at' – forbid marines who spotted after the blast a second approaching boat to blow it out of the water; this aspect of the incident created a scandal and an investigation. Nevertheless, the USS Cole was able to fire back if it wished to. See sources note 16 & www.wikipedia.org.

[19] See Max Weber, *"Objectivity" in Social Science* in: Shils & Finch, *Max Weber: Methodology of the Social Sciences*, 1949, esp. p.90.

[20] Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?* International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), ICT Paper on Terrorism 2002, p.10 (source: Schmid & Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, 1984 edition, p.100). Yet in 1983 Duvall and Stohl defined terrorism as "action intended to induce sharp fear and through that agency to affect a desired outcome in a conflict situation"(Schmid & Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, 1988 edition, p.36), thereby following B.M. Jenkins' assertion that "fear is the intended effect, not the by-product, of terrorism"(ibid, p.36) - and contradicting their statement on the irrelevancy of motives for the concept of terrorism. After all, the intention to create fear is a motive.

[21] Thus John Horgan exhorts others to "get rid of all the political rhetoric and see terrorism in its true form: as a criminal method to express a political, religious or other belief. ... By defining terrorism as a method one is able to bypass the fruitless discussion about morality or legitimacy [of any terrorist act] and thereby reach more international consensus [on what constitutes terrorism]"(translated from Dutch). Quote from Hans Steketee, *'Terrorisme is geen ideologie' - Terreurdeskundige John Horgan over politiek geweld ('Terrorism is not an ideology' - Terrorism expert John Horgan on political violence)* NRC Handelsblad (*NRC Trades' Paper*, Dutch newspaper) 17 oktober 2001, p.5. John Horgan was Lecturer Forensic Psychology at the University of Cork, Ireland, and a specialist on political violence. Now he is Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at University of St. Andrews.

[22] W. B. Gallie, *Essentially Contested Concepts* Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol.56, 1956, pp.167-198.