

Doctoral thesis
First reader: Prof.dr A.P. Schmid
Second reader: Dr A.E. Pijpers
Department of Political Science, Leiden University

FRAGILE PEACE IN MACEDONIA

Interethnic tensions, attempts at conflict resolution, and prospects of armed conflict

A Case Study

by

Caspar ten Dam

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Caspar ten Dam, political science student
St.nr.8854270
Vrouwenweg 1E, 2322 LJ, Leiden
Tel.: 071-5803194

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Introduction. Research aim, concepts and typologies

Research aim, and the steps we take

This paper assesses the conflicts, and the local and international efforts to prevent, contain, or solve them, that affect the peace and security of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), commonly called 'Macedonia'. This is our overall research aim.

The first chapter gives a historical analysis of the (latent) conflict within Macedonian society - and of external influences like the suppression of the Albanian majority in Kosovo - since its independence in late 1991. The second chapter assesses the degree of conflict in Macedonia between June 1995 and June 1996 (more precisely, between 1 June 1995 and 1 June 1996).¹

In both chapters, we analyze and determine the level of the conflict(s) and the development of the conflict(s) during these periods, i.e. their direction: escalation, stagnation, or de-escalation. A longitudinal, month-per-month analysis is conducted in order to find any pattern in the level and development of these conflicts. The level and direction of conflicts in Macedonia are also analyzed in chapter 1.

Our special interest is in the period between June 1995 and June 1996, as we wish to assess in chapter 3 the likelihood of any (de)escalation of any conflicts during the following 12 months. Escalation could be in the form of an external conflict spilling over into Macedonia, an external aggressor invading Macedonia, or a domestic disturbance spilling over into one or more neighboring states.

The period of twelve months is chosen for the benefit of the "Checklist for Country/Conflict Profiles" developed and continuously modified by the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM, established in 1988). Our case study, conducted and completed during June and July 1996, is intended to be a contribution to this research project.

We analyze across all chapters the (future) attempts at conflict resolution and international negotiations by the United Nations, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, other international regimes, and individual states like the United States. We analyze local i.e. domestic attempts at conflict settlement and conflict resolution as well. We try to assess their strategies, the (in)effectiveness of their strategies, and thus their (in)significance as conflict-inhibiting (f)actors.

We present in the conclusion our main findings, and our assessment of the concepts and typologies used. If necessary, we suggest expanded research aims and methodologies for future research, including possible improvements of concepts and typologies.

An epilogue or postscript has been added in July 1997 about the developments in and around Macedonia from June 1996 until June 1997. Our intention is to find out to what degree our assessments, predictions and conclusions in chapter 3 and the Conclusion have been born out by the latest events. Nothing has been altered post facto in these assessments, predictions, and conclusions made in the summer of '96. Otherwise we would be dishonest and manipulative in our 'reappraisal' of our polemological case study. If possible, we want to find out why some, if any, of our 'likelihood predictions' shown in Table 3.2 (see chapter 3) have been 'rejected' by recent events.

Concepts, and the definitions and typologies we use

The concepts and typologies to be discussed are the ones we would use to analyze the degree of conflict in any country; they are proposals for general use. Concepts like 'war' are thus defined even if they are not frequently used in the case-study of Macedonia.

Concepts like 'security' and 'conflict' appear to be self-evident. Nevertheless, we offer our own definitions of the main concepts in order to prevent any misunderstanding or confusion. Some of these definitions are modified variants of existing ones developed by others, and some are direct adoptions of existing ones.

The first concept that needs to be clarified is 'security'. Security is any form of structural stability maintained by state institutions. Thus the concept of 'stability' refers to the strength or robustness of security. In our analysis we distinguish at least three levels of security: individual, national, and regional, roughly corresponding with Sandole's individual, societal/national, and trans-societal/international levels of conflict and conflict resolution.² We define security as the protection against violent attacks of the lives, health (well-being), and property (wealth, income, possessions, etc.) of citizens (individual level); groups (societal level); state institutions (national level); states (regional level); and supranational institutions and principles (international level). For the trans-individual levels, the protection of the lives and general well-being of institutions should be taken metaphorically.

The security of individuals should be regarded as the essential requirement for peace, here defined as ideal, tranquil stability without simmering tensions or any apparent threats. Sandole rightly points out that

"while there are clear differences of scale and appearance between, say, a divorcing couple and an international war, *individuals* are still involved across the spectrum of different levels of analysis, as *decision-makers*; by implication, so are individual-level causes and conditions. This is why, for John Burton, the individual is the *unit of explanation*, the generic, cross-level independent variable".³

Of course, we concentrate on the possibilities of civil and interstate wars as high-level armed conflicts, not on divorce rates in Macedonia. We look in the end at the security of individual citizens, i.e. at the degree of protection against threats of organized violence. We presume that security policies at the higher levels are ultimately intended to safeguard the lives of individual citizens. However, the interests of the ruling elites and the state institutions they control may clash with those of the citizenry, especially in repressive, authoritarian regimes. The 'national security' of the elite may thus be at the expense of the individual security of ordinary citizens.

This problem of 'conflicting security interests' appears to be the main cause of contemporary conflicts in the world. A.J. Jongman concludes from the global July 1994-July 1995 survey of PIOOM, that "most of the ongoing high-intensity conflicts are civil wars".⁴ The government and a rebel group are the usual warring parties in such wars. But in some (past) cases state institutions have completely collapsed, with fighting continuing among 'warlords' (see Somalia, Liberia, etc.). Such wars can better be described as 'anarchic' than 'civil'.

Only groups of developed, stable democracies appear to show any consistency in security interests across the spectrum of analysis, from the individual to the global level (see the scenario of more and more democracies representing an ever widening 'zone of peace'). The thesis of 'peace among democracies', strongly supported by empirical findings, underpins such a consistency. The security of individual citizens in these mature democracies may be threatened by criminal, terrorist and other extremist groups, for so far the state is unable to protect them against attacks from those groups. But the state itself generally respects the basic human rights of its citizens in such democracies, at least much more so than in unstable, often young democracies and in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

Now we need to circumscribe the fundamental concepts of 'conflict', 'war', and the associated concepts of 'conflict resolution' and 'international negotiations'. We essentially agree with John W. Burton's distinctions between conflict and dispute, and between settlement and resolution. He rightly objects to the interchangeable use of these terms, as such use is based on the wrong assumption that "all human relationships could be regulated and controlled by an authoritative third party", i.e. by dispute settlement.⁵

Burton defines 'disputes' as disagreements among parties which "involve negotiable interests", and 'conflicts' as disagreements among parties which involve "ontological human needs that cannot be compromised"; he thus defines 'settlements' as "negotiated or arbitrated outcomes of disputes", and 'resolutions' as "outcomes of a conflict situation that must satisfy the inherent needs of all".⁶ However, Burton does not indicate how we could empirically determine which human needs are inherent or ontological: to what degree, for instance, are ethnic and/or national identities real human attributes, i.e. manifestations of necessary human characteristics? The thesis of national identity as an artificial, culturally nurtured construct seems to be more supported by results of anthropological, social and psychological studies than the thesis of national identity as a real, ontological need. Nevertheless, Burton's conflict-dispute typology offers us a useful device for classifying often violent disagreements as either requiring settlement by an authoritative third party (usually a state body), or requiring problem-solving resolution by neutral and independent (usually non-governmental) experts who go at the source of the problem. The latter kind simply refer to such fundamental problems with such rigid and contrasting positions by the opposing parties, that these cannot be solved by mere arbitration enforced from above. Descriptive and empirical analyses could quickly ascertain which disagreements should be defined as disputes and which as conflicts - though some cases will always be difficult to classify. Burton's typology is practical rather than 'scientific' in the sense of representing mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.

Most disputes between groups and states are settled in international negotiations. The concepts of 'negotiation' and 'settlement' are thus on the same level, though the first usually refers to the talks and the second to the outcomes.

Problem-solving conflict resolution - as opposed to the new field of 'Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)' whereby a court is the arbitrator - is an extremely difficult enterprise: how to reconcile the aims of secessionist rebels from an ethnic minority with those of the centralist government, for instance? Indeed, Sandole defines conflict as "a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of *mutually incompatible goals* by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another"(emphasis our own).⁷

One of the first steps to break such deadlock is 'conflict prevention', the promotion of mutual trust and subsequent cooperation and agreement on the nature of the problem.⁸ Any subsequent resolution may require fundamental shifts in the goals and means of the opposing parties: for instance, cultural autonomy may be a suitable alternative to either secession or continued dependence on a centralized state.

If mediators aim to prevent, contain, or end any outbreak of violence, a destructive symptom of conflict, then we should speak of 'conflict settlement': the negotiated agreement among the opposing parties to de-escalate the conflict with cease-fires and the like, while the conflict itself is not yet fundamentally resolved. Burton does not make such a distinction. But his emphasis on the importance of prevention is justified: it is also required prior to conflict settlement, otherwise the outcomes of the latter may be short-lived (breakdown of cease-fires, etc.).

The frustration of individuals and groups in their inability to acquire immediate autonomy or independence for their 'ethnicity' or 'nation' often (but not always) leads to violence, i.e. 'armed conflict'. Burton's "frustration-of-needs-leads-to-aggression" hypothesis (based on Dollard et al, 1939), as an element of human needs theory, appears to be valid - though only in its modified form, in which frustration is a "*contributory condition* of aggression" rather than a "*necessary and sufficient condition*" i.e. a direct cause of it.⁹

However, we question the apparent assumption that ethnic, national, or any group identity is a basic human need to be respected in any conflict situation. We also question the more fundamental assumption that such identities represent a natural, even physiological characteristic of human behavior. The ultimate objective of conflict resolution, "the satisfaction of human needs that are universal"(Burton)¹⁰, should not lead to the automatic acceptance of grievances, certainly not of exaggerated demands by nationalist extremists.

Our typology on the level of conflict in Table I is based on PIOOM's Table I. We also adopt PIOOM's quantitative indicators to classify countries in rough categories for the benefit of its project, but still object to their usage without relation to population size. We have modified the category's formulations. PIOOM's original Table I presupposes fluid stages of increasing conflicts, shown by formulations like "*growing* levels of systemic strain" (see stage II). Such formulations are based on the basic assumption in PIOOM's monitoring project of "Gross Human Rights Violation Conflicts" that "there is a chain of events whereby increased conflict proneness leads to increased political violence and this, in turn, leads to increased human rights violations".¹¹ However, many conflicts and near-conflicts may hover within one level for long periods, without either de-escalating to a more peaceful level, or escalating to a more violent level.

Stage III in PIOOM's original Table I is called a "serious dispute situation". But Burton's definition of dispute is the generally accepted one in this treatise. We prefer and use the term "political conflict" for stage III from now on.

The PIOOM-researchers also assume that "political crises" i.e. transformations of simmering tensions into open confrontations (a shift from stage II to III) stay mainly domestic, while "humanitarian crises" i.e. dramatic increases in violence (a shift from stage IV to V) have an international impact. Apparently, they do not justify these assumptions with explicit arguments, such as refugee flows affecting regional security. We have to surmise these arguments ourselves.¹² The different stages of conflict defined by PIOOM concern the domestic scene; interstate conflicts are actually not covered by this typology.

The quantitative definition of high-intensity conflict roughly corresponds with Singer & Small's classical definition of war in the Correlates of War project: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. One should keep in mind that PIOOM also counts "*indirect* conflict-related deaths", "caused by hunger, diseases, and exhaustion"(Jongman).¹³

Table I
Five Stages of Conflict and Two Crises Thresholds, with quantitative indicators

Stage I: Peaceful Situation: a high degree of social stability and regime legitimacy; conflict dormant or non-existent.

Stage II: Political Tension Situation: tensions between political, civic, and/or ethnic groups, often along social cleavages; manifest conflict with no major violence against persons.

* * Political Crisis * *

Stage III: Political Conflict Situation: social instability and erosion of regime legitimacy; open conflict with sporadic violence between political, civic, and/or ethnic groups (< 100 political violence victims per year).

Stage IV: Lower Intensity Conflict: open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups; regime repression and insurgency (100-999 political violence victims per year).

* * Humanitarian Crisis * *

Stage V: High Intensity Conflict: open warfare among rival groups; severe government repression and/or guerrilla terrorism, accompanied by mass destruction and displacement of the civilian population (> 1,000 political violence victims a year).

Sources: PIOOM Newsletter, Vol.7 No.1, Winter 1995, pp.5 (Table I)& 6.
 PIOOM Checklist for Country/Conflict Profiles, Leiden University, question 10.

These quantitative definitions ignore the relative amount of fatalities due to violence, when compared with the entire population. A thousand casualties in China signifies a much 'smaller' conflict than a thousand casualties in Liechtenstein! PIOOM stresses that the quantitative criterion represents just one of the fifteen types of indicators used to classify the countries in one of the conflict-stages.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the absolute number of fatalities should be coupled with population size.

'War' usually denotes an armed conflict with many casualties. But the definition of war remains arbitrary so long as it is solely based on quantitative criteria. If we wish to use the term war as a separate concept, we should give it characteristics distinct from 'normal' conflict, even if the latter also denotes political violence.

The connotation of the word 'war' often contains a tinge of ruthlessness, even cruelty, suggesting destruction and bloodshed. This tinge is openly expressed in Sandole's definition of armed, aggressive conflict: a situation in which

"at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of another; and/or *psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another*"(emphasis our own).¹⁵

We could regard a war as the most extreme variant of armed conflict, in which at least one of the warring parties aims to defeat the other as completely as possible. For instance, military interventions by the international community should be described as wars only if they want to defeat the 'aggressor' or 'violate'. A peace-enforcement operation, like Joint Endeavor by NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, may use force against the violating party; but such force is intended to bring the party back into line, not to rout its armed forces. Real defeat involves at least the destruction of the fighting capability of the opposing army, as has been almost the case in the 1991 Gulf War against Saddam Hussein's forces.

If one wants to fight a 'clean war', one does not intend to eliminate the enemy's elite and/or population, nor to commit any other human rights violations. A 'dirty war' often involves organized mass murder against a group for their political (oppositional, secessionist) characteristics (politicide), or for their communal (racial, ethnic) characteristics (genocide).¹⁶ However, genocides and politicides should not be referred to as wars if the victimized groups lack the means to defend themselves with significant weaponry.

Therefore, war can best be regarded as an all-or-nothing, qualitatively extreme conflict between armed actors, even if only for analytical purposes. Sandole's definition of an aggressive conflict can also be called a war if the term "armed" (prior to "actors") is added to it. If military battles in such a conflict result in many fatalities in absolute and relative numbers, we can speak of a "large-scale war". If the fatalities in absolute and relative numbers are low (below 1,000 per year, etc.), we can speak of a "small-scale war".

We have circumscribed the phenomenon of war, because the main interest in PIOOM and other research projects on conflict and conflict resolution lies in the study of and prevention of conflict escalation. And full-scale war is the most extreme variant of high-intensity conflict. They have developed conflict-level and conflict-escalation indicators for timely detection of likely worsening of conflict, in order to be better able to prevent them. The prevention and/or timely constraint of any conflict is also the aim of the so-called early warning and response system, developed by the London-based NGO International Alert. Our case study uses ten "most critical factors (MCF)" out of the fifteen types of conflict-inhibiting and/or -facilitating indicators developed by PIOOM, in order to assess the degree of possible escalation in Macedonia.¹⁷ These factors are shown in Table II; we have modified the formulations of some of them.

Table II. Factors of conflict (de-)escalation

- 1) Degree of heterogeneity of population;
- 2) Degree of parliamentary democracy;
- 3) Extent of minority- and/or majority-group representation (ethnic, religious, linguistic) in the government and other state institutions;
- 4) Ideology of the government or entire regime (the degree in which it is nationalistic, etc.);
- 5) Degree of government censorship (if any);
- 6) Number of conflict fatalities (see typology of table I);
- 7) Number of threatened victim groups and the degree of any threat against any group (ranging from discrimination to genocide);
- 8) Use of sophisticated weapons (if any in any armed conflict);
- 9) Theater of conflict (are other countries involved, is there any interstate warfare, etc.?);

10) Number of conflict participants (how many parties are involved, also from other countries?).

The latter two indicators are often interrelated, though the last one may point to a conflict with more than two parties in a very small theater, such as a local district.

We intend to provide sufficient information and insight on the case of Macedonia to be able to answer the "PIOOM Checklist for country/conflict profiles". We have decided not to present this checklist as an Appendix, because our answers to most questions would just have repeated the remarks, observations, and conclusions in the text of this thesis.¹⁸

Research approach, and our refinements of the research aim

Our case study on Macedonia needs a focus, otherwise we may lose ourselves among the welter of concepts and typologies (i.e. categories) described and adopted above. Simply put, the lens we use to detect and (re)trace essential developments in the tiny Balkan state is our research approach. So we need some fundamental concepts and typologies that "separate the corn from the chaff" (a Dutch expression). They should function during the analysis as reigns on all the other concepts and typologies, otherwise the latter may 'run' away from us.

Our focus for discerning the level and development of conflict in Macedonia is on the political battle between and among extremists and moderates, and on the strategic and tactical alliances within and across extremist and moderate parties and civic organizations.

Our hypothesis is that the degree of (potential) conflict is determined by the strength of the moderates vs. the extremists, and the alliance formation within and across political and civic movements. The idea is that hidden tensions within a society, possibly due to structural violence (Galtung, 1969), only develop into physical violence i.e. open conflict if extremist leaders succeed in manipulating and mobilizing a part of the population against another part. Political concepts like extremism vs. moderatism, nationalism vs. republicanism, and alliance formation are useful for our present analysis. These definitions of these concepts, developed by my own, are presented in Table III.

The strength of moderate and extremist forces in Macedonia is determined by the ability of each to forge alliances of like-minded groups and factions as a counterbalance against the other force. Of course, in polarized societies some tactical i.e. opportunist alliances may exist between, for instance, reactionary and conservative parties against an emerging alliance of radicals and revolutionaries. Fear of a revolution may be the unifying factor of any alliance consisting of all kinds of people who want to maintain the status quo. In such highly charged situations, the extremists in both camps will likely infect the moderates in each camp, particularly the waiverers and opportunists. It is more difficult to represent the moderate outlook and convert the other people in the faction, party, or society as a whole. And among the moderates, only the reformists are really willing to make compromises and eager to seek consensus.

We expect the moderates to be statist, and the extremists to be nationalist. Of course, moderate nationalism is possible as long as the basic rights of foreigners and other nationalities or ethnicities (often minorities) are respected. But nationalism appears to have the *tendency* to create hostile feelings against the 'others', as one's own 'uniqueness' is so much emphasized, even glorified.

Table III. Political concepts of ideology and alliance formation

III.A Fundamental concepts

Nationalism: the belief that a nation, i.e. a territory with a supposedly homogeneous people with common characteristics (culture, language, ethnicity) should have its own state. When a national people attains a state, i.e. a governing authority, its rights are paramount over any other people residing within the territory.

Statism, or **Republicanism:** the belief that the territory of a region, a republic, or any other unity, should have its own state. Such a state does not necessarily have to be based on one ethnicity. Its citizens may be from heterogeneous communities, but they in principle hold the same rights.

Extremism: fanatical ideology or attitude, whereby the use of force in whatever form (from intimidation to violence) is deemed a legitimate, 'normal' means to realize or maintain the nationalist, fundamentalist, or any other objective or attainment.

Moderatism: tolerant ideology or attitude, whereby negotiation, consensus-seeking, and peaceful conflict resolution are considered legitimate, 'normal' means to realize and maintain the statist, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, or any other objective or attainment. The use of force is only used as an extraordinary means to defend such an objective or attainment against an aggressor.

III.B Types of political orientation, on a right-left scale with extremist poles

Reactionaries: extremists who want to defend the status quo, such as a political system in its current form, at all costs - including violent and other repressive methods.

Conservatives: moderates who want to defend the status quo, but prefer to use non-violent, peaceful means of negotiation and accommodation, refraining from brutal repression.

Reformists: moderates who want to modify, improve the present (political) system through negotiation and accommodation, if this is necessary to keep the peace, i.e. resolve or at least curtail any tensions in society. They do not want to do away with or fundamentally alter the status quo.

Radicals: moderates who want a fundamental change, believing that only such a change - through negotiation and accommodation - will keep the peace, and thus the society prosperous and secure.

Revolutionaries: extremists who want a fundamental change at any costs; they are ready to destroy the status quo by violence and usurpation.

III.C Types of alliances

Strategic alliance: any form of cooperation, usually long-term, between two or more political and/or civic organizations of similar outlook, or between factions of similar outlook within those organizations, in order to reach or safeguard a common objective. One expects such an alliance to consist of moderate parties or factions against (threats from) extremist opponents and vice versa.

Tactical alliance: any form of cooperation, usually short-term, between two or more political organizations of dissimilar outlook, or between factions of dissimilar outlook within those organizations, in order to share power, stave off a common (external) enemy, or safeguard their different interests that happen to be compatible. Such an alliance may even consist of moderate and extremist actors, particularly when such a unity is necessary against an external aggressor.

More concepts and typologies are used in the analysis, but they are introduced 'on the spot' as they are usually (sub-) variants of the ones presented above. After describing all our main concepts and typologies, we can now refine our research aim by distinguishing the following specific research questions:

1 What sort of conflict(s), if any, occurred in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia since a) its independence in 1991, and b) June 1995? In other words, have any disagreements and clashes occurred in Macedonia between groups with opposing, supposedly incompatible, ethnic, national, socio-economic, and/or other interests?

2 If any conflict(s) occurred in Macedonia since a) 1991, and b) June 1995, what intensity and pattern did they show: did the conflict(s) hover within one level (stagnation), de-escalate toward a lower level, or escalate toward a higher level?

3 To what degree can any stagnation, de-escalation, or escalation of any conflict in Macedonia since a) 1991, and b) June 1995, be accounted for by alignments and realignments among moderate and extremist forces? In other words, did any alliance formation or alliance dissolution (splintering) within and among political and/or civic movements affect the development of conflict(s)?

4 What are the prospects of any (new) conflict in Macedonia emerging, stagnating, de-escalating, or escalating during the next twelve months after June 1996, and what are such prospects on the longer term?

5 Which initiatives and policies of dispute settlement, conflict settlement, and particularly conflict resolution have been undertaken by (moderate) Macedonian organizations and international organizations since a) 1991 and b) June 1995, and which initiatives are to be expected in the next twelve months?

The last research question belongs to all three chapters. The fourth research question belongs to chapter 3, and retrospectively also to the epilogue (although not regarding the full 12 months after June '96). The other research questions belong to chapters 1 and 2, though the one about the validity of alliance formation may also be included in chapter 3. But it is difficult to test the hypothesis "alliance formation among moderates and extremists determines the nature, level, and direction of conflict" on future developments.

One could refine the research questions by including the conflicts in neighboring countries affecting any (latent) conflicts in Macedonia, or affecting the latter's security (the inclusion of "conflicts around Macedonia" in each research question would have complicated their formulation). Some attention is given to external conflicts in Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Greece. But full inclusion would have suggested a comparative analysis between several Balkan countries, which is not the case. The analysis of conflicts in Macedonia's neighbors is secondary, primarily intended to assess their impact on Macedonia. Consequently, analysis of conflicts and alliances in Greece, for instance, is not nearly as detailed and thorough as analysis of conflicts and alliances in Macedonia. Finally, the opinions and policies of Macedonia's neighboring countries (or other countries) regarding and affecting Macedonia's domestic conflicts, such as the status of the Albanian community, are seen as internal developments. External conflicts regarding and affecting Macedonia's statehood, such as the question under which name it should be recognized, are seen as external developments affecting Macedonia.

Chapter 1. Tension and Conflict since Macedonia's 1991 Independence

1.1 Tension and Conflict in and on Macedonia, 1991-1992: consolidation of the state against heavy odds

1.1.1 Early political developments and alliance formation after the elections in 1990

The first multiparty elections in the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia were held during November and December 1990. Such elections were also held in the other five Yugoslav republics during the same year. The elections in Macedonia were won by the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), a descendant from the revolutionary, even terrorist IMRO which organized a failed uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1903, and assassinated king Alexander of Serbia in Marseille in 1934. It became the biggest party in the 120-seat parliament, with 38 seats (see Table 1.1.A), which soon after established a closely knit alliance with the small Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (DPNME).

The more moderate League of Communists of Macedonia - Party for Democratic Prosperity (SKM-PDP), an electoral coalition between the former Communist party and the PDP, got 31 seats. Apparently, the PDP of ethnic Albanians got 17 seats separately in the parliament after it was founded in 1991 (see warning in Table 1.1.A).¹⁹

Kiro Gligorov, a reformist ex-communist and republicanist proponent of a multi-ethnic state who had been president of the Yugoslav parliament during the '70s, was elected as Macedonia's first President in January 1991. He preferred a sovereign, self-governing Macedonia that would "participate in the Yugoslav Community".²⁰ He soon led a strategic alliance called the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDAM), the successor of SKM-(Macedonian)PDP (but see note 19). He helped to form a wider and more loose alliance with the Reform Forces' Alliance of Macedonia (SRSM in Macedonian 21), led by former Federal Prime Minister Markovic. Both the SDAM and SRSM formed a two-party government under Prime Minister Kljusev.

This moderate government coalition kept IMRO from power, and the latter's call for immediate independence was thus ignored for the time being. Gligorov and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic sought to maintain a new, looser kind of Yugoslav (con)federation, as hasty, full-blown independence could easily ignite inter-ethnic conflicts in their multi-ethnic republics.

Their position became more difficult as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic increasingly dominated the Federal Presidium since the abolition of autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989, and since the full collaboration of Montenegro from 1990 onwards. Milosevic's initial aim to establish a *de facto* 'Greater Serbia' by domination of the Yugoslav state institutions made the demands for independence in most other Yugoslav republics understandable, whether or not these demands were fanned by nationalistic feelings.

The wars in Slovenia (26-27 June 1991 - 3 July 1991) and Croatia (22 July 1991 - 2 January 1992), and the departure of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslav Presidium within that period, killed the last remnants of Yugoslavia - and the last hopes for a new Yugoslav federation in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the Macedonian government reluctantly decided to hold a referendum on independence in September 1991; an overwhelming majority voted 'yes'. In the meantime, domestic relations between ethnic groups and external relations between Macedonia and some neighboring states had worsened. Particularly the remark by IMRO's leader, 25-year old Ljupco Georgievski, in June 1991 that "Some 25,000 Macedonians live in Greece, and . . . A united

Macedonia has long been the dream of Macedonians" did much to escalate domestic and interstate tensions.²²

The 1991 census on Macedonia's population make-up further contributed to the interethnic tensions. All Albanian parties boycotted this census, ranging from the radical but relatively moderate Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) founded in 1991 and led by Nevzat Halili, and the nearly extremist National Democratic Party (NDP) led by Iljaz Halimi. Among other things, they protested the absence of questionnaires in the Albanian language. Furthermore, they distrusted a government with no Albanian interest parties and a census with no international monitors to detect any fraud. These worries united the Albanian parties in a tactical alliance on two interrelated issues: the (il)legitimacy of the census and the size of the Albanian population. Cynics would say that their boycott, largely followed by Albanian citizens, helped them to continue their claims that 30 to 40% of the population were Albanian, in contrast to the official estimate of 21.7% (see Table 1.2).

At the end of 1991, the Macedonian government and state were much less legitimate in the eyes of ethnic Albanians than at the beginning of 1991. The census issue weakened the legitimacy of the government to such an extent that we could speak of a political crisis, bordering on a political conflict situation (see stage III in Table I). There was already a political tension situation (see stage II in Table I) in Macedonian society even prior to the 1990 elections, though the social and political cleavages have steadily widened since then (see Table II, indicators 3, 4, and 7 in particular).

This crisis reached a climax in January 1992, when an illegal referendum for territorial autonomy was held in southwestern Macedonia near the cities Kumanovo, Tetovo, and Gostivar. An overwhelming majority of the local population, around 70% of them Albanian, predictably voted 'yes' for an autonomous Albanian "Illyrida Republic" (!). This referendum heightened fear among ethnic Macedonians of Albanian secessionism leading toward a 'Greater Albania', as western Macedonia shares borders with Albania and the former autonomous province of Kosovo inside Serbia. Around 90% of the population in Kosovo were and are Albanian.

Outsiders may be amazed about the sensitivity and distrust among the ethnic Albanians against the Macedonian authorities, and about the fragility of the Macedonian state. The first situation is largely due to the latent conflict about the status of the Albanian people in Macedonia, intimately connected to the status of their language. The second situation is partially due to these Albanian demands for equal status, but also to the skeptical, distrustful, and even hostile reactions abroad to Macedonia's independence declaration, particularly from Greece.

We first explain the nature of the (latent) external conflict between Macedonia and some neighboring states on the formers' symbols of independence, using events in 1992 as the main examples for this explanation. We then explain the nature of the (latent) internal conflict between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians on the former's constitutional status, also using developments in 1992 for this purpose.

TABLE 1.1.A 1990 Elections in Macedonia
[Table lost; reconstitute]

TABLE 1.1.B 1994 Parliamentary elections in Macedonia
Source: Munziger Archiv 34/94 (from Internet; see gangulf@universal.nl.)
[Table lost; reconstitute]

TABLE 1.2 Census

[Table lost; reconstitute]

***: curiously, the sources give different numbers, while referring to the same census. For instance, R.W. Mickey mentions 22.9% Albanians, while MB appears to adopt the percentage claimed by the Albanians (see Mickey, Transition Vol.1 No.1, 30 January 1995, p.40).

Table 1.3 Information on FYROM

[Table lost; reconstitute]

Sources:

Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), volumes 1992-1993, 1993-1994, 1994-1995, & 1995-1996 (*: different estimates in different volumes);

Dr. James Gow & James Pettifer, Macedonia - Handle with Care JIR, September 1993, p.387;

Frank Westerman Servie annexeert stiekem stukjes Macedonie (Serbia stealthily annexes little pieces of Macedonia), Volkskrant 2 juni 1994, p.5 (**: specific number of tanks is mentioned by this source).

FYROM = Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

1.1.2 What's in a name: the essence of Macedonia's troublesome relations with Greece and other neighboring countries since its independence in 1991

The EC Council of Foreign Ministers established on 16 December 1991 the so-called Judge Badinter Commission to screen requests for recognition as independent states by the EC (EU since the ratification of Maastricht in November 1993). The Council also formulated the criteria of recognition which this Commission should use, particularly for the new states in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

Ironically, the same Council in the same meeting during 16-17 December decided under heavy German pressure to recognize Slovenia and Croatia by 15 January 1992, without waiting for the Badinter Commission's recommendations. This Commission eventually cautioned against premature recognition of Croatia, given the lack of codified minority rights in the new Croat Constitution of December 1990. But the German government was intent to recognize Croatia regardless of any reservations by the Badinter Commission, encouraged and pressured by the strong "Catholic lobby" from the Croat diaspora.²³

The EU member states decided under heavy Greek pressure to delay the recognition of Macedonia at the same meeting in December 1991 and at the Lisbon summit of the European Council in June 1992, while the Badinter Commission by then had approved Skopje's (capital of Macedonia) request for recognition! Yet the young and fragile Macedonian state was able to reach a pragmatic, if uneasy and tense modus vivendi with the other neighboring states. This has been a remarkable achievement, as nationalists in all these states (including Greece) have claimed at least since the 19th century at least part of Macedonian territory, "arguing that the people living there were predominantly of their own respective ethnos"(Perry).²⁴

Albania had no fundamental objections against the name 'Macedonia'. Indeed, James Pettifer wrote in 1992 that "the formation of the new state [Macedonia] has been welcomed [in Albania], primarily because it is seen as a counterweight to Serbia and an irritant to Greece".²⁵ The relations were rather strained by the issue of the constitutional status and education of Albanians in Macedonia (see next section).

Bulgaria, however, had some problems with the name 'Macedonia'. Though it was the first country to recognize Macedonia as an independent state, it did not recognize the Macedonian nation. Bulgarian politicians and citizens continued to regard the Macedonian language as a Bulgarian dialect - and the ethnic Macedonians essentially as fellow Slavs. Thus Bulgarians did not like the term 'Macedonian' for so far it suggested a culture distinct from their own.

Curiously, the irredentist wishes for a 'Greater Bulgaria' and a 'Greater Macedonia' by extremists in both countries, particularly within their respective IMRO-branches, cover roughly the same huge area with a port to the Aegean Sea (preferably the Greek city Thessaloniki!). The more these extremists are willing to cooperate with each other - if they are able to agree on the historic interrelationships between the 'Bulgarian' and 'Macedonian' identities - the more Macedonia, Greece, and other Balkan states need to be on guard (see further section 1.2.1).

Thus Greece was the only neighboring country which refused to recognize Macedonia because of its name. Since the adoption of the independence declaration by Skopje's parliament at the end of 1991, the Greek conservative-liberal government of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis responded with trade restrictions and diplomatic moves to prevent the "Republic of Skopje" from becoming a member of the Council of Europe, the Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE), and other international institutions. Greece took these steps and refused to recognize Macedonia for the following fundamental reasons:

- * 'Skopje' should adopt another constitutional state name than the 'Republic of Macedonia', because Greece's north-eastern province already bears that name ('Aegean Macedonia', also referred to as 'Greek Macedonia'). Greece regards the name 'Macedonia' as its historic birthright, referring to the kingdom of Macedon in the 4th century BC, with King Philip II (356-336 BC) and his son Alexander the Great as its most famous leaders.

- * Skopje should abandon the 16-point Star of Vergina in its national flag because it was a 'Greek' symbol, attributed to King Philip II of Macedon.

- * Skopje should scrap from its 1991 Constitution all supposedly irredentist references to Aegean Macedonia, particularly those expressing concern for ethnic Macedonians living abroad as in Aegean Macedonia (not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution), and include provisions for equal (minority) rights for all ethnic groups.

The Greeks were so sensitive and worried about any territorial aspirations on Greek Macedonia, that neither the moderate outlook of President Gligorov and the new government in Skopje, nor their reassurances, could offset the latter's 'provocative' adoptions of a Greek state name, a Greek flag, and of supposed references in their Constitution to Slav Macedonians in northern Greece. These adoptions were considered by Greece to be incompatible and thus in conflict with its own national interests; in this sense, the conflict was started by Greece (see the definition of conflict in the Introduction). Surprisingly, the 'name issue' would turn out to be Greece's biggest worry, though the other two issues appear to be more substantive.

The Macedonian unicameral, 120-seat parliament called the Sobranie (according to the 1991 Constitution) actually showed understanding to Greece's concerns by adopting in 1992 two amendments to its Constitution: "the Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighboring states"(Amendment I), and "the Republic shall not interfere with the sovereign rights of other states and their internal affairs"(Amendment II).²⁶ Despite this large concession to Greece's third demand, Athens "has not been satisfied by those changes and subsequent similar declarations"(Perry).²⁷

The reformist Prime Minister Mitsotakis did not have the political backing to resolve the conflict regarding Skopje's symbols of independence with his counterpart Kljusev. Mitsotakis' government was based on an unusual coalition between the rightist New Democracy Party (ND) and the communist Alliance of the United Left established after the 1989 elections to deal with the corruption within the former government under Andreas Papandreu, founder and leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Therefore, its political mandate was mainly to root out the corruption of the previous government, not to have a free hand in solving conflicts with a neighboring state. Consequently, Mitsotakis was confronted with domestic pressure not to respond positively to any gestures from Skopje short of full compliance with the three basic demands. James Pettifer gives a revealing example:

"The first major victim has been the Greek foreign minister, Mr. Samaras, who was sacked in April this year [1992] by prime minister Mitsotakis for taking a hard line over Macedonian recognition But Mitsotakis miscalculated the degree of feeling against recognition among the Greek public and was forced into a vote of confidence With a majority of only two in parliament, and a substantial body of opinion in the New Democratic Party (ND) supporting the positions of Mr. Samaras (particularly members from northern Greek constituencies), the Macedonian issue is clearly capable of bringing down the government."²⁸

Meanwhile, the international community had not yet undertaken structural initiatives to mediate between Macedonia and Greece, in order to resolve their conflict on the former's symbols and expressions of independence (name, flag, constitution, etc.).

The Dutch ambassador in France Henry Wijnaendts, chosen by Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek (as President of the EC-troika of foreign ministers) as special EC envoy to Yugoslavia in June/July 1991, occasionally visited Skopje to talk about problems like Athens' reaction to its independence declaration. However, Wijnaendts' attention was elsewhere. His main tasks were:

- * securing the cease-fires in Croatia during 1991 (as many as fourteen cease-fires were quickly broken before the final one took hold);
- * supporting the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECCM) set up in July 1991 to witness the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army (JNA) from Slovenia and the numerous cease-fire violations in Croatia and Bosnia (where war broke out in April 1992);
- * acting as the Co-Ordinator of the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia from September until November 1991.

Likewise, Lord David Owen - chosen on 27 August 1992 during the London Conference as EC mediator, and Co-Chairman with UN mediator Cyrus Vance of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) - concentrated on conflict settlement and resolution between the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

David Owen points out in his *Balkan Odyssey* (1995) that it was the British EC Presidency (July - December 1992) which had been trying to "persuade the Greeks and the Macedonians to resolve their deep differences over calling the new state the Republic of Macedonia".²⁹

Owen and Vance assisted the mediation efforts of the British government by visiting Mitsotakis in Athens on 22-23 September 1992 and Gligorov in Geneva on 16 October. About these visits, Owen made the following observations:

"It was the decision to use the Vergina Star on the Macedonian flag and put on their stamps a Greek castle on the sea at Thessalonika which showed a more than theoretical claim to Greek territory. For me as the EC Co-Chairman it was a very delicate matter, and I was content at that stage to let the British Presidency take the lead and to wait for the report they had commissioned from their Ambassador O'Neil. When we met President Gligorov I realized that this was going to be a hard issue to resolve; behind an external reasonableness he hid an inner resolve and inflexibility on this issue, because for him too this was an essential national interest. My job was to do everything possible to keep the Twelve together and I had no interest or wish to isolate the Greeks."³⁰

If true, decisions like putting a Greek castle on a stamp were really provocative and justifiably alarmed the Greeks. However, Owen's telling determination to regard Greece's policy as a "legitimate upholding of a national interest"³¹ in order to maintain unity within the EC, explains why mediation attempts from this quarter were regarded with mixed feelings in Skopje and were ineffective for years to come.

Owen's attitude could hardly be called an approach of even-handedness required by any outside mediator. One should never fall in the trap of artificial neutrality as happened in Bosnia, where mediators like Owen himself publicly called all warring parties equally guilty of the war and of human rights violations (HRVS), despite the numerous facts to the contrary.³²

When Owen characterizes Gligorov as an inflexible politician, he clearly overlooks the fact that the latter may have been justifiably angry at Greece's cold reaction to Macedonia's major constitutional amendments in 1992. After all, these amendments represented significant concessions to Greece's demands, and indicated understanding of Greece's concerns.

The United States played a far more crucial role in conflict prevention by calling for a small 'trip wire' force in Macedonia to deter any territorial aggression from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or any other country.

Encouraged by the US' suggestion, Gligorov requested the UN Security Council for such a force in late 1992. Subsequently, a mission from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), established in March 1992 to keep the peace in three UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, visited Macedonia from 28 November to early December 1992. Its positive report was accepted by the Security Council, and in December the latter adopted UN Resolution 795, authorizing the deployment of a preventative peacekeeping force to monitor Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Republic of Yugoslavia.

The first deployment on 6 January 1993 consisted of just 147 Canadian soldiers, but they were relieved on 2 March by a battalion of nearly 700 troops from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. More importantly, this United Nations Protection Force Macedonia Command (UNPROFOR M) was beefed up in July by 300 US troops, after the UNSC approved this reinforcement on 18 June 1993. Such a 1,000-strong force with US participation (see Table 1.3)

was just big and credible enough to make Milosevic think twice before embarking on any adventure in Macedonia.

By that time, Gligorov had already succeeded in September 1991 to convince the government in Belgrade and the top brass in the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA or JNA) to withdraw its forces from the newly independent republic. Full-scale withdrawal started in February 1992, and Gligorov agreed with acting Yugoslav Defense minister Colonel General Blagoje Adzic to complete JNA's departure by 15 April 1992.³³ Milosevic agreed to this probably because:

- * the Serb minority, like in Slovenia, was negligible and thus not worth fighting over;
- * the JNA needed as many of its assets as possible to keep a watch on its main enemy, Croat President Franjo Tudjman;
- * the JNA thus needed all its manpower and material still in Macedonia, also for possible use in Bosnia and especially Kosovo, where the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova declared in 1991 the "Albanian Republic of Kosova", installed an underground government, and led a peaceful resistance against Belgrade's rule since then.

Consequently, the JNA left almost nothing behind, accounting for the lack of heavy weaponry possessed by the tiny Macedonian Army. According to Perry, "Milosevic evidently expected to return after events elsewhere calmed down"³⁴, but the US-led deployment of UNPROFOR M put any such designs on hold.

Macedonia's president and government succeeded in maintaining their country's security - it proved to be surprisingly robust - during the first year of independence, despite the external conflict with Greece which prevented the international recognition of the fragile, landlocked republic. Crucial preventative moves by the US and the UN helped to strengthen Macedonia's security, at least for the time being. To the amazement of many ordinary Macedonians, the 'Four Wolves' (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania) had refrained from devouring parts of their country and unleashing a Balkan war.

1.1.3 The demand for equal status and education by Macedonia's Albanians: the essence of interethnic tensions since 1991

Since Macedonia's independence, ethnic Albanians felt themselves to be second-class citizens. They wanted to be characterized as a constituent people in the new Constitution, i.e. to have the same constitutional nation status as the ethnic Macedonians. But the latter regarded especially Article 48 of the constitution, which ensured "the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the nationalities", as a sufficient guarantee for equal civil rights.³⁵

However, the term "nationality" was another word for "minority" - and the Albanians did not want to regard themselves as a minority: the preamble of the Macedonian constitution indeed stated that all ethnic groups had "full equality as citizens", but called all groups minorities except the ethnic Macedonians.³⁶ This distinction seemed reasonable, as the ethnic Albanians were a minority in quantitative terms, even if they happen to make up 40 percent of the population.

The Albanians were upset by their designation as a minority group in the 1991 Constitution, because they had equal nation status in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, which included the recognition of Albanian as a state language. The loss of equal language status was their biggest grievance, as minority rights did not include the use of one's own language on all levels in society up to the highest state institutions (cabinet, parliament, etc.). They thus felt that their position had deteriorated after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Since September 1991, the Albanians claimed their right for primary, secondary, and university education in their mother tongue (which they apparently lacked in Yugoslavia despite the 1974 constitution!). At first, the Macedonian authorities refused to provide or allow (legalize) facilities and instructors for education in the Albanian language, dismissing Albanian teachers in mid-1992 for teaching Albanian in secondary schools. Why did the authorities refuse to allow education in the Albanian language? And why did the ethnic Macedonian parties, in the cabinet as well as in the opposition, have such a conservative attitude, wishing to preserve the *status quo* of the 1991 constitution? If not conservatives, they showed themselves at least to be reluctant reformists on the sensitive issues of constitutional status and education in the language of the 'minorities'. The following motivations may have shaped government policy since 1992.

First, Gligorov's Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDAM) and other mainly ethnic Macedonian parties had to contend with the sentiments in their own cadres and constituencies. Since the declaration of the Albanian Illyrida Republic in the beginning of 1992, and "the appearance of extremist Albanians concentrated near the Albanian border" who "from mid-1992, engaged in small-scale disruptive activity"(Xhudo)³⁷, Macedonians feared that separate education in the Albanian language would play in the hands of separatists. They also distrusted suggestions by Albanian leaders of autonomous provinces for the Macedonian and Albanian ethnicities, convinced that such a 'federalization' together with separate language education would lead to a de facto secession, even to a 'Greater Albania'.

Second, the Macedonian authorities could hardly fulfill immediately or fully all Albanian demands for separate education, proportional representation in state institutions (including the army), and the like. The authorities asked for patience, as legalization of schools and universities in the Albanian language would take time. After 1992, the government actually provided for more Albanian-language primary and secondary education. But Albanians, continuously unsatisfied, complained that there were yet no university courses available in their language.

Third, ethnic Macedonian politicians pointed to practical difficulties if specific demands, such as the right to speak Albanian in the parliament, were met. Would it be practical if Albanian parliamentarians would speak in their own language to colleagues who would stick to theirs? Probably, the ethnic Macedonians feared bureaucratic chaos if different languages were spoken in the main institutions, the ministries, and other government bodies.

Fourth, The ethnic Macedonian politicians may wish to maintain their Slavic mother tongue as the main elite language in those government bodies, in order to keep the state unified. This may explain their continuing reluctance to allow and legalize universities with an Albanian curriculum. This may be the political motive behind the legalistic argument put forward much later by the new Minister of Education Emilija Simovska and the Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, in April 1995 after the so-called "Tetovo crisis" (see section 1.2.1): the state could not accept unilateral moves by ethnic groups to establish their own universities prior to due legalization; "if you lose procedure, you lose everything"(Frckovski).³⁸ Simovska made some other remarks which exposed this motive:

"She noted that because pre-university schooling provides for instruction in one's native language, the only point of intersection educationally between ethnic groups is at the

university level. ... In effect she was addressing the majority fear that if an Albanian-language university were allowed to exist, it would be the harbinger of a fractured, and potentially broken, state"(Perry).³⁹

The fall of the first post-Yugoslav government under Kijusev in September 1992 due to its failure to gain international recognition was a major step in gaining the trust of the Albanians: the new four-party government with SDAM-chairman Branko Crvenkovski as Prime Minister included the radical PDP, giving the latter five ministerial posts. The other partners were the Liberal Party (formerly SRSM & MDPS) and the small Socialist Party. Moreover, 26-year old IMRO-leader Georgievski was ditched from the vice-presidency, an influential post next to Gligorov which he occupied since the 1990 elections.

This political development was soon offset by riots in and around the Bit Pazar market in Skopje on 6 November 1992. Around 3,000 Albanians, many black-marketeers, vandalized shops and vehicles, angry about the teacher dismissals in mid-1992 and about false rumors of a killing by the Macedonian police of a 15-year old Albanian boy selling cigarettes.

This first major outbreak of political violence cost the lives of four people by police bullets, and caused 30 injuries. According the Ministry of Internal Affairs, five out of the 38 rioters arrested by the police were provocateurs of the Serbian secret service KOS. Such official pronouncements referring to an external enemy must be interpreted very carefully, as they may well be attempts to mislead the public by using a foreign scapegoat.

Whatever the immediate cause of the riots, the damage was done: Sami Ibrahim, vice-chairman of the PDP, warned on the funeral of the demonstrators killed at Bit Pazar, that the autonomous 'Illyrida Republic' would secede from Macedonia if their grievances were ignored and their demands not met. SDAM-chairman Vladimir Milcin warned on his turn that the coalition with the PDP was very brittle, because "demagogues with provincialistic ambitions", particularly hawks like Ibrahim in the Albanian leadership, were endangering the strategic alliance.⁴⁰

Interethnic tensions had escalated to a dangerous level by the end of 1992, and the moderates within the government were in trouble, pressured by extremists inside and outside their parties to take a hard stance. The Macedonian body politic had clearly arrived at the brink of a political conflict situation. It may even have crossed into this third stage of conflict (see Table I), if we regard the Bit Pazar riots as an occurrence of political violence, and if we regard the Albanian anger against the government as a breakdown of state legitimacy and a reversal to factional politics along ethnic lines.

1.2 Tension and conflict in and on Macedonia, 1993 - May 1995:

moderate constraintment of violent incidents

1.2.1 A battle for hearts and minds: realignments among moderates and extremists

During 1993, the PDP led by Halili, and the more radical, almost revolutionary NDP led by Halimi, managed to maintain an alliance given their common demands for equal constitutional status and education. But within the PDP a growing split emerged between radicals and near-revolutionaries, particularly between the PDP representatives led by deputy president of parliament Arben Xhateri, and the even more radical members of the party headquarters in the north-western city of Tetovo

(also the base for the NDP and other Albanian parties) led by Menduh Thaci, the then 28-year old Tetovo branch president.

The Albanian government, consisting of the anti-communist Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) and led by Albanian President Sali Berisha (also leader of DPA), actively supported the Thaci faction. Albania wanted to pressure the Macedonian government to concede to the demands of the Albanian community, and allegedly to increase its influence in this community in order to ensure its leadership role if a Greater Albania would ever be 'necessary' in the future. The Macedonian government perceived a Tetovo-Tirana-Pristina triangle emerging as a possible basis for a Greater Albania, as Thaci had strong links with the LDK and other movements in Kosovo as well.

Such fears may have spurred the Macedonian authorities to drastic action. In early November 1993, they arrested ten ethnic Albanians for illegal arms trading; plans for establishing a paramilitary force called the "All Albanian Army"; and worst of all, staging an armed rebellion to realize an independent Illyrida Republic. Shock waves went through the body politic when it became clear that Deputy Minister of Defense Hussein Huskaj and PDP's secretary-general Midhat Emini were among the arrested. According Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, the Albanian paramilitary force received DM600 000 from the Albanian diaspora and was in an advanced stage, indicated by the police seizure of 300 semi-automatic rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and a list of around 21,000 recruits. Prime Minister Branco Crvenkovski added that the weapons were made in Albania and smuggled across the border.

The charges against the arrested Albanians seem preposterous and made up to weaken the biggest and most moderate Albanian party - though it seems illogical to portray moderate Albanian politicians as extremists, as this would play in the hands of the real Albanian extremists. However, there are some direct and indirect indications that the government charge of "conspiracy to form military formations" against eventually ten ethnic Albanians may have been true after all:

First, since the trade sanctions by Greece in late 1991 and the UN trade embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 30 May 1992 (UNSC Resolution), Macedonia became highly dependent on Albanian smugglers in western Macedonia linked to the Albanian Mafia (dominated by Kosovar Albanians), in order to survive economically. For this reason, the Macedonian authorities were reluctant to act against the emerging 'Balkan Medellin', "made up of a number of geographically connected border towns, namely Veliki Trnovac and Blastica in Serbia, Vratnica in Macedonia, and Gostivar in Albania"(Milivojevic).⁴¹ Naturally, Serbia left the Albanian Mafia alone in order to ensure continued sanction-breaking, and Albania tolerated the smuggling for economic and political reasons. According to Milivojevic, the NDP ("close to becoming a terrorist organization") and even the PDP received laundered foreign exchange (forex) profits from the Albanian Mafia (also used for bribing corrupt government officials); set up paramilitary units; and had contacts with Albania's SHIK secret police.⁴² Therefore, these criminal channels could easily be used for the smuggling of arms for a political uprising. So the government claims in November 1993 were convincing, though the politicization of the Mafia connection may still have been a trumped up charge.

Second, the independent media supported the government's claim of a planned Albanian revolution, though they tended since independence toward self-censorship, fearing that "excessive criticism of the government might endanger the country's stability"(Geroski).⁴³

The independent Albanian press tended to support the claims by right-wing extremists at PDP's emergency meeting in December 1993 that the Macedonian authorities had fabricated the charges

against the arrested Albanians in order to delegitimize the party and justify a crackdown. No wonder why Geroski laments in his 1995 article that "no one appears to be concerned about the growing division and "ghettoization" of Macedonia. Macedonian media address [ethnic] Macedonian readers, viewers, and listeners, and the Albanian media address their ethnic audience."⁴⁴

Nevertheless, the government's claim appears to have been correct, as the daily Vecer reported the statements of the accused to the investigating judge, (apparently) admitting that they organized the paramilitary force and planned the uprising. Court rules prohibited such a publication of statements prior to their acceptance as evidence, but Vecer's revelations were alarming. The accused may have been pressured by intimidation and/or torture to admit their guilt, but the available sources do not give any indication of this possibility.⁴⁵

Thus we may conclude with some caution that some Albanians including two cabinet ministers really prepared an armed revolt - unbelievable as it may seem, as Haskaj and Emini appeared to represent the moderate faction within the PDP together with most of the PDP's 17 members of parliament. Milivojevic supplies an extra argument for our adoption of the government version of events: "Given the immense political implications of these arrests and the trial that followed on from them in 1994, Frckovski could only have acted in the way he did for the most compelling of reasons."⁴⁶

Third, despite some distrust of the government's claims at the December '93 party meeting, most moderate PDP-members appeared to accept these claims. There were no massive rallies by the PDP with other Albanian parties demanding the release of the ten Albanians; the remaining three PDP-ministers remained in the cabinet; and there was no permanent walk-out by the PDP-deputies. But the temporary walk-out was a frequently used tactic by the PDP to increase pressure on the government to concede to its long-standing demands, and was also used in this case. The moderates were even able to resist pressure abroad to leave the government:

"After helping precipitate a split in late 1993 [within the PDP] ... , the Albanian government, its media, and its diplomats in Skopje sought openly to undermine the "traitor" Albanians who participated in Macedonia's governing coalition"(Mickey).⁴⁷

True, Nevzat Halili, his deputy Sami Ibrahim (the one with the harsh criticism on the November '92 riots), and their supporters were blamed for the PDP's weak response to the November '93 arrests, and were ousted from the leadership by ultra-nationalists led by Xhateri and Thaci - who laid aside their rivalry and joined forces - at the party conference of January 1994. Ironically, the final push at the conference was given by the moderate majority, who suspected Halili of willingness to concede to the ultra-nationalist demands.⁴⁸ The radical Abdurrahman Aliti became the new leader, and Halili decided to found and lead a new party with its headquarters near Tetovo, called the Party for People's Union (PPU).

However, the new-found alliance between Thaci and Xhateri failed to use Aliti as their puppet; the latter refused their demands, such as a permanent walk-out from government and parliament. Thaci and Xhateri split away from the mainstream PDP and founded on 22 April 1994 their own party, alternately called the National Party for Democracy (NPD, not to be confused with the NDP) and the Party of Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDPA).

The latter name quickly became their preferred one, as they presented themselves as the legitimate version of PDP, fighting for the ownership of this name in the courts. They eventually failed, and

had to run as independents during the October 1994 elections. But the Thaci-Xhateri faction continued to call themselves the PDPA.

The split within the PDP was a dangerous development as the PDPA-faction could form a wider alliance with the NDP and other extremist groups. For some reason, it never came to such an alliance in the form of an electoral coalition during the 1994 elections. Probably, NDP-leader Halimi was too extreme even for the Thaci-Xhateri duo. One must keep these gradations in extremism (and moderatism) in mind.

The reformists and radicals within the PDP led by Aliti were able to maintain a precarious internal alliance, and were thus able to continue the alliance with Crvenkovski's and Gligorov's SDAM - despite the polarization and escalation of ethnic tensions due to the November '93 arrests and the violence by Macedonian border guards against illegal Albanians from neighboring countries.

The PDP was forced, however, by popular clamor and pressure from NDP and PDPA, to radicalize its stance and policies vis-à-vis its coalition partner. Otherwise, the PDP would have lost all its credibility and legitimacy in the Albanian population.

De-escalation, at least on the short term, was achieved by the short prison sentences for Haskaj [Huskaj] and the others [when?]; the extraordinary census during late June and early July 1994; and the parliamentary and presidential elections of 16 and 30 October 1994. Moreover, pressure by the United States and other countries on Albanian president Berisha convinced the latter to halt his disruptive interference policy in Macedonian affairs, and to state his support for the Albanian participants in the Macedonian government during a summit with Gligorov in May 1994.

The extraordinary census was a major and rare success of the international community as mediator in Macedonia's internal conflict. It helped to solve at least one element of the fundamental conflict on status and education between the ethnic Albanians and the ethnic Macedonians: the hot debate on the size of the Albanian community in Macedonia. The European Union, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE (now OSCE) called for a new census, whereby the former gave financial assistance of 3-4 million ECU, the latter two oversaw the monitoring, and all offered advice. The Macedonian authorities agreed. According to Perry (using the Skopje Government Statistical Office as a source), the results were as follows (compare with the figures in Table 1.2):

". . . of the republic's 1,936,877 citizens, there are 1,288,330 ethnic Macedonians (66.5 percent); 442,914 Albanians (22.9 percent); 77,252 Turks (4 percent); 43,732 Roma (2.3 percent); 39,260 Serbs (2 percent); 15, 315 Torbeshi (0.07 percent); and 8,467 Vlachs (0.004 percent). The remainder are Croats, Bosnians, Bulgarians, and others (0.022 percent). The total population, including foreigners, is 2,075,196."⁴⁹

Albanian leaders complained that the final results (announced in November, but leaked prior to the elections) were biased or even illegitimate, claiming that the Albanians comprised around 33% instead of the official 22.55% (see Table 1.2). But most of them had exhorted their constituencies to participate, and most of the Albanians did. The PDP and the more moderate Albanian civic movements had agreed to participate mainly because of the international monitoring, which was absent in the 1991 census. And they reluctantly accepted the census' outcomes, though still believing their population size to be higher. The 1994 census further isolated the Albanian near-extremists and extremists, because they in particular claimed the extravagant number of 40% Albanians living in Macedonia. Thus the matter was not put completely to rest on the domestic scene, though it was eagerly put to rest on the international scene by the CE- and OSCE-observers.

The near-extremists and extremists on the ethnic Macedonian side isolated themselves by withdrawing from the elections, a futile and self-defeating gesture. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPNME), led by IMRO-leader Georgievski, made the capital blunder of boycotting the second-round elections on 30 October. He unconvincingly claimed fraud and called for new elections, but actually behaved as a bad loser after the disappointing first-round results on 16 October.

The radical Democratic Party (DP) led by the charismatic Petar Gosev followed suit. The DP got unexpectedly low first-round results, despite its economic policy program against corruption and for stabilization, and despite its previous rise in the opinion polls. Gligorov's Alliance for Macedonia, an electoral coalition of his SDAM, the LP, and the SP, unexpectedly won the first round (turnout was 78 percent).⁵⁰

The DP and VMRO-DPNME failed to form an electoral alliance to counter Gligorov's, accounting for their poor results. The DP was closer to the moderate mainstream than VMRO-DPNME, and the latter had to deal with an internal revolt against its authoritarian party rules. Moreover, the Alliance for Macedonia had at its leader a relatively popular President who still retained high legitimacy, unlike the government.

To increase pressure for new elections, VMRO-DPNME, DP, and some small parties set up alternative polling sites. The 150 CSCE- and CE-monitors assured that the elections were on the whole fair, though two members of the Macedonian election commission resigned and the presidential elections should have been held later according the Constitution. The opposition parties claimed to have gathered more than 400,000 protest votes. But their 'alternative elections failed as well, because "many in the local branches of VMRO-DPNME, especially the ethnic Macedonians who live in predominantly Albanian communities in western Macedonia, protested the boycott because they feared that Albanian candidates would sweep the field in their areas"(Mickey).⁵¹

Not surprisingly, the Alliance for Macedonia won by a landslide in the second round, collecting 95 of the 120 parliamentary seats. The PDP won 10 seats, the NDP 4 seats, and the PDPA-independents 4 seats as well (see Table 1.1B).

However, the IMRO-led boycott caused the turnout in the second round to be much lower: 57.5 percent. And Gligorov was reelected with a meagre 52.4 percent, showing a still high but gradually decreasing popularity.

Despite its loss to mainly the PDPA, the PDP managed to survive the controversy within the Albanian community of its government participation. Crvenkovski - whose SDAM was again the largest party with 58 seats - again became prime minister, and rewarded the PDP for its stubborn loyalty and moderatism by giving it four cabinet posts, the same number as for the much bigger LP (this contributed to future tensions within the cabinet between the LP and its coalition partners).

The VMRO-DPNME and its allies were not represented in parliament, by their own fault. The ultra-radicals (near-extremists) and extremists among the ethnic Macedonians - on the education issue they could be called ultra-conservatives (near-reactionaries) and reactionaries - were thus put on the sidelines for the next four years. On the other hand, this increased the temptation within these forces to adopt extra-parliamentary, violent methods. In spite of angry outbursts by politicians like VMRO-DPNME deputy chairwoman Dosta Dimovska, calling the parliament "illegal" in a 1995 interview, they kept this temptation in check - at least for the time being.⁵²

On the longer term, a frustrated VMRO-DPNME could form closer ties for subversive purposes with its Bulgarian counterpart, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Union of Macedonian Societies (VMRO-SMD) led by Vance Mikhaylov.

Luckily, these IMRO-dominated alliances were and continued to be barred from government in both countries. Numerous extremists within these political movements wished for the re-establishment of the short-lived 'Greater Bulgaria' (ended by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878) and/or of the 'Greater Macedonia' envisaged by IMRO-nationalists in the 19th century, both covering roughly the same huge area with a port to the Aegean Sea (preferably Thessaloniki).

The VMRO-DPNME indeed appears to exhibit 'pro-Bulgarian' tendencies, and the most extreme politicians within both the Macedonian and Bulgarian IMRO-branches appear to have common pan-Slavic interests. But if each branch would claim the sole leadership role - such as nationalistic Macedonians declaring that the Bulgarians are 'Pirin-Macedonians' (a reference to the river valley regarded as part of Greater Macedonia) - then their irredentist projects could easily collide.⁵³

The period of calm since mid-1994 did not last, however. The new Crvenkoski government had to face a new challenge, possibly even more serious than the one in November 1993, because it concerned the basic issue enflaming even the moderate Albanians: education.

Despite promises by the Macedonian Pedagogical Institute for state teachers to offer instruction in Albanian, such courses were still not available by December 1994. Consequently, Albanians took matters in their own hands in Tetovo - a place where interethnic tensions run always high, as shown by the killing of a Macedonian gang member by an Albanian gang on 18 June 1994.

They planned to establish their own university in their own language without waiting for government approval, instantly winning praise from Albanians inside and outside Macedonia, notably from Albanian president Berisha.

Angered by Berisha's interference and Tetovo's unilateral action, the government lost its head and bulldozed down a building earmarked for the new Albanian university in early December. The tensions, already near the boiling point, increased even further after the arrest on 23 December of 29 members of the 1989 parliament in Kosovo (Kosova called by Albanians) who had fled to Macedonia after Milosevic's crackdown.⁵⁴

The arrests were somewhat understandable, as these radical Kosova Albanians were the main pushers for the 'illegal' university, heightening suspicions that they were using the education issue for their own agenda (ties were suspected with Muslim organizations like Islam Vakuf based in Saudi Arabia). Indeed, the 'rector' of the Albanian university distributed the application forms for the entrance examinations on 18 December, as if the bulldozing of the university building had not happened. His name was Fadilj Sulejmani, an ethnographer born in Macedonia and educated in Kosovo. He fled in 1991 from the latter to the former. He also headed the Forum for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms. And this person hardly acted as a moderate at the opening ceremony on 15 February 1995, when he warned the police that as many as 200,000 armed Albanians (also from Kosova?) would support him if necessary: "there is no force that can stop us".⁵⁵

During 16 and 17 February 1995, riots erupted after around 200 Albanians tried to force their way through police cordons in front of the alternative university building, the faculty of science and mathematics in the village Gorna Recica near Tetovo, also the place of Sulejmani's office. According to witnesses the police fired back after stones were thrown at them, after which the surrounding crowd of more than 1,500 people (some of them curious bystanders) became angry and pitched battles with the police occurred. When the riots died down, it became clear that a 33 year-old Albanian, Abdyl Selam Emini, had died, and around 60 people, including at least 9 policemen, had been injured.

The former leaders of the PDP and current leaders of the PPU, Halili and Ibrahim (who appeared to be a decent radical after all), calmed an angry crowd of 10,000 people demanding the release of

Sulejmani on 19 February in front of the police headquarters after attending Emini's funeral. They were able to prevent further violence, despite the fact that the police had raided and vandalized the offices of the Democratic Forum of Gostivar on 17 February, and that unknown people had vandalized an Albanian cemetery in Kumanovo. And the Macedonian authorities exhibited either ungratefulness or an inability to check the excessive behavior of the police, when Halili and Ibrahim were arrested on 22 February.

Gligorov at least called for calm on 21 February, when he met OSCE-Commissioner on Minorities Max van der Stoep who had hastily travelled to Skopje to mediate in the conflict. The special UN representative Hugo Anson likewise presented himself as a mediator for at least settling the conflict, quieting the emotions down. Nevertheless, the police continued to act provocatively, which only increased the determination of the ethnic Albanians to continue their protests. For instance, around 1,000 people in Tetovo honored Emini one week after his funeral, and the Albanian university opened under Dr. Murtezan Ismaili as interim-director.

Albanian deputies boycotted the Macedonian parliament after Sulejmani and his supporters were convicted of at least 30-day prison terms (Sulejmani was sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment), but the PDP-deputies already returned after two weeks [contr.p.{40}]. The PDP was in an uncomfortable position in the cabinet, but Sulejmani's imprisonment (he was out on bond by mid-1995) did not lead to massive protests or riots. Interior minister Frckovski explained in April 1995 why: with the imprisonment of "unpredictables, ... there is a great relaxation, first, among Albanians - political leaders in general and among us - because some unpredictable guys are out of the game".⁵⁶

Particularly the reformists and the radicals in the PDP and PPU were relieved by Sulejmani's marginalization. After the crisis died down, more positive steps were taken: for instance, the Tetovo riots finally convinced the staff of the Macedonian Pedagogical Institute to obey the orders of the Ministry of Education and provide instruction in Albanian. We agree with Van Moyland that "The post-November 1994 domestic political environment has substantially altered, the sting having been removed from extremists on both Albanian and Macedonian sides"(our emphasis).⁵⁷

The successful de-escalation of the Tetovo crisis did not resolve the essence of the problem of ethnic education, but it ensured the continued isolation of the extremists. Consequently, attacks by Xhaferi and Thaci against the PDP-leader Aliti - who after his accession in early '94 changed his tune from radical to reformist- for his rejection of any type of separatism failed to move the average Albanian citizen. Xhatefi's warning of violence in April 1995, and his claim that "Slavs want to dominate non-Slavs", were ignored. And Thaci's call for "space" for Albanians (suggesting at the very least segregation and territorial autonomy) remained impotent.

Even Xhaferi's attempts to form a broad PDPA-VMRO-PDMNE alliance to unseat the incumbent government backfired: by mid-1995, Georgievski had initiated contacts with the local branches of the PDP in Skopje, Gostivar, and Tetovo in order to ease interethnic tensions. The Tetovo crisis, and its shown potential for full-scale political violence, obviously scared the ethnic Macedonian opposition parties into moderating their policies.

1.2.2 Embargo's and incursions: escalation of external conflicts with Greece and other neighboring countries between 1993 and May 1995

After winning the 1993 elections on a platform of virulent nationalism, accusing Mitsotakis' government of a 'soft' policy on the "Macedonian question", Papandreou again became prime

minister, and his PASOK again were to dominate Greece's political landscape. The consequences were soon to be felt, most of all in Macedonia.

On 16 February 1994, the new government decided to block the transfer of goods from Thessaloniki toward Macedonia, and to close all border posts with the landlocked republic, in order to force Gligorov to finally give in on Greece's three basic demands. Unlike the previous sanctions, this was a full blockade.

This draconian measure was not only the result of PASOK's radicalism, but also a reaction to the recent decision by the UN to recognize Macedonia under the official name of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)". The other EU member states and the non-European permanent members of the UNSC considered this name a sufficient compromise and concession to Greece. But this deal was made with the previous Greek government, and failed to take into account the widespread alarm in Greece that the name of FYROM engendered: it still included the dreaded word 'Macedonia'. Papandreou wanted to prevent the legitimization of Skopje at all costs, because this would make it harder to bring pressure to bear on Gligorov.

In February, Papandreou raged in public against Germany, France, UK, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, the US, and Russia for having recognized "the republic of Skopje" under the name of FYROM. These recognitions 'forced' him to use the blunt weapon of the blockade, in order to retain any leverage against Skopje.

The other EU member states had lost their patience with Greece by then. They had repeatedly delayed recognition of Macedonia despite the go-ahead from the Badinter Commission, and had to listen repeatedly to Greece's extravagant demands and oversensitive concerns over the last few years. Moreover, the new Greek Deputy Prime[Foreign] Minister on European Affairs Theodoros Pangalos had promised on 21 December 1993 that the Greek EU Presidency, starting on 1 January 1994, would not put Macedonia (nor Bosnia) as a major issue on the political agenda. And Athens' failure to inform the EU in time on its latest and most drastic trade embargo, as required by EC law, was the last straw.⁵⁸

EU's other 11 foreign ministers condemned Greece's action at their Council meeting in the Greek city of Ioannina on 27 March 1994. And the European Commission brought the case before the European Court claiming violation of Article 224 (EEC Treaty), after Greece ignored its ultimatum to lift the blockade by April 13th. But the Court ruled at the end of June 1994 that the Commission, not the Greek government, had to prove that Greece's security was not threatened at all (according to EEC Article 169, one could only decide unilaterally on drastic sanctions if one's national security was at stake). In the end, the Commission was unable to come up with sufficient evidence, and the solicitor-general Jacobs advised in early April 1995 to drop the whole case, arguing that the Court had no authority (the Court finally decided to reject the Commission's case due to lack of evidence).

A frustrated EU could do little to stop Greece's unilateral blockade against Macedonia, and was too angry with one of the parties to act as a neutral mediator between them in order to resolve or at least settle their conflict. Attempts at conflict resolution by any outside actor were bound to fail anyway, as the conflict had escalated too much for any negotiations to be feasible on the short term. UN mediator on Macedonia Cyrus Vance (Thorvald Stoltenberg took over his job as UN mediator on former Yugoslavia on 3 May 1993) quickly ran up against a wall, the parties unwilling to make any compromises at any negotiating table. For instance, Vance's three-name proposal, by which Greece, Macedonia, and the UN-bodies would each use a different name - respectively "Republic of Skopje", "Republic of Macedonia", and "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" - failed to bring the parties closer together.

The stubbornness on Macedonia's side was understandable: it lost between \$40 and \$60 million in exports per month by the Greek trade blockade since its establishment in the beginning of 1994. The impact on its economy was limited (as shown by the economic figures in Table 1.3) because it was already experienced in responding flexibly to Greece's punitive measures, in smuggling and other ways of UN sanctions-breaking in connivance with rump-Yugoslavia. Otherwise, Macedonia's economy would have completely collapsed even prior to the Greek blockade, with dire consequences for internal stability. However, the blockade increased the hardship among ordinary citizens in Macedonia, and industrial production fell by 8 percent in 1994 probably because of this blockade (see Table 1.3).⁵⁹

The Macedonian government was less and less willing to concede on any of Greece's demands, certainly not on its name. Gligorov and Crvenkovski repeatedly demanded the lifting of the embargo prior to any talks on the basic issues of name, constitution, and flag.

Surprisingly, the first attempt at rapprochement was made by Greece in early April 1995 in New York under the auspices of Cyrus Vance. But the Macedonian representatives withdrew at the last moment, citing their government's insistence on the lifting of the blockade prior to any talks. Nevertheless, the first serious attempt at conflict resolution for more than one-and-a-half years was encouraging.

Papandreou's softening of his position was mainly caused by the ineffectiveness of his confrontational policy. The former junior minister on European Affairs Pangalos, who led a growing group of Greek politicians calling for the blockade's abolition, pointed out that Macedonia was able to endure the blockade indefinitely, while Greece was unable to end its isolation within the European Union.

By early May 1995, the idea of the "small package" was debated in New York, Skopje and Athens. This package contained the following deal: Greece would lift its blockade, in return for Macedonia's removal of the Vergina star from its flag, and in return for the latter's addition of extra assurances in its constitution against any future claims on Greek Macedonia. Negotiations on "the big package" encompassing the most contentious issue, the state name, were delayed indefinitely.

The small package thus consisted of a curious but promising mix of conflict settlement (lifting of the blockade would de-escalate the conflict) and conflict resolution (two of the main issues would be resolved). Viewed from this perspective, Greece could rightfully claim that Macedonia would make the biggest concessions. Negotiations on the small package were to be long and arduous. But the vital first step toward accommodation of both parties' interests was made - which indicated that both sides were gradually regarding their goals as less incompatible than previously thought.

Apart from attempts by Bulgaria and especially Albania to influence Macedonia's domestic politics (see section 1.2.1), Macedonia had to deal with aggressive incursions by Serbia on its territory during mid-1994.⁶⁰ Despite Gligorov's smart policy of 'equidistance' - i.e. maintaining an equal distance to all neighboring countries without preferring one as an ally above the others, thereby allaying any suspicions from the others - and despite his friendly relations with individual politicians in Belgrade due to his communist past, Milosevic still refused to recognize Macedonia. Belgrade wanted, among other things, to maintain good relations with Athens, and still regarded Macedonia as an "artificial nation".⁶¹ Its withdrawal from Macedonia during 1991-1992 was primarily based on opportunistic motives, and not on a fundamental acceptance of Macedonia's independence (see section 1.1.2).

Milosevic finally decided to test the waters, and see how determined UNPROFOR M really was to act as a 'trip-wire' force. From April 1994 onwards, the new Yugoslav Army (YA) stealthily

occupied little pieces of Macedonian land just at the border, a meadow here, a piece of road there. This incremental, gradual strategy made it very difficult for the UNPROFOR M Command, or for the UNSC in New York, to say: "until here, and no further!" Milosevic exploited the Western reluctance to intervene militarily - unless a massive, large-scale invasion by the YA [or JA, Jugoslavi Armija] in Macedonia would oblige them to do so. Moreover, Belgrade's small-scale aggression was facilitated by alleged calls for unification with Serbia within some northern villages in Macedonia dominated by ethnic Serbs, who claimed that around 250,000 of them lived in Macedonia (compare with official figures in Table 1.2).

In this way, the JA was even able to gobble up villages like Slavuzevac. Having received no credible threats of force from the international community, an emboldened JA issued an ultimatum on 24 May to the Macedonian border guards near the village of Gasince, and to the Norwegian blue helmets at UN compound U-40, to withdraw within two weeks from 'Serbian territory'. Attempts by the Norwegian commander of UNPROFOR M Tryggve Teleffsen in early May to stop these incursions in talks with the commander of JA's southern corps in Nis had evidently failed to impress Belgrade.

On 21 June 1994, just when the counting started for the new census, Macedonian Defense Minister Vlado Popovski protested against the latest Serbian incursion, the occupation of the hill Cupino Brdo (a culmination of the provocative moves around it since late May), and warned that it would be taken back very soon. Popovski expressed the Macedonian government's alarm and exasperation with Teleffsen's feeble policy of diplomacy without the threat of force. The 1,100-strong UN force was strong enough to deal with the provocations of small groups of Serbian reservists; it did not have to deal with heavily armed crack troops. Indeed, it was the tiny and ill-equipped Macedonian army that, on Popovski's orders, threatened to shoot some 15 Serbian soldiers from Cupino Brdo in the beginning of July 1994, and succeeded in scaring them away. It was this credible threat that worked, rather than the diplomatic efforts by UN commander Teleffsen, even though the latter's talks with YA chief Momcilo Persic were soon followed by YA's withdrawal of around 500-600 m from its positions on 2 July.

We know nothing about any behind-the-scenes pressure by the United States, but Milosevic was evidently more discouraged from further aggression by Popovski's attitude than by Teleffsen's. Milosevic wanted only to test the waters, to assess the reactions from the UN and neighboring countries, not to undertake a costly invasion against a small but determined Macedonian army.

This episode showed that the JA would be able to overrun Macedonia on a massive scale, if it would be economically and militarily stronger without the UN sanctions in place. If such an invasion is swift and if it takes the international community by surprise, the response by the UN and the US would be too slow, and thus too little and too late, given their reluctance to use force.

Belgrade may keep the option open for such an invasion on the longer term, beyond 1997 (see some of the scenario's in chapter 3), as it expects no strong objections from Sofia (capital of Bulgaria) and Athens. Indeed, in early 1994, Serbia even suggested a confederation between Belgrade, Skopje, and Athens, which would mean a de facto integration of Macedonia into the Republic of Yugoslavia. Milosevic already proposed a division of Macedonia between Serbia and Greece back in 1991. Perry remarks in an August '95 article that

"At present, the idea of carving up Macedonia among neighboring states seems to have little appeal. Only Serbia is a possible aggressor, though the Serbian press periodically mentions the possibility of a Greek-Serbian partition".⁶²

Milosevic may appear to be a pragmatic if opportunistic politician, but he has always shown to be an expansionist and irredentist if he gets the chance. On the other hand, such aggressive plans may be put on the backburner, if Milosevic would get more advantages from recognizing Macedonia's independence in stead of destroying it - such as international recognition of rump-Yugoslavia and the complete lifting of the UN trade embargo (which paradoxically makes future aggression possible, if Russia would veto in the UNSC new sanctions against Belgrade).

In any case, Serbia continued its more subtle involvement in Macedonian domestic affairs, developing ties with the Serb and Montegrin minorities in Macedonia for future manipulation, exploitation, and mobilization. For instance, in April 1995, representatives of those Serb and Montenegrin communities held talks in Belgrade with government officials, complaining of their minority status in the present Macedonian constitution.

Chapter 2. Tension and Conflict in and on Macedonia since June 1995

2.1 Tension and Conflict in and on Macedonia, June - December 1995: sudden disruption of its domestic peace, improvement of its international position

2.1.1 Internal developments

On 30 May 1995, Sulejmani, the rector of the unrecognized Albanian university in Tetovo, was released on bail. Accompanied by Milaim Fejziu, the (new) chairman of the Forum for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, he said that plans to set up and develop the university would continue (he was allowed to open the new academic year on 16 October). This time, his language was much more moderate:

". . . we need to strengthen cooperation between us, including an accord with the Macedonian democratic forces. We should spread the word that Tetovo university has no political goals, but aims at educating our children and youth."⁶³

Apparently, he wanted to allay the fears of Albanian separatism among the ethnic Macedonians. PPU-leader Halili, who was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment despite his moderate role during the unrest of 17 February, was likewise released on bail. Halili also refrained from angry or provocative statements. Thus their release did not lead to an immediate re-escalation of interethnic tensions. Indeed, Halimi's moderate pronouncements at the congress of his NDP, which started in Tetovo on 27th May, was another indication of the general calm prevailing during the summer of 1995. Among other things, he said that

"our activity is not aimed and has never been aimed at harming the interests of anybody, much less the interests of the Macedonians. Our party is determined to follow this road and fight to the end to satisfy the just demands of the Albanian population in Macedonia."⁶⁴

If such statements were genuine, then they indicated a shift away from extremism, specifically revolutionarism, by parties like the NDP. The PDP appeared to think so, as it formed a strategic alliance with the NDP in the form of a joint deputies' group in parliament on 3 November 1995.

The political moderation of the Albanian parties and the stabilization of interethnic relations hardly signified any definite resolution of the fundamental conflict on the twin-issues of equal status and equal education. In mid-June 1995, for instance, the PDP voiced its indignation and disillusionment at the apparent unwillingness among its coalition partners to fulfill their promise of university education in the Albanian language for the 1995-96 school year. This promise was one of the conditions for PDP's participation in the government coalition. Measures to improve Albanian representation in state institutions - such as the appointment of the first ethnic Albanian general in the Macedonian army, and of three ethnic Albanian diplomats in Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland in April 1995 - were considered insufficient to satisfy either the demand for equal representation or the demand for equal education.

Albanians continued to press for these demands, even vis-à-vis third parties, as the European Parliament delegation found out during a visit in Tetovo on 1 November 1995. But the MEPs were too much overpowered by divergent demands from the local Macedonians (who feared

discrimination), and from the local IMRO, to act as effective mediators on such a short notice. The refusal by the EP-delegation to use the term "Republic Macedonia" angered the Macedonian press, and thus limited its ability for conflict resolution even further.

A more promising attempt at conflict resolution was undertaken on 16 November by German Ambassador Geert Ahrens, special mediator of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). He held talks with representatives of the three main Albanian parties, the PDP, PDPA, and NDP, discussing his proposal for new talks with representatives of the ethnic Macedonian parties under the supervision of the ICFY conference in Geneva. The first trilateral talks since the unsuccessful meeting in Geneva under Ahrens' supervision on 7 July 1995 (probably due to heightened antagonism caused by the Tetovo crisis) were to be held in December 1995.

Smaller ethnic groups felt that they were forgotten by these international negotiators. These groups, such as the Macedonian Serbs, were disappointed as well about the government's perceived failure to give them full civil rights. This demand for full rights was reiterated by the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs (DPS), Dragisa Miletic on 31 May 1995 (the DPS was founded in March 1992). He also claimed that hundreds of Serbs were emigrating to rump-Yugoslavia because they failed to obtain citizenship despite fulfilling the legal obligations. Their lower number in the 1994 census as compared to the 1991 one appears to support these claims.

The controversial decision in May by the Ministry of Transport and Communications to 'clean up' the airwaves by a new requirement of registration for private radio and television stations, further endangered the period of social stability. More than 80 such stations without a valid license were closed by October 1995, seriously endangering the independent media in Macedonia, particularly the Albanian media: in Tetovo, five Albanian-language radio and television stations were taken off the air. The Ministry promised to come up with a solution for those affected stations by the end of June, such as allowing them to start anew and ask for an official permit. But a satisfactory solution was not (yet) reached by the end of 1995. A handful of stations, among them some Albanian, succeeded to restart their operations after they won their court cases based on charges of censorship -despite the Ministry's assurances that it only wanted to define the "rules of the game".⁶⁵

The Macedonian government under Crvenkosvki appeared to be itchy and suspicious of Albanian revolutionarism even many months after the Tetovo crisis. These worries caused the Macedonian authorities to sent out mixed signals. On the one hand, it encouraged and welcomed the return of the PDP-deputies in mid-July to the parliament after a boycott of six months due to the Tetovo crisis - though their demands, especially the legalization of Tetovo university, were still not met (according Albanian TV, they returned due to fear of losing their parliamentary immunity). Even the new draft law on university education, which was discussed in parliament during the middle of November, failed to satisfy them: they specifically attacked Article 9, which only allowed the Albanian language to be used in faculties for 'national minorities' personnel' (teachers).

On the other hand, the Macedonian police at Skopje Airport seized on 30 June 1995 fifty copies of a book on Ferro-nickel Metallurgy by Dr. Nagip Murati, a Kosovo Albanian. Murati told the Kosovo Information Center that the police arrested him, and tried (unsuccessfully) to force him to admit that these copies were intended for the Tetovo university. In comparison, the police raid of the DPS headquarters in Skopje on 12 September was more understandable, as the Serb party continued to use pictures of Milosevic within its premises despite the prohibition against using the insignia and symbols of a foreign state. Nevertheless, these heavy-handed police actions hardly helped to improve interethnic relations on the long term.

Paradoxically, the increasing pressure by Albanians abroad on Crvenkovski's government to solve the domestic conflict with the Albanian community may have increased its itchiness towards this community. The attitude of moderate politicians like Rugova, the radical but pacifist leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), on Macedonia's ethnic problems were gentle. He suggested on 7 July during a news conference in Pristina (the capital of Kosovo), that the conflicts regarding the rights of Albanians were interconnected throughout the southern Balkans, and that an escalation in one part would escalate tensions in another part:

"President Gligorov has been worried about the situation in Kosova. We also discussed the demands of the Albanians in Macedonia. We made the common observation that tensions in the area are increasing and that we must find a fair political solution for all outstanding issues through peaceful means."⁶⁶

The attitude exhibited by most leading politicians from Albania were less friendly. For example, Sabri Godo, leader of the right-wing Albanian Republican Party (one seat), stressed on 17 July that Macedonia's Albanians should never be considered a minority even if the official estimate of around 23 per cent happened to be true. On 11 July, the Albanian parliamentary delegation led by Eduard Selami, chairman of the foreign policy commission in the Albanian parliament, stated in Skopje that their country would react when the status of Albanians in Macedonia were at stake. This veiled threat overshadowed subsequent assurances that such conflicts should be resolved through dialogue "without national euphoria and extremes"⁶⁷. But he added that the talks with their Macedonian counterparts were satisfactory given the latter's openness and sincerity.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski (not to be confused with prime minister Branko Crvenkovski) and his Albanian counterpart Alfred Serreqi rightly stressed during their talks on 21 August in Skopje, that their bilateral relations were burdened by Macedonia's domestic issue of Albanian status and education, not by the international issue of Macedonia's independence and state symbols.

The Macedonian government need not have been so nervous about Albanian extremism during the summer and autumn of '95. Even NDP-leader Halimi had changed his tune after the Tetovo crisis. We reiterate Van Moyland's observation that the sting had been removed from the extremist fringes within both the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities since the 1994 elections. The sobering effect of the Tetovo crisis paradoxically marginalized the extremists on both sides even further. Consequently, Albanian nationalists in Albania and Kosovo had not as much influence as before.

The Bulgarian nationalists were the only party with any potential to disturb Macedonia's domestic peace during the latter half of 1995. But even their attempts to mobilize their ideological kin in Macedonia faltered. On 21 August 1995, VMRO-SMD co-chairman Krasimir Karakachanov (Mikhaylov had died by then) announced that his movement had formed an alliance with two even more radical/extremist Bulgarian emigré organizations, Lyuben Dimitrov (LD) and Pravda Patriotic Macedonian Organizations (PPMO), in the Canadian city of Toronto a week before. In Toronto, they signed a document calling for the abolition of the 'artificial' border between Macedonia and Bulgaria, a demand which VMRO-SMD already voiced at its congress in March 1995. LD-leader Georgi Mladenov and PPMO-leader Aleksandur Karadzhev, both Bulgarian Canadians, bluntly stated that "members of a single nation should not live in two different states"⁶⁸ - indicating that the goals of Greater Bulgaria and Greater Macedonia could coincide.

This initiative by the three nationalist organizations, who explicitly aimed to revive the Bulgarian character of Macedonia (indicating that Greater Bulgaria may not coincide with Greater Macedonia in cultural terms!), got little support inside Bulgaria. The Bulgarian newspaper '24 Chasa' in effect ridiculed the idea of eliminating the border with Macedonia in an editorial on 22 August.

Bulgaria's socialist government under Prime Minister Zhan Videnov felt secure enough to ignore these and other populist demands by VMRO-SMD. On 21 July 1995, the government deported Georgi Popatanasov to Macedonia (where he officially belonged as a citizen), a leader of the extremist Ilinden United Macedonian Organization (Ilinden OMO), which had been barred from legal registration due to its separatist ideology. And on 26 July, it arrested 20 OMO-members in southwestern Bulgaria after they spread leaflets (printed in Skopje) for a nationalist 'celebration'. Videnov's harsh policy against Ilinden OMO was probably due to the latter's separatism, which was far more dangerous to the Bulgarian state than IMRO's expansionism.

Unlike VMRO-SMD, the members of Ilinden OMO regarded themselves as Pirin-Macedonians and wanted to secede from Bulgaria in order to form with (part of) the Republic of Macedonia a Greater Macedonia in a cultural sense. The VMRO-SMD wanted a unification between entire Bulgaria and (part of) Macedonia, whereby the Bulgarian culture would predominate. So the goals of Greater Macedonia and Greater Bulgaria may be geographically and even historically similar, but they can be culturally dissimilar, depending on the political movement one is referring to. No wonder why there was no strategic alliance between VMRO-SMD and Ilinden OMO. The former organization even attempted to disrupt a demonstration of the latter at Sandanski in southwestern Bulgaria during April 1996.

In theory, Ilinden OMO would be more akin than the VMRO-SMD to the most revolutionary wing of the VMRO-DPNME in Macedonia. But neither of them had sufficient influence in VMRO-DPNME, as its leader Georgievski had pushed it toward moderation since the Tetovo crisis in February 1995. Even if either of them had control over VMRO-DPNME, they could hardly have infiltrated the Macedonian government given the latter's non-parliamentary status (unlike VMRO-SMD). On the other hand, extra-parliamentary means ranging from mass rallies to terrorist attacks would have been the only means available to realize their nationalist goals. Milivojevic already warned in Jane's Intelligence Review of February 1995 that the VMRO-DPNME was suspected of "secretly arming its ultra-nationalistic membership with the assistance of influential VMRO irredentist forces in nearby Bulgaria".⁶⁹

If these reports are true, Georgievski must keep the extremist faction(s) within his party in check, in order to prevent the outbreak of political violence from the ethnic-Macedonian quarter.

On 3 October 1995, a period of stagnation, at the bottom of the second stage of conflict (political tension), came to an abrupt end. In the morning, just after returning from talks with Milosevic in Belgrade on mutual recognition, Macedonian president Gligorov was seriously wounded by a car bomb in front of the Hotel Bristol in the center of Skopje. The car bomb exploded just when Gligorov's car sped by on its way to the parliamentary building. His chauffeur Aleksandar Spirovski was immediately killed, and five other people were wounded, four of them (three citizens and one security staff member) seriously. One of the seriously injured, engineer Hristo Hristomanov, died in Skopje on 7 October.⁷⁰

Gligorov was lucky: he was in the front seat next to the driver, who took the force of the blast. The car was almost completely destroyed, some nearby cars caught fire, and several surrounding buildings were damaged. The president, still conscious, was rushed to the Surgical Town Hospital for urgent treatment of his multiple wounds to the head, face, legs and arms. He was later on

(during the same day) transferred to the Surgical Clinic of the Medical Faculty in Skopje, where he underwent surgery on his (left, right?) eye. He was released from hospital on 18 October, and received medical treatment at home.

Immediately after the assassination attempt, all border crossings were closed or put under strict control; Parliamentary Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov (LP-leader) was named as acting president according the Constitution; and an investigation team of the Interior Ministry led by the attorney general started its work, with the help of anti-terrorist experts from the US, UK, and Germany. This team found out during the same day that the bomb, 20 kg of explosives, was placed in the back of a sand-filled Citroen Ami 8 with Kumanovo license plates, and was probably set off by remote control. The police began a massive man hunt for two men, who according to eyewitnesses were clad in blue and sped away in a Renault 25 just after the blast. They also arrested some 'suspicious' people, without avail. By the beginning of December, the police (and the investigating team) became desperate: they combed some of Skopje's suburbs in search for possible conspirators, and issued a public appeal for information called "Let Us Try Together". Neither action produced any breakthrough. No one claimed responsibility.

In the ensuing days, weeks, and months, many conspiracy theories were discussed in the media, though the authorities have not yet succeeded in catching the perpetrators or uncovering their motives. The small Democratic Party (DP, one seat in parliament) was one the few parties which protested (on 12 October) against these speculations and mutual accusations, as they incited an already "heated atmosphere" in the country.

Menduh Thaci, leader of the PDPA, voiced his surprise and relief on 9 October, when he pointed out that nobody from the ethnic Macedonian media or parties had yet blamed Albanians for the attack - "that would have brought about a real destabilization of the country". He believed that the attack was "an act of political terrorism instigated from abroad".⁷¹ Indeed, hardly anybody speculated about an "Albanian connection", probably because of its explosive potential in the domestic arena. It was more convenient to talk about external, non-Albanian culprits.

More credence was given to the "Macedonian connection", the theory that ethnic Macedonian nationalists in VMRO-DPNME and/or other organizations planned to kill Gligorov, in order to derail the interim-agreement with Greece signed in New York on 13 September 1995.

On 3 October, VMRO-DPNME immediately condemned the assassination attempt, clearly wishing to forestall any speculation of its involvement in this attempt. The next day, it pointed the finger to pro-Yugoslav reactionaries: "The political timing and the way of carrying out the assault indicates it is the doing and serves the interests of a small group of people in Macedonia nostalgic of former Yugoslavia and their foreign patrons."⁷²

On 5 October, VMRO-DPNME wished Gligorov a speedy recovery, and postponed the peaceful protests against the Interim Accord of 13 September, in which Macedonia promised to remove the Vergina star from its flag as a major concession to Greece (see further section 2.1.2).

Many Macedonian nationalists inside and outside the IMRO-led alliance were enraged by this accord, because as conservatives and even reactionaries they wanted to keep Macedonia's chosen state symbols. After September 13, some of them issued death-threats against 'traitor' Gligorov. On 3 October, they strew pamphlets in Kicevo and Prilep (western Macedonia), calling for a "peaceful protest against the betrayal of the symbol of Macedonia, of the Macedonian minority in other countries, and of the name that has been definitely lost after the accord was signed by the present authority, which is preparing even greater betrayals for us". After the first news of the assassination attempt, some pamphlets got an extra, hand-written text: "Kiro died, let him rest in affliction".⁷³ So

a terrorist attack on the president by angry nationalists is quite feasible. But, apart from provocative declarations, no trails led to these people.

Variants of the so-called "Bulgarian connection" received the most attention. Already on 5 October, Bulgarian Interior Minister Lyubomir Nachev had to discount early allegations of his government's involvement in the attack, stating that "Bulgaria is one of the countries that are least interested in tension in Macedonia and the region".⁷⁴

The VMRO-SMD, like its sister-organization in Macedonia, promoted the "Serbian connection" in order to turn attention away from themselves as possible conspirators (on 8 October, some of their sympathizers in Macedonia were arrested by the Macedonian police for questioning, according to VMRO-SMD). On 9 October 1995, VMRO-SMD leader Karakachanov accused the Serbian secret service of carrying out the terrorist act, with the support of pro-Yugoslav reactionaries in Skopje and Belgrade who wanted to reintegrate Macedonia into the present Yugoslavia. But the Macedonian authorities continued to arrest "pro-Bulgarian politicians" for questioning, which drew an angry response from VMRO-SMD on 1 November, which asked the Bulgarian government to condemn the "anti-Bulgarian actions and repressions in Macedonia".⁷⁵ These arrests began to affect the bilateral relations between the two countries: the Bulgarian foreign ministry denounced on 8 December the 'inadmissible' arrests of Macedonian citizens of Bulgarian 'origin'. Skopje actually announced on 12 December that the Bulgarian army had concentrated troops at its border, with increased combat readiness!

Denials by Ilinden OMO of their involvement were equally ineffective, as the banned Macedonian movement in Bulgaria had demanded a few days prior to the attack the resignation of Gligorov and new elections in Macedonia. The members of OMO were incensed about the interim accord with Greece, and had a long-standing grudge against Gligorov for his refusal even to consider the idea of a Greater Macedonia. When they heard about the attack when frequenting their restaurant in Blagoevgrad, they said that Gligorov had brought it on himself. If Ilinden OMO were really involved in the assassination attempt, then we should speak of a 'Macedonian connection from abroad'.

The assassination of the Macedonian president may have been planned by a mixed group of extremists from all over the Balkans with common interests against the survival of the Macedonian state and its multi-ethnic society. Some accomplices may have been hired elsewhere. A senior official of the Interior Ministry suggested this on 8 October: he pointed out that the buyer of the car bomb "Citroen Ami 8" (on 28 September in Skopje) apparently spoke with a Serbian-Croatian accent, with a Kajkav dialect spoken north of Zagreb.

Initially, alternative explanations pointing to conspirators within the Macedonian government got little attention and little credence in the Macedonian press. Thus IMRO-leader Georgievski's accusation on 10 October 1995 that the authorities were deliberately pointing the investigation to his party in order to hide the real culprits within the government - he even referred to 'one of Gligorov's closest colleagues', apparently pointing the finger to Interior minister Frckovski, who resigned on the same day due to his inability to protect the President - was not taken seriously.

Georgievski pointed out that only Gligorov's close colleagues, and people in the Interior ministry and the secret service, were informed about the President's movements after his return from Belgrade. This argument was one of the few convincing ones pointing to a "government connection". Moreover, the Interior Ministry already admitted on 4 October that the president's car

was unarmored, and that security procedures were neglected (Gligorov should have sit in the back; a security car should have preceded the president's, etc.). This all sounded suspicious.

This theory was lost in the background when Frckovski, who 'definitely' handed in his resignation on 26 October 1995 (again refused by prime minister Crvenkovski, according an official announcement on 17 November!), stated on the same day that an unspecified multinational corporation in a neighboring state manufactured the bomb on 28 September, and planned the assassination with the help of Macedonian citizens. This statement sounded preposterous. But the Macedonian media carried on this story with its own investigations, and came up with a peculiar variant of the 'Bulgarian connection': a Bulgarian company called Multigroup Holdings was implicated in the attack. As the main shareholder of the Bulgarian bank in Skopje, founded by Balkanbank, Multigroup supposedly represented Mafia interests which were threatened by Gligorov's and Crvenkovski's anti-corruption efforts (the latter fired in mid-July six high-ranking officials who were not functioning "on the positive level"). This explanation, of corrupt business people, politicians, and officials committing a desperate act, was also used for the theory of the "government connection".

According to the official (!) newspaper *Nova Makedonija*, the Multigroup vice-president Dimitur Ivanov even supervised the manufacturing of the explosive device. If all these allegations were true, we could hardly speak of an act of political violence, though it may well have political implications (such as the arrest of corrupt politicians and civil servants).

On 3 November 1995, Bulgarian prime minister Videnov angrily attacked the Macedonian and Greek(!) media reports connecting the Bulgarian company to the assassination attempt - as did the company's chief-secretary Draganov a day earlier. Multigroup president Iliya Pavlov said on 3 November that he considered legal action against the newspapers responsible for the allegations; he also suggested that rival companies may have started these 'groundless' rumors.

2.1.2 External developments

The conflict between Greece and Macedonia on the latter's state name, state symbols, and some provisions in the constitution seemed still deadlocked and unsolvable by the end of June 1995, despite the talk about the so-called "small package" (see section 1.2.2). Papandreou's angry rejection on 27 June of French President Jacques Chirac's proposal at a EU dinner - with the support of the Spanish and German leaders Gonzalez and Kohl - to lift the Greek embargo on Macedonia as a necessary precondition for fruitful negotiations, made abundantly clear that Greece was not ready for compromise, concession, or any other kind of accommodation.

Papandreou blasted Chirac's proposal and the European Union's general sympathy for Macedonia as "a shameless provocation against a member state".⁷⁶ It must be said that Chirac behaved quite undiplomatically by referring to "Macedonia" instead of "FYROM" during the dinner.

The US assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke - mediator of the US peace initiative for former Yugoslavia (in practice focused on Bosnia), who eventually masterminded the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995 - pressured Papandreou to be more flexible on the Macedonian issue during talks in Athens on 4 September 1995. The Greek government stuck to its position that it would go to New York the following week for crucial talks on the small package without prior lifting of its embargo. But Holbrooke insisted that such lifting should at least occur simultaneously with Macedonia's concessions on its flag and constitution. Papandreou clearly got the message: the US was growing impatient with the continuing strangulation of Macedonia, and would not tolerate Greece's obstruction of an overall settlement of the disputes and conflicts in former Yugoslavia; a letter from US President Clinton

sent to the Greek prime minister a few days earlier said as much. The American president sent a similar message to Gligorov (Holbrooke and his assistants also visited Skopje), but less pressure was required on Macedonia. Indeed, Macedonia was ready to make the actual concessions on the real issues in the small package, in return for the lifting of the Greek embargo. Macedonian foreign minister Stevo Crvenkovski inadvertently (and unconsciously) suggested his country's 'capitulation' in the negotiations during his address to the *Skupstina* (Assembly) on 5 September. He said that the Greek embargo had been defeated, which - if correct for so far his country had been able to survive the blockade - meant that Macedonia was going to 'sign away' two huge concessions in return for nothing except some restoration of trade links! In reality, Greece was also ready to recognize and establish full diplomatic relations with Skopje under the name of FYROM.

The Interim Accord on the small package was signed in New York under the aegis of UN mediator Cyrus Vance on 13 September 1995, and would come into force within 30 days. Greece promised to lift its blockade within 30 days, though the text of the accord only mentioned the requirement of free flow of people and goods. The US established full diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with Macedonia on the same day (though the official opening of the US embassy happened much later, on 23 March 1996). According to many observers, this accord was realized by Holbrooke's short visit to Athens (a short phone call to Papandreou did the trick according some sources), rather than by the 29 months of unsuccessful mediation efforts by Vance and the US president's envoy Matthew Nimetz.⁷⁷ Holbrooke had the advantages of a powerful personality and strong support from Clinton, which Nimetz lacked during all these months.

The VMRO-DPMNE led the domestic opposition against the accord, accusing the government of denigrating Macedonia's cultural heritage by bargaining away state symbols like the Vergina star. But Gligorov deftly responded to such criticism by saying the following in a television interview on 16 September:

"I must say we elicited absolutely no understanding regarding the flag. It was not because of whose symbol it is [Greece and Macedonia agreed that neither of them would use the Star of Vergina as a state symbol]. ... [But] Are we going to wage a battle after 2,300 years? Are we going to transform this question into a Cypriot issue that cannot be solved even after 10 years? If we wage a battle for the symbol, we could find ourselves in the following situation: Our young people who are now 20 years old will be 40 years old before they can start a normal life .. . Do we have to pay this price for insisting on the symbol? The symbol is beautiful, the flag is also beautiful, but ... in the absence of understanding from anybody in the world, we would have waged a quixotic battle for something that has often been a subject of Balkan wars in history".⁷⁸

Gligorov brilliantly ridiculed the mindset of Balkan nationalists like Karadzic; warned the young generation of the costs of armed conflict and war; and promoted the advantages of compromise, in one sweeping statement. Here, the 79-year old Macedonian president was at its best, the father of the nation who understood the concerns of his citizens, the great communicator who instinctively knew how to lure them away from nationalist extremism. So one should not be surprised at the popular view of him as the vital guarantor of Macedonia's peace and security. Indeed, many Macedonians dreaded the day that Gligorov would disappear from the political scene.⁷⁹

Gligorov got support from 86 parliamentarians, who collectively submitted a draft law on a new flag on 22 September. It must be said that Gligorov's job was made easier by the absence of the VMRO-DPMNE and the DP from parliament, due to their boycott of the 1994 elections. The law

on a new red flag, with an 8-point golden-yellow sun, was adopted on 5 October by an overwhelming majority of 110 votes in favor, despite the attempted assassination of Gligorov.⁸⁰ The parliament also ratified the Interim Accord on 9 October (it was due to come into force on 11 October). After a slight delay and some US pressure, both parties officially signed on 13 October the memorandum on implementation of the Interim Accord, and it went into effect on 15 October. Greece lifted its embargo at the same time.

The signing of the Interim Accord did not improve the prospects for the "big package", despite expectations that an agreement on some fundamental issues would encourage the parties to solve some other fundamental issues as well.

These expectations of a "spill-over" effect were apparently fueled by Greek foreign minister Papoulias' statement on 6 September that a compound name for the FYROM including the word Macedonia could be agreed upon after the interim accord. But any observer and any participant in the talks should have been warned by the effective rebuttal of Papoulias' idea by his own ministry (probably after Papandreou's intervention) on the next day: Greece would agree to talks on the Macedonian name issue after the signing of the interim accord, but would never recognize Skopje under the name Macedonia, nor accept any compound name including the word Macedonia. Papandreou bluntly said on 7 September that Greece would eventually win on the name issue. The Greek foreign ministry stated on 15 September that Skopje was bound by the New York accord to use the name FYROM until the name issue was resolved in negotiations under the auspices of Vance - which could last a long time (8 years at maximum)!⁸¹

Further negotiations with Skopje were put on a standstill when Papandreou fell seriously ill in late November 1995. The leading members of PASOK were gradually forced to deal with the sensitive issue of succession, in the event that their dominant leader would die or remain incapable of resuming his duties.

Athens' recognition of Skopje under the name of FYROM had also some positive consequences. Among other things, this recognition finally lifted Greece's veto against Macedonia's admittance to international organizations. Macedonia was admitted to the Council of Europe on 27 September 1995; to the OSCE on 14 October 1995; to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) project in November 1995; and to NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council in March 1996.

On the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kotic remarked 3 June 1995 that mutual recognition could take place very soon, provided that Skopje solved its conflict with Athens, and provided that Skopje accepted FRY's "continuity". The last condition referred to FRY's supposed succession rights on the property and financial assets of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).

This condition was rejected by the Macedonian government. On 30 November 1995, for instance, its minister of finance Miljovski stated that Macedonia would continue to claim succession rights on SFRY's property and assets situated in the country when it still was a Yugoslav republic. Both Slovenia and Macedonia insisted on such a distribution of former Yugoslav property for obvious economic reasons (as were Belgrade's for wanting to hold on to all this property!), and were angry at Croatia's recognition of the FRY as legal successor of SFRY in November 1995. But this outstanding issue was regarded as a practical dispute solvable by compromise, rather than a conflict with perceived incompatible interests. Moreover, this issue was overshadowed by the common aim in both Belgrade and Skopje to get the UN sanctions fully lifted as soon as possible (as happened

by November). Mutual recognition would facilitate the restoration of bilateral trade. Thus economic rather than political motivations helped to improve relations between the two Balkan countries.

Mutual political distrust still existed, despite Gligorov's good contacts in Belgrade due to his past career in the Yugoslav Communist Party. Actually, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) preferred to use its contacts with the Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM), a coalition-partner in Crvenkovski's government. Thus SPS deputy chairman Goran Percevic first talked with the SPM-leadership during a socialist congress in Skopje on July 1st, and only afterwards visited Gligorov - who was able to resume some of his duties since November '95 - on July 3rd. On both occasions, Percevic stressed his government's determination to improve bilateral relations. On 21 December, Gligorov, recovering well from the attack on his life in early October, said there was no reason for any further delay in mutual recognition between the two countries. Foreign minister Crvenkovski even claimed on 28 December that there was "not a single contentious issue burdening Macedonian-Serbian relations".⁸²

But suspicions of Yugoslavia's long term intentions motivated Macedonian Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski's call in mid-August for strengthening the size and mandate of the UN force in Macedonia, by now christened the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Handziski was also worried about the orchestrated influx of thousands of Croatian-Serb refugees into Kosovo (in order to change the ethnic balance) after the fall of the Krajina to the Croatian army in early August, and about a possible confrontation between Croatia and Serbia in Eastern Slavonia (the last area in the hands of Croatian-Serb separatists).

Handziski even suggested that, given the fact that "the changes in Knin Krajina have decreased the possibilities for Serbia to have an exit to the sea in this region", Belgrade would look toward the Greek port of Thessaloniki as a possible alternative: "We consider this of equal danger of our state, because in that case the strategic interest of the Republic of Macedonia will rise, and the Greek government will finally realize that a strong and stable Macedonia is more convenient for it than a Greater Serbia".⁸³

The Macedonian army had already strengthened its military ties with the US and Turkey in the previous months - which led the Macedonian chief of staff Col-Gen Bocinov to state rather naively on 19 July 1995 that "we will get the necessary support from Turkey and the United States if we meet an attack".⁸⁴

The US would be more willing to intervene in Macedonia than in Bosnia, because unchallenged aggression against the former would almost certainly escalate into a wider Balkan war. American interest in preventing or containing such an eventuality was shown by initiatives like the new US liaison office in Skopje; the promise by US Secretary of Defense William Perry on 23 November 1995 to deliver military aid to the Macedonian army; and the planned joint US-Macedonian military exercises in March 1996. But US-led military support in the event of an attack was not guaranteed, given the reluctance in all Western capitals to intervene for the sake of regional security with no direct links to their own security.

Mutual recognition, bilateral trade, and other economic interests may superficially improve relations between Serbia and Macedonia, but fundamental suspicions, especially on the Macedonian side, would continue for many years to come.

2.2 Tension and Conflict in and on Macedonia, January - June 1996: polarization of its domestic politics, consolidation of its international position

2.2.1 Internal developments

By the beginning of January 1996, Gligorov was fully recovered, able to resume all his duties, and turn his attention to domestic matters. Already on 27 December 1995, he held talks with a PDP delegation led by its leader Aliti. The delegation told the President that they still objected to the draft law on university education, as it did not provide for legalization of the Tetovo university. The PDP-politicians repeated their warning that they would leave their executive and parliamentary posts if the Albanian-language university and the right of equal education were not recognized.

Gligorov was seen as a partisan leader of the ethnic Macedonian community by the PDP and other Albanian parties. He incurred the wrath of the PDP, PDPA, and NDP when he allegedly said in the beginning of May 1996 that the Tetovo university was illegal and that those who supported such a university were a small band of separatists. They resented his classification of Albanians into either unionist supporters of the Macedonian state, or separatist opponents of it, while a large majority of moderate Albanians supported the Tetovo university and the principle behind it. On 8 May, Radio Macedonia accused the Albanian parties of manipulating the Presidents' statements, arguing that his characterization of Tetovo university as an illegal institution was legally correct and simply a statement of fact. It concluded its barrage with the complaint that "they are not able to give an example of another state in which minorities enjoy so many human rights and freedoms, and so much tolerance, as in the Republic of Macedonia".⁸⁵

The SDAM warmly supported these arguments in mid-May, even accusing the Albanian parties of "placing themselves at the service of pre-election campaigns in some neighboring countries", a clear reference to the coming elections in Albania.⁸⁶

Poor Gligorov also had to contend with calls for higher status by smaller minorities, such as the Serbs. DPS-leader Miletic denied on 4 January that his request in the previous month for international mediation on the issue of Serb rights in Macedonia was a threat to the constitutional order. The Macedonian government made this accusation because Miletic also requested the involvement of Serbia in his proposal for conflict resolution through international mediation. Nevertheless, Miletic insisted that the Serb demands were legitimate and should not be politicized by the media, pointing out that the preamble of the 1991 Constitution did not explicitly mention ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins as communities living in Macedonia. Only the census results showed that they existed. Tiny communities voiced the same complaint, such as the 2,000-strong Croat community, which founded the civic Union of Ethnic Croats in Macedonia in Skopje on 19 January 1996.

On 9 March 1996, Miletic stressed at the DPS congress that his party was ready to work together with all ethnic groups, including the Croats, in order to promote equal rights for each of them. Miletic was much less forthcoming to Gligorov, whom he criticized on 22 May for supposedly supporting Kosova's independence (Gligorov did not; he just stated that the majority of Albanians in Kosovo wanted such independence and showed his understanding for it), just after the de facto agreement on mutual recognition between FYROM and FRY. Ungratefully, the DPS-leader refused to congratulate Gligorov on this diplomatic breakthrough. Miletic probably opposed mutual recognition because it decreased the chances of an 'independent' Macedonia as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a goal adopted by the DPS congress on 9-10 March 1996.

The criticism of the Macedonian Albanians against the accord between Macedonia and Serbia was more understandable: it would lead to Belgrade's international recognition, despite the continuing oppression of the Albanian majority in Kosovo (see section 2.2.2).

The Albanian government and the Rugova's underground government in Kosovo supported the long-standing demands of Macedonia's Albanians. Albanese politicians typically formulated their support in the form of veiled threats, as the Speaker of Albanian parliament Pjeter Arbneri did on 16 January 1996: "We have good relations with the Macedonian state, *but first of all*, we support and *defend* the Albanians in Macedonia not only because they are our brothers, but because they are right"(emphasis our own).⁸⁷

Rahmi Tuda, the coordinator of the visiting delegation of the PDP-NDP parliamentary group, even warned on the same day that "Macedonia's peace and stability can be preserved only by equal citizens"⁸⁸, accusing the Macedonian government lack of good will in resolving the conflict. The prime minister of the self-styled Republic of Kosova, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, provocatively stated in mid-January that the Macedonian state had few chances of survival if it continued to treat one-third of its population as second-class citizens.

Thus, the fundamental conflict with the Albanians polarized again in early 1996, despite some attempts at mediation by representatives of the Geneva-based UN Center for Human Rights and the OSCE during visits in Tetovo in February. Moreover, the US' clear-cut but blunt approach to this domestic conflict made it a less attractive mediator for the Macedonian government, as shown by the following remark by Victor Comras, head of the US liaison office in Skopje, to PDP-leader Aliti in Tetovo on 19 January 1996: "the PDP needs to continue on its current political path, committed to equal status for the [ethnic] Albanians, which implies the Albanian language and education, for which it will receive the *support of the American government*"(emphasis our own).⁸⁹ The US fully supported the Albanian demands, rather than seeking a compromise between the two major communities in Macedonia on this issue. The Macedonian government was much more enthusiastic about the US' support of Macedonia's independence and security. But even this enthusiasm waned after US Undersecretary of State Timothy Wirth stated on 6 May 1996 that the US would only be able to assist in military education, not in military equipment and armaments, despite Perry's promise in November '95.

The resolution of Macedonia's domestic conflict was put on the backburner when a serious rift occurred within the government's strategic alliance. On 10 February 1996, after much speculation in the media, prime minister Crvenkovski announced a reshuffle of the cabinet with nine new ministers - in total 12 posts for the SDAM, 5 for the PDP, and 3 for the SP - but without any posts for the Liberal Party. Gligorov tried to avert LP's ousting by a nation address on 6 February:

"Unfortunately, in the last few months, a process has emerged to break up the Alliance for Macedonia [the electoral coalition which chose Gligorov as their joint presidential candidate at the 1994 elections]. In a short period of time, a number of principles were forgotten and personal intolerance came to the fore. ... I want to appeal to the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Alliance to try to find acceptable solutions."⁹⁰

One of the reasons why Macedonia's great communicator failed in this instance was inadvertently provided by himself during his national address: ".. all this is taking time when all of the alliance's political goals have been accomplished".⁹¹ The more an alliance's goals are fulfilled, the less

common interests bind the parties of the alliance together; personal animosities and tactical differences come to the fore.

Gligorov also failed in this instance because as President he had no direct power over the cabinet; he had a lot of influence and popularity as a father of the nation standing above party politics, but had far less influence on government affairs. True, Gligorov got widespread support from the media and some opposition parties. DP-leader Gosev immediately used the controversy to snipe at the government on 12 February, accusing it of concentrating power in the hands of a few individuals to the detriment of the LP and Gligorov. But Crvenkovski was able to ignore such criticism, as the DP and the VMRO-DPNME were not presented in parliament due to their boycott of the 1994 elections. He was also able to ignore DP's call for early elections on 12 February together with the PDPA (both parties obviously tried to form a strategic alliance).

On 13 February, Gligorov hastily backtracked from his appeal, even apologizing for the heated responses from the coalition partners, causing the split between them to deepen. The effect of his appeal had polarized the dispute, contrary to his intentions, he said. This humiliating retreat decreased Gligorov's standing and influence for months to come.

Prime minister Crvenkovski, when he presented his new cabinet to parliament on 21 February for approval, explained his reasons for the reshuffle. He accused the LP of increasing disloyalty vis-à-vis the Alliance for Macedonia's election platform (the basis of the government program). According to him, the LP acted more and more like an opposition party in two ways: distancing itself from tough and unpopular (economic) policies, and freely criticizing any other policy as it saw fit: "There can be no lasting political partnership if one of the partners intends to take part only the fame and success but does not intend to bear responsibility when problems and difficulties arise".⁹²

Crvenkovski further attacked the opportunistic support by some parties of Gligorov's conciliation effort, and went out of his way to praise the president's standing at home and abroad. He clearly wanted no alienation between himself and Gligorov, if only because of the latter's popularity.

The parliament approved Crvenkovski's new government on 23 February with 83 votes in favor and 23 against. Subsequently, LP-leader Andov resigned from the office of parliamentary Speaker. In his letter of resignation in the beginning of March, Andov argued that LP's exclusion from the government in effect dissolved the Alliance for Macedonia, thereby creating a completely different government. The prime minister was constitutionally required to ask for a new mandate from the president on behalf of a new government coalition. Instead, Crvenkovski bypassed the president and parliament. This legalistic argument may be correct, but Andov gave no specific reasons why his party was ousted. In his statement, he only suggested a power-hungry prime minister intent on disrupting the constitutional balance to the detriment of the president and the LP, and to the benefit of the SDAM (of which Gligorov was also a member!).⁹³

Whatever reason brought about LP's departure from the government, the split within the Alliance for Macedonia may weaken the cohesion among the moderate political forces, and may encourage extremist forces to create new violent disruptions. On the one hand, the Alliance for Macedonia seems to be fracturing further, given the new SP-leader Ljubisav Ivanov's harsh criticism on 26 May 1996 against Crvenkovski's government for its mistakes in economic reforms. On the other hand, he reaffirmed SP's readiness to stay in the government coalition. Moreover, even if this alliance falls, other moderate alliances are possible. Realignments, if not too disruptive and hostile, may not result in permanent damage to the moderate center after all.

By the beginning of 1996, no breakthroughs in the investigation on the attempted assassination of Gligorov in early April '95 were yet made, and no definite suspects were arrested or identified. But most people in Macedonia were convinced of a "mixed, Bulgarian-based connection": members of the Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian Mafia, who had worked for the Communist secret services during the Cold War, planned the assassination, with the Bulgarian multinational Multigroup Holdings as its organizational center. These extremists had multiple but compatible interests: preventing the normalization of relations between Macedonia and its neighboring countries (which could hurt smuggling and other criminal activities), promoting Russian-nationalist leadership in the region with a Pan-Slavic sphere of influence, or even a Pan-Slavic (con)federation headed by Russia, etc.

Such conspiracy theories were speculative, and only contributed to worsening relations with Bulgaria in particular. Political and civic organizations in Bulgaria increased the pressure on the Macedonian government to stop harassing (pro-)Bulgarian Macedonians. For instance, at the end of January 1996 a National Committee in Defense of the Rights of Bulgarians Outside the Present (!) Borders of Bulgaria was set up, led by Peter Konstantinov.⁹⁴ The Bulgarian foreign ministry announced on 15 March 1996 that it still awaited Skopje's response to a note on human rights violations (HRVS) against Macedonians who regarded themselves Bulgarian, sent in late January with a three-month deadline. Most of these alleged HRVS were caused by the numerous arrests of (pro-)Bulgarian Macedonians in late 1995 due to the assassination attempt against Gligorov. At the same time, members of VMRO-SMD's youth organizations protested in front of the Macedonian embassy against the latter's refusal to accept a letter to prime minister Crvenkovski, which denounced the "anti-Bulgarian campaign" in Macedonia. On the same day, the Macedonian foreign ministry sent back an icy note: it stated that Bulgaria's note on alleged HRVS in Macedonia went "beyond the framework of legitimate interest in respect for, and promotion of, universal human rights".⁹⁵

Relations were further strained by VMRO-SMD leader Karachanov's statement at the end of April '96 that the "Bulgarian nation should seek some form of unification with its compatriots outside the country".⁹⁶ He called Macedonia the "second Bulgarian state", and even suggested that parts of Greece (Thrace) should be part of this integration in the more distant future. In essence he repeated the joint demand issued in August '95 by his party and two organizations of the Bulgarian diaspora in Canada.

The theory of the "government connection" suddenly and unexpectedly gained prominence by the accounts of policeman Zlatko Bosnja[v]ovski in the independent weekly Fokus on 10 and 17 May 1996. Bosnja[k]ovski was a former bodyguard of Jordan Mijalkov, the Interior Minister of the Kljusev government, and a member of Gligorov's security staff until right after the assassination attempt. In the interview of 10 May, he accused the Interior Ministry of murdering Mijalkov, who died in a car accident in Serbia. On 17 May, he said he was on Gligorov's security team on 3 October 1995. Just before Gligorov's car was to pass through, he noticed a suspicious-looking Fiat 300 near his assigned spot in central Skopje. He called his chief on his radio to request the removal of the vehicle. He succeeded in overcoming notable reluctance in the police top brass. The car was moved away, and he went in Hotel Bristol. His following comments are astounding:

"Shortly afterwards, I was ordered to move near the building of 'Nova Makedonija'. So they were moving me away from the president's security. However, I fooled them by turning into the first street and secretly came back. Being a policeman, I had a hunch...

An Ami 8 vehicle was then parked on the street. The vehicle belonged to our assistant to the minister, legal counselor Dijana Tavcioska!"⁹⁷

Adding that only the security service could know of the President's route, Bosnjakovski accused the Interior Ministry of complicity in, possibly even masterminding, the plot to kill the President.

These allegations seem preposterous, and the policeman had 172 disciplinary offenses on his name. But he claimed that his incorruptible, decent determination to carry out his duty accounted for these false disciplinary measures. The Interior Ministry obviously denied these allegations. Interior Minister Tomislav Cokrevski (his predecessor Frckovski was by then the new foreign minister) already attacked the press on 7 May 1996 for reporting similar allegations, accusing them of becoming a "serious threat to democracy in Macedonia and the stability of the state".⁹⁸

Are the allegations of Bosnjakovski and others of an "Interior Ministry connection" true? Should they be regarded as trustworthy sources? If they are, the interior ministry and other government bodies harbor groups of opportunist extremists, who prefer the *status quo* of the 'necessary' corruption during the period of Macedonia's political isolation and economic strangulation between early '92 and late '95. Their influence must have waned since the lifting of the UN sanctions and the Greek embargo due to the interim accord with Greece. However, they may become desperate and plan other assassinations against Gligorov and other moderate politicians in order to protect their positions and riches.

2.2.2 External developments

The politics in Athens was dominated by Papandreou's sickness, demise, and succession (his resignation was made public on 15 January- he died in late June), culminating in the official announcement of the new government under Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis on 21 January 1996. Nevertheless, negotiations on the "big package" - actually an extension of the "small package" of the Interim Accord with an agreement on the Macedonian name issue - were gathering steam from the start of 1996.

The push was given by Cyrus Vance, who again proposed the name "Nova Macedonija"(New Macedonia, also the name of a major newspaper in Skopje) as a possible solution at coming talks in New York starting on 11 January. Vance already proposed this composite name back in May 1993, as part of a draft agreement which was never signed. He reportedly stressed in January 1996 that a compromise name was inevitable if the name issue was to be resolved, and that his idea was only a suggestion to break the deadlock.

Greek foreign minister Papoulias vehemently denied that Vance's proposal was on the agenda of these talks, but the rumors were persistent. Greece was not happy about the name proposal, because it contained the word 'Macedonia' in a compound name (which they refused to accept), and because the word 'New' could easily be used as an irredentist reference to Greek Macedonia.

Even Macedonian foreign minister Stevo Crvenkovski was unenthusiastic about Vance's idea, fearing that it may be expressed in a UNSC resolution. He stressed on 11 January that Macedonia only accepted UN mediation on the issue as agreed over two years ago, not UN arbitration i.e. imposition of a solution. This was a sour note in an otherwise optimistic statement, welcoming the European Union's decision to establish full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia - another positive spin-off from the Interim Accord with Greece, together with the official opening of the Greek and Macedonian liaison offices in each other's capitals on 17 January 1996.

The talks in New York produced no breakthroughs, partially because the new Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, while he had taken a more conciliatory standpoint as deputy foreign minister, was committed to PASOK's rigid stance on the Macedonian name issue. Prime minister Simitis solidified this rigidity, by promising on 29 January that he would continue his predecessor's Hellenistic (Greek nationalistic) policy of creating a "powerful Greece" able to deal with "Turkish expansionism and any nationalistic upsurge by its neighbors" and to protect the "Greek expatriates".⁹⁹ Moreover, Belgrade continued to coordinate its external policies on Macedonia with Athens: according to Greek foreign minister Pangalos on 26 January, Belgrade had promised to recognize Skopje only under the UN-designated name of FYROM.

An accord on the "big package" was also obstructed by Skopje's unwillingness to change its constitutional name. Ambassador Ivan Tosevski, Macedonian negotiator in the New York talks, claimed on 9 March 1996 that Vance had not submitted "any kind of proposal for any name version".¹⁰⁰

Interestingly, the Greek government spokesman stated a week earlier that Vance did propose the name of "New Macedonia", contradicting the late foreign minister Papoulias' denial in January. Maybe Pangalos was still trying to moderate the government's standpoint, despite his announcement in early March that full economic cooperation with Skopje was only possible after the name issue was resolved - according Athens' preconditions (absence of the Macedonian name or any of its derivatives, etc.). This negotiation ploy of adding an extra condition may scuttle the establishment of a Macedonian trade consular office in Thessaloniki, as proposed on 15 March by Ljupco Arsovski, the head of the Macedonian liaison office in Athens. It may also scuttle Macedonian defense minister Handziski's offer on 22 March to Alexandros Malias, head of the Greek liaison office in Skopje, to allow Greek troops to participate in military exercises in FYROM during October as part of NATO's PFP program. Gligorov said on 11 May in Paris that the name issue must not affect the improvement of bilateral relations; Macedonia was clearly more willing to improve these relations than Greece.

Macedonia remained equally uncompromising on the name issue, especially after Belgrade recognized Skopje as the Republic of Macedonia (!) in April 1996. This weakened Greece's negotiating position, as more and more countries recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name since then. Athens had no longer time on its side: from a rational perspective, it needed to strike a deal, otherwise "it might end up the only country that refuses to recognize Macedonia under that name" (Krause & Markotich).¹⁰¹

By the beginning of 1996, mutual recognition between Macedonia and Serbia (formally between FYROM and FRY including Montenegro) was very close - at least according many media reports in the region. According to these reports, negotiators on both sides were seeking during two rounds of preliminary talks in Skopje and Belgrade in January 1996 to decouple from mutual recognition the contentious issue of succession rights and legal continuity of former Yugoslavia (claimed by Belgrade, opposed by Macedonia and Slovenia). This separation of closely related issues, in order to reach a partial solution on at least some of them, is a well-known strategy in international negotiations. And this strategy has often been successful, as in the case of the September '95 Interim Accord between Macedonia and Greece. Success of implementation naturally depends on the degree in which interrelated issues can logically be separated and separately negotiated on.

At first, the attempts to separate the recognition and succession issues seemed unsuccessful. Macedonian foreign minister Frckovski claimed on 12 March 1996 that mutual recognition was no problem, but that an accord was hold up by disagreements with Belgrade on whether to include an

agreement on the Yugoslavia succession issue in such an accord. Possibly these disagreements accounted for Milosevic's sudden cancellation of his planned meeting with Gligorov in Skopje on 20 March; the Macedonian foreign ministry had stated on 17 March that both presidents would announce an accord on mutual recognition during that day. Nevertheless, Macedonian foreign minister and his Serbian counterpart Milan Milutinovic signed an accord on mutual recognition and normalization of bilateral relations on 8 April 1996. Belgrade had conceded to Skopje's demand to continue separate negotiations toward an accord on Yugoslavia's continuity. Belgrade even recognized Skopje under its constitutional name, to the utter amazement of Athens. The Greeks were devastated: they expected Milosevic to keep its promise to recognize Skopje under the name of FYROM only. But Stefan Krause and Stan Markotich rightly pointed out that they "obviously underestimated Milosevic's Realpolitik, which led him to do what is in his and in his country's interest without being hindered by any sentimentality about Athens' previous [pro-Serbian] support".¹⁰²

Milosevic calculated that the advantages of recognizing Macedonia outweighed the disadvantages of alienating Greece; he was therefore willing to make heavy concessions to Skopje in order to reach an agreement on normalizing relations. The first big advantage was international recognition: German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said on 8 April that the accord removed "the last obstacle to the recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the member states of the European Union".¹⁰³ Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden had recognized FRY by 22 April - despite objections by the European Parliament on 18 April, which pointed out that improvement of the human rights situation in Kosovo should have remained a precondition of recognition.

The second big advantage was obviously the prospect of increased trade with and through Macedonia. Macedonia would benefit economically in the same way, which was the main reason why most opposition parties (including the extraparliamentary ones) supported the Macedonian-Serbian agreement, and why it was ratified in the Macedonian parliament on 25 April with 75 in favor, 11 against (all from ethnic Albanian parties), and one abstention. Bowing to the inevitable, Greece recognized rump Yugoslavia on the same day, though still seething with anger.

Gligorov's eagerness to improve relations with Belgrade by pushing successfully for mutual recognition may endanger his policy of equidistance in the region, which so far has helped to maintain Macedonia's security. Macedonian commentator Zoran Dimitrovski put the finger on this potential disadvantage in an article on 24 May 1996: "Albania has recognized Macedonia under the name of FYRM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Bulgaria does not recognize its language and nation and the problems with Greece are well known."¹⁰⁴

Dimitrovski was worried about the reactions of the other neighbors to Macedonia's preferential treatment of rump Yugoslavia, given the recent agreement in late May between the two countries to create a free trade zone by 1 January 1999.

The other neighboring countries would be less inclined to respect Macedonia's territorial integrity if it starts to behave like Serbia's subordinate ally just like Montenegro. In that case, Albanian, Bulgarian, and even Greek extremists may get more popular support. They may even get government backing to infiltrate Macedonia and instigate domestic disturbances there, in order to pressure Skopje to return to its equidistant policy, or even to destroy the Macedonian state if pressure fails.

Gligorov needs to be careful: he should not bind himself too closely to Belgrade with economic and political cooperation agreements, nor should he create such an impression. Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece would be willing to risk instability and even warfare in the southern Balkan region rather

than allow the appearance of a de facto Greater Serbia at their borders. Therefore, continuance of equidistant neutralism - which is something else than artificial neutralism by placating all neighboring states at all costs (Belgrade's HRVS against Kosovo's Albanians should still be condemned) - is the best foreign policy to ensure Macedonia's survival into the 21st century. But now we are assessing the likelihood of future events. Such predictions form the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 3. Prospects of Conflict in and on Macedonia after June 1996

3.1 Models of danger, categories of likelihood, and scenario's of conflict

Predictions are based on speculations and guess-work. In essence, future events are unpredictable because the future is not fixed - if we discard the (religious) notions of predetermination and fate. Predictions are 'unscientific' because future scenario's cannot be tested as hypotheses before we have arrived in the future. We can only compare i.e. 'test' our scenario's with actual developments later in time.

We can base our scenario's on past events and patterns uncovered by historical and other forms of analysis. In other words, we can support our scenario's with 'scientific' arguments, pointing to factors which have shown to influence or even shape events like conflicts in a Balkan country. Thus we can structure our predictions, and make at least educated guesses.

We have decided to assess the prospects of conflict in Macedonia until June 1997, for the following two reasons: first, the more distant the future, the more speculative our predictions; second, the chosen period includes the future period of six months and corresponds with the period of one year used in PIOOM's country checklist.¹⁰⁵

We develop one or more scenario's for each level of conflict as shown in Table I. Each scenario, apart from stage I, describes a main external or internal 'aggressor' from a specific quarter, e.g. rump-Yugoslavia. Different manifestations of extremism produce different types of danger to Macedonia's peace and security. This is the reason why we use some basic models of security threats, presented in Table 3.1 (developed by myself), which can be valid for multiple scenario's across different levels of conflict.

The following categories of likelihood (not taken from any source but made by myself) are used to characterize the prospects of the conflict scenario's between 1 June 1996 and 1 June 1997: "very likely", "likely", "possible", "unlikely", "very unlikely", and "unclear" if one is really at a loss about the prospects of a particular scenario. Table 3.2 at the end of this chapter summarizes and refines our predictions by classifying the scenario's according these categories, and assesses the likelihood of infiltration, aggression, etc. from foreign governments rather than insurgent, extra-parliamentary, or parliamentary opposition movements from abroad.¹⁰⁶

In the next sections, we concentrate on some of the most likely and/or interesting scenario's, and assess the role of non-governmental forces as well. We can be succinct about the prospects of the three lowest levels of (non-)conflict in Macedonia in section 3.2, because its domestic and external conflicts since its independence in late 1991 have never moved to a higher stage.

It is much harder to assess the prospects of scenario's covering the higher levels of conflict, because we have conducted no comparative analysis between several Balkan states: elaborate and detailed study of the domestic situations in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia is required in order to predict with confidence the likelihood of "infection"(model 2), and especially "oil-stain"(model 3) and "domino"(model 4). Thus the classification-concepts in Table 3.1, which I developed on my own, are preliminary, and should be tested with further historical and comparative analyses. Thus we can only partially answer the fourth research question formulated in the Introduction.

We must be succinct in our case study about the prospects of instigation, aggression, and chaos emanating from Macedonia's neighbors; otherwise it is no case study anymore. We make one exception: we describe in section 3.3 in some detail the possibilities of lower and high intensity conflict in Macedonia due to developments in Kosovo and Albania. We do this for three reasons:

- Macedonia's main domestic conflict is intertwined with the Albanian communities abroad;
- these interrelations help to explain why conflict escalation is most likely to occur by a rise in Albanian extremism;
- we have to assess the likelihood of such rise in Albanian extremism in Kosovo in particular to underpin our predictions.

Regarding Macedonia's non-Albanian neighbors, including Serbia apart from Kosovo, we can state with some confidence that their political systems are unlikely to collapse in the near future, and that their current governments are unwilling or unable to create political or armed conflicts in Macedonia. Serbia wants to capitalize on its improved relations with Skopje; Bulgaria wants no foreign adventures to wreck its chances of eventual accession to NATO and EU; and Greece can hardly act as an aggressor given the constraints of NATO and EU membership, and has few means to act as an instigator given the absence of a substantial Greek minority to mobilize and manipulate. It is equally unlikely that the present Macedonian government would instigate and escalate conflicts in and with its neighbors - except risking political tensions on international issues like its state name.¹⁰⁷

Extra-parliamentary and oppositional extremists are much more likely to stir up trouble in Macedonia than their respective governments in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece; the classifications for these extremists would be generally one category higher in Table 3.2 (from Possible to Likely, etc.). Thus Bulgarian organizations like VMRO-SMD and Ilinden OMO may well try and succeed in escalating the domestic conflict in Macedonia within the next twelve months

Table 3.1 Types of security threats or Models of danger

1. "The Local Virus": one or more homegrown extremist movements encourage or create political violence or any other method of destabilization within (part) of the country only, without spreading the violence or any other negative aspects to neighboring countries; these extremists want to escalate a conflict in order to come to power or realize any other goal.

This basic scenario is typically existent as a potential danger to a society's peace when the domestic conflict is in a stage of political tension; an actual danger to the state's security when the conflict is in a stage of political conflict; and an acute danger to the state's existence in the form of a civil war in all higher stages of conflict. If the danger is typical of the region but occurs in each country more or less independently, we speak of a "regional virus"; this variant denotes a typical but isolated phenomenon, often the result of similar socio-economic problems and dissatisfactions among countries with a similar culture.

2. "The Infection": one or more foreign extremist movements encourage or establish domestic sister-movements in one or more other countries, creating or escalating a conflict by political violence or other disturbances, in order to seize power or fulfill any other objective.

The main culprit of this kind of danger is external: extremists from abroad, for instance from countries B and C (e.g. from Albania and Kosovo) plot against country A (e.g. Macedonia). Extremists of country A are led by those of countries B and C, or the former at least admire the methods and successes of the latter (even if their ideology is dissimilar) and try to emulate them. Thus external encouragement can a) occur by example of success, or b) by leadership. The first

variant can be called a "regional infection" which, unlike "regional virus", is a typical form of extremism in multiple countries whereby the national branches encourage and support each other. The second variant can be called "aggressive infection", whereby one extremist movement leads the pack, and infiltrate civic and political organizations in other countries to create such a pack.

3. "The Spreading Oil-stain": one aggressor, usually an extremist regime, attacks or invades one or more neighboring countries, in order to destabilize other regimes, occupy territory for nationalist purposes, or to succeed in any other objective.

This basic scenario belongs to the levels of lower intensity and high intensity conflict, because no country under armed attack would be merely in political conflict, let alone in peace! It usually occurs in the form of an interstate war with one clear aggressor. This model often occurs when an extremist movement in country A becomes the new regime either through democratic elections (the "Hitler model"), revolution (the "Lenin model"), or a coup d'état (the "Pinochet model") and invades one or more other countries. Unlike model 2 (infection), the extremists do not have to (and do not want to) limit themselves to stealthy infiltration only.

4. "The Domino": the acts of one or more extremist movements, ranging from creating a localized civil war in one country (model 1) to engaging in stealthy and open forms of territorial expansionism (respectively models 2 and 3), affect the peace and security of multiple countries due to their interdependence.

This basic scenario represents a sudden unravelling, a massive destabilization, of the internal securities of a whole range of countries, caused by one of the other basic scenario's. For instance, a civil war in country A which seemed at first to be a local virus, turns out to have a domino-effect: the anarchism in country A not only destroys its state institutions, but also its trade and other links with the surrounding countries. Refugee flows from country A may also destabilize the internal cohesion of these countries. The collapse of one state may drag surrounding states into similar chaos, disintegration, and anarchy. So an infection leading to an oil-stain with a domino-effect is a typical causal chain of events which simultaneously shows the escalation of a conflict to its highest stage. But the models of danger can be used as mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, so long as a current or future event remains 'stable' within one category.

3.2 Prospects of lower levels of (non-)conflict in the next twelve months

Prospects of de-escalation toward peaceful situation, and stagnation at political tension.

Only a swift and complete resolution of the main domestic conflict - the perceived incompatible interests between Macedonia's ethnic communities on constitutional status and education - can put an end to the interethnic tensions within the next year. Otherwise, a peaceful situation will be extremely unlikely in the near future: Macedonian and Serb reactionaries can misuse Gligorov's *rapprochement* with Belgrade in order to promote forced integration into rump Yugoslavia, and Albanian revolutionaries can exploit the frustration within their community to promote secession. Gligorov, Crvenkovski, and like-minded reformists should finally give the Albanians equal status as a constituent people. The PDP and most other Albanian parties have shown themselves moderate and loyal enough not to misuse equal status to fracture or secede from Macedonia.

The practical difficulties accompanying equal status and education - such as the use of multiple languages in the parliament and other state institutions - can never outweigh the fundamental advantages: improved relations between the ethnicities, and even social stabilization at the lowest stage of non-conflict. Albanian-language schools should teach their pupils Macedonian-Slav as a second compulsory language and *vice versa* in order to prevent *de facto* segregation between the communities. In return for equal constitutional status and tertiary education, the Albanians should concede to the use of the Macedonian language in the central state institutions. Other communities can get equal status as well, as long as this avoids a cacophony of languages spoken in parliament or other absurd outcomes.

Macedonian society may thus become immune against viruses and infections; invasion and destabilization due to anarchy from abroad would be the only dangers left. Alas, developments in the last 12 months show few signs that the SDAM and other ethnic Macedonian parties would soon overcome their fears and suspicions, and grant the ethnic Albanians equal status.

In late May 1996, PDP-leader Aliti warned that if the fundamental Albanian demands were not met, his party and other moderate political forces would not be able to restrain their dissatisfied constituencies for much longer. Therefore, stagnation at political tension is the most likely prospect during the next twelve months, and a temporary escalation toward political conflict with some riots is also likely during this period. Even further escalation toward higher levels of conflict is possible.

Prospects of escalation toward political conflict in Macedonia

Gligorov's fatherly role and PDP's participation in the government since late 1992 have helped to increase Macedonia's state legitimacy among the minority communities. However, this legitimacy remains brittle, and may erode due to large-scale riots and other disturbances causing many casualties. Thus far, such violence, indicating political conflict, has been rare, short-lived, and small-scale. A quick and easy escalation from political tension to political conflict due to external infection is not very likely - except in the case of Kosovo. Patience is wearing thin among Kosovo's Albanians; a violent revolt against Belgrade's rule would involve military support from Albanian revolutionaries in Macedonia (and Albania) and vice versa, if Albanian revolutionaries from Kosovo try to support their secessionist 'brothers' in Macedonia. Thus the biggest and most likely danger to Macedonia's peace and security is a quick escalation from political tension - then merely a transit stage - to political conflict in Macedonia due to big disturbances in Kosovo.

Even low intensity conflict is possible. We assess the prospects of violent conflict(s) in Kosovo in the scenario's of armed conflict in Macedonia in the next section.

3.3 Prospects of armed conflict caused by Albanian extremism from abroad

Developments in Kosovo and Albania

Since the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosova on 2 July 1991, its 'President' Ibrahim Rugova has been able to lead a largely peaceful resistance against Belgrade's suppressive rule. But how long would he and his supporters be able to keep this resistance peaceful? Until recently, most Albanians in Kosovo expected to be rewarded by the international community for their pacifism. However, since June 1995, Rugova and other Albanian leaders have repeatedly and vainly called for conflict resolution in Kosovo as part of an overall peace settlement and as a precondition of FRY's recognition - and the lifting of UN sanctions. But the Dayton accord in

November '95 did not address the Kosovo issue, and rump Yugoslavia was recognized by the international community in April '96 despite the continuing suppression in Kosovo.

The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (NMLK) distributed pamphlets in the Albanian capital of Tirana during October '95 with the text "What are you waiting for, Albanians? Why do you not rise up in war?", a clear attempt to infect the minds in a province of a neighboring country.¹⁰⁸ This Tirana-based (!) nationalist movement had made many more calls of this nature in its paper *Clirimi* (Liberation) during the previous three years. This time they were really dangerous, given the low priority given to Kosovo by the American negotiators led by Holbrooke, and the resulting dissolution among many Albanians. The paper *Clirimi* also attacked Albanian president Berisha for being so enthusiastic about American promises to pressure Milosevic to give Kosovo its autonomy back.

Albanian extremists inside and outside Kosovo were also able to exploit the rising tensions in late 1995 caused by the resettlement of nearly 10,000 Croatian-Serb refugees in Kosovo after the fall of Knin Krajina to the Croat army (some refugees were sent by Belgrade to this region against their will). They were also able to exploit the rising frustration caused by the continuing and relentless persecution of revolutionaries, radical dissidents, and other people by the Serb authorities. For instance, the Serbian district court in Prizren sentenced in late September '95 as many as 44 former policemen and local officials to a total of 113 years imprisonment for setting up a parallel Albanian police force and administration. During 1995, at least 294 Kosovo Albanians were sentenced on the charge of endangering Serbia's territorial integrity.¹⁰⁹

During October and November 1995, Rugova still continued to press for inclusion of the Kosovo issue on the agenda of the peace conference on former Yugoslavia, while the negotiations in Dayton (Ohio, US) almost exclusively concentrated on Bosnia. Rugova still insisted that only an independent and neutral Kosovo would be "a just and lasting resolution", giving ample ammunition to revolutionaries to stick to the maximalist demand of full independence - something which even moderate Serb politicians would never agree to.

The demand for a return to the autonomy that Kosovo enjoyed prior to its abolition in 1990 is much more reasonable and realistic, and enjoys strong US and EU support.

Indeed, the Western powers demanded in March 1996 greater autonomy for Kosovo, as a precondition for full diplomatic relations - though after FRY's recognition in the next month there was confusion about whether recognition already meant full normalization, or whether the latter also meant good relations with multiple (economic) cooperation agreements. Maybe the Western powers deliberately kept the distinction vague after their quick recognition of FRY - with the exception of the US.

Anyway, by that time Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) had heightened expectations too much by its continuing demands for full independence to settle on a lesser goal.

Even attempts by LDK-prime minister Bukoshi, Albanian foreign minister Serreqi, and others to soften the pill with a transition period under a UN protectorate, or any other kind of "temporary international civil administration", were unsuccessful and bound to fail. After the signing of the Dayton peace accord, Rugova attempted to enlist support for LDK's demands from other countries than the United States, notably from Germany. All these diplomatic offensives to gather international support fell on deaf ears; Western politicians praised Rugova's peaceful policy probably because they were relieved that Kosovo had not (yet) been consumed by warfare.

Seven political parties in Kosovo sent a joint letter to the Paris Conference, where the Dayton accord was officially signed on 14 December 1995, protesting the marginalization of the Kosovo issue and the absence of 'legitimate' LDK-representatives at the negotiation table.

Given this disillusion and anger, we should not be surprised about the increasing number of violent attacks by Albanian revolutionaries since the beginning of 1996. Even Albania suffered some violence in early 1996, particularly the car bomb explosion in a supermarket in central Tirana on 26 February 1996, killing 3 people and injuring 26 others (ex-Communist reactionaries of the former secret police and Mafiosi were the most likely culprits).

The first major act of violence in Kosovo occurred on 11 February 1996, when hand-grenades were thrown in several Serb refugee camps, causing some explosions but no casualties (according to Serb authorities). A representative of the NMLK (the owner of Clirimi mentioned earlier) said on 17 February that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) carried out the bombings, warning that "this is only the beginning". Albanian politicians in Tirana blamed Rugova's indulgent policies for the February '96 bomb blasts rather than the perpetrators. Some of them, including Berisha, may even be tempted to start trouble in Macedonia and Kosovo again, just as they did during the early '90s.

On the same day, LDK-deputy chairman Hydajet Hyseni claimed that he never heard about the KLA, and that he believed the Serbian extreme-nationalist Vojislav Seselj to be responsible for the terrorist attack, so as to discredit and divide the LDK. Hyseni concluded that "the best way to eliminate radicalism and the work of anarchist and extremist forces is to secure a fair and lasting solution to the issue of Kosovo".¹¹⁰ But the trouble was that the LDK still saw full independence as the only 'fair and lasting solution'.

This rigidity was an understandable reaction to Serb nationalism, fanned and led by Milosevic since the late '80s. It explains LDK-deputy chairman Fehmi Agani's remark on 15 March 1996 that "with its acts, Belgrade is ever more convincing the Albanians of their [independence] demands".¹¹¹ So a statist, post-Milosevic regime may eventually convince them to agree on autonomy after all.

Criticisms on Rugova's policy increased during the first half of 1996. Notably, Adem Demaci, leader of the Kosovo Human Rights and Freedoms Committee, remarked in mid-February 1996 that LDK's leadership "will find it difficult to produce what they have promised the people [independence and international support for it]".¹¹³ He added that they must face some facts and make some hard choices: if American negotiators like Holbrooke would come forward and state that they should take autonomy or leave it, "we must demonstrate that we are also capable of rejecting it, but not merely rejecting it verbally and then drinking tea and coffee and hoping for a miracle".¹¹³

Demaci ridiculed the naive optimism of Rugova & company, and suggested that the LDK may have to operate in the wilderness if it wanted to stick to the goal of independence. He denied reports that he was planning to form a new political bloc against the LDK, arguing that it would only divide and weaken the opposition to Belgrade. But the fact that these rumors were circulating, indicated an erosion of LDK's legitimacy and cohesion as a strategic alliance.

... and the likely effects on Macedonia

Given these developments in Kosovo and Albania, trouble in Macedonia, ranging from political tension to lower intensity conflict, due to infection from the Albanian government or extremist Kosova movements remains a (likely to slim) possibility. High intensity conflict is highly improbable, as the Macedonian government would not respond with ethnic cleansing or other methods of genocide and/or politicide, even if Albanian revolutionaries would throw bombs or commit other terrorist acts.

Albanian president Berisha repeatedly assured the outside world that he only wanted a dialogue between the legitimate Albanian leaders of Kosovo and Belgrade with a mediating third party. But

can Berisha be trusted? He continued to show his intolerance to the ex-Communist Socialist Party, the Democratic Alliance (a breakaway group from the ruling Democratic Party), and other opposition parties. The authoritarianism displayed by Berisha's DP culminated in the approval on 22 September 1995 of the absurd "Law on Genocide" (supposedly committed during the Communist period), and in the irregularities during the first round of parliamentary elections on 27 May 1996, when the SP and other opposition parties decided to withdraw their candidates.¹¹⁴ Albanian Speaker Arbënorë's remark on 31 January 1996 to a group of parliamentarians of the Republic of Kosovo that "we have never hidden the fact that we are an unjustly divided nation and this is the greatest injustice for the Albanian nation so far"¹¹⁵, hardly signified a real acceptance of the multi-ethnic Macedonian state! On the contrary, it signified a continued longing for a Greater Albania. The same nationalist view was implicit in Albanian foreign minister Serreqi's paradoxical remark on 27 March 1996 that "Albania maintains the image of the factor of stability in the region though half of its population lives out of its national borders"(emphasis my own).¹¹⁶ This shows how much we need statist outlooks and ideologies to keep the Balkans or any other region peaceful and stable.

One thing is certain: since late 1995, non-government extremists from Albania were actively aiming to escalate tensions in Kosovo into a political conflict or worse, all of which could spill over into Macedonia.

The Macedonian government, worried about the instability at its northern border with Kosovo, was considering in mid-May 1996 a request to Washington for a contingent of US troops, even if the UN Security Council were to decide to extend UNPREDEP's mission after the expiration date of 31 May 1996 (which it did). It made this request despite the recent decision in Washington not to help the Macedonian Army to boost its amount of heavy weaponry (see section 2.2.1). Nothing came of the request, but it shows how worried the Macedonian government was about recent developments in Kosovo. Defense minister Handžiski's remark in early June 1996 that "We created a legal basis for the presence of US forces in the Republic of Macedonia with the aim of providing a collective approach to the defense of our country" was clearly not just intended to allow US participation in military exercises in NATO's PFP programme.¹¹⁷

Table 3.2. Likelihood-classifications of conflict-scenarios in Macedonia

[Table lost; reconstitute]

Explanation Table 3.2

VUL = Very unlikely; UL = Unlikely; P = Possible; L = Likely; VL = Very likely; ? = Unclear. Classifications are based on likelihood of government involvement, including the DSK-government in Kosovo.

Examples: When in bold (e.g., P), one shows that one is pretty sure about one's prediction. When one doubts whether a scenario is unlikely, possible, or likely, one could indicate this with <P>, UL>>, or <<L, depending on which category one slightly prefers (one arrow points to the next category, and two arrows point to two adjacent categories in one or both directions). Possibilities like >> with three arrows represent so much uncertainty, that one could just as well use '?'.

Addition: Macedonian Gov. (M) affecting a) Albania, b) Kosovo, c) Serbia, d) Bulgaria, e) Greece
Political tension by infection from M: P in a), b), d), and e); UL in c)

Political conflict by infection from M: P in b); UL in countries a), d), and e); VUL in c)

Lower intensity conflict by infection from M: P in b); VUL in a), c), d), and e)

Lower intensity conflict by aggression from M: VUL in all countries

Lower intensity conflict by domino-effect from M: if it collapses (UL), L in b); P in a) and d); UL in c); VUL in e)

High intensity conflict by infection from M: UL in b); VUL in a), c), d), and e)

High intensity conflict by aggression from M: VUL in all countries

High intensity conflict by domino-effect from M: if collapse (UL), P in a), b) and d); VUL in c) and e)

Conclusion

Main findings

Our elaborate and detailed historical analysis has uncovered the following wave pattern of domestic conflict in Macedonia during the last five years: short upsurges of violence lasting not more than a week, often fanned by extremists but quickly and effectively constrained by moderates, followed by long periods of relative calm of many weeks or even months, though with continuing interethnic tensions due to unresolved conflict issues.

This wave pattern is shown in the Figure below, with the main (known) incidents at the top of the waves. The form of the wave pattern points to a remarkable robustness of Macedonian society, despite all the internal problems and external challenges it suffered since its independence.

The strong backbone of society helped the moderates to form and maintain strong and wide alliances, while the (near-)extremists were often forced to split from the mainstream political movements, form their own organizations, and unsuccessfully try to form their own alliances. Thus we have been able to fully answer the first and second research questions (see Introduction).

Pattern of Macedonia's domestic conflict

Illyrida Bit Pazar Jan 92 Nov 92: 4 dead	Ethnic fights? Tetovo Jun 94: 1 dead Feb 95: 1 dead	Ass. attempt Oct 95 2 dead
Political conflict		
<hr/>		
Political tension		
<hr/>		
Peaceful situation		
<hr/>		

Our analysis leaves us with some questions about historical events. For example, why did the declaration of the autonomous Illyrida Republic in January 1992 not create a big political crisis? Our sources do not mention any riots, confrontations between Albanian separatists and Macedonian soldiers, or other disturbances that could cause many casualties. For some reason, the Macedonian authorities did not think it necessary to respond with military intimidation or force. Maybe the separatists lacked popular support (but what about the referendum?), got the cold shoulder from the PDP and other mainstream Albanian parties, and thus were not deemed a serious threat. However, we need to be sure. Also, the death of a Macedonian youth by interethnic gang-warfare on 18 June 1994 stirred up a great deal of emotions; but it is unclear whether this was part of bigger unrest. Further research is required to fill in the blank spots.

In total, eight people have died in indirect political violence (riots, etc.) and direct political violence (assassinations, etc.) during the last five years, a rough average of 2 fatalities per year. In quantitative terms, we could classify Macedonia in PIOOM's "serious dispute"(political conflict) category. However, our - and PIOOM's - definition of political tension includes "no major violence against persons" - which still means some violence.

If we apply a quantitative criterion like "less than 10 political victims per year" for conflict stage II, we could even state that Macedonia has never been in the third stage of political conflict. However, PIOOM's global survey of conflicts for 1994-1995 places Macedonia in the serious dispute

category.¹¹⁸ Even if we discard the quantitative categories and look at the qualitative definitions of the conflict stages only, we could never place Macedonia in the third category for 1994-1995: the threat of violent escalation has been sporadic, never continuous. Moreover, alliance rather than factional politics has dominated in Macedonia, despite the deep social cleavages. And the Macedonian government and state institutions, if sometimes unpopular, have been able to maintain their legitimacy.

Assessment of the concepts and typologies used

The gap between our and PIOOM's classification of Macedonia within the five stages of conflict may be caused by the vagueness of the definitions of these stages. Our definition of 'war' may help to sharpen the distinction between the two highest stages of conflict: we could use the term "high intensity conflicts" to indicate wars in which opposing parties try to defeat or even destroy each other. But otherwise we have to think anew about the whole structure of the conflict typology; new formulations and distinctions may be necessary.¹¹⁹

Our own concepts and typologies need to be improved as well. The explanatory power of alliance formation has been satisfactory, so that we can answer the third research question in the affirmative: alignments and realignments have affected Macedonia's conflicts (the domestic ones in particular), and the political organizations who have been able to form the biggest and most solid alliances have also generally been the most powerful and successful ones. But we have detected two limitations:

First, the explanatory power of alliances in Macedonian politics lessened as soon as the existing alliances consolidated and settled into a fixed relation with other alliances or parties. In contrast, busy periods of realignments, like during 1993 between Albanian political forces with breakaway groups trying to supersede the old parties, have been very revealing. Such periods showed who were strong and who were weak, who were smart and who were dumb. The key concept is thus realignment rather than alignment.

Second, the distinction between strategic alliances and tactical alliances has not worked. It is difficult to determine when and to what degree politicians follow their ideological principles, or any opportunistic motivations, when they (try to) form certain alliances. The coupling of "long-term" to "strategic", and "short-term" to "tactical" should also be discarded, because they are based on the untested assumption that opportunistic alliances are less stable than ideological ones. Therefore, we propose the following new concept:

Political alliance: any form of cooperation between two or more political and/or civic organizations or factions within those organizations with

- common outlooks (moderatist or extremist) and ideological goals (*ideological alliance*, between moderates only, etc.);
- common outlooks but dissimilar objectives or priorities (*pragmatic alliance*, e.g.. between reformists and radicals);
- different outlooks but with at least one common objective (*opportunist alliance* to share power, or *emergency alliance* to stave of a common external enemy, etc.).

We assume that political alliances between parties with different outlooks and no common objective at all cannot be established or survive for long. The fundamental concepts, moderatism vs. extremism and nationalism vs. statism have generally worked well. The types of political orientation, ranging from reactionaries to revolutionaries, have been useful categories as well.

However, one must be careful about what kind of status quo one is referring to: if this means general acceptance of Macedonia's post-Yugoslav independence, then most moderate forces in that country can be described as 'conservative'. Pro-Yugoslav reactionaries have been weak and small compared to the mostly Albanian revolutionaries who have wanted to secede from Macedonia and merge into a greater Albania; even the PDP has harbored such people, as shown by the "Albanian Army" crisis in November '93.

If we define the status quo as the acceptance of the 1991 Constitution, then nearly all Albanian parties can be described as radicals (while generally reformist or conservative regarding the protection of Macedonia's independence and cohesion). In short, the typology of political orientation works only if we specify the content of *status quo*.

Finally, we have been able to answer the fifth research question on conflict resolution and settlement only in a limited way. We have described some major international initiatives at mediation in Macedonia's internal and external conflicts, but only superficially.

Our available sources do not include official documents or detailed accounts of international negotiations, let alone information on experimental methods of conflict resolution, such as problem-solving workshops initiated by either Macedonian or foreign (academic) experts. It would have been nice to find and study such information, given our discussion in the Introduction on the theoretical concepts and practical methods developed and applied in Conflict and Peace Studies. We were unable to do this on such a short notice (a month-long research), but hope that our suggestions and findings are useful to the theorists and practitioners in the field of polemology.

Epilogue. Tension and Conflict in and on Macedonia since June 1996

A first look at the predictions, with some rules and circumscriptions

Most of the predictions in Table 3.2 and its Explanation have been confirmed. Any scenario which has transpired within the twelve months from 1 June 1996, and have been classified as P, L, or VL in July '96, is supported. Scenario's which have not transpired and are classified as UL or VUL are confirmed as well. Likewise, scenario's which have happened but are classified as VUL and UL, and those which have not happened but are classified as P, L, or VL, are refuted. The latter may be correct on the longer term, if they materialize sometime beyond June '97.¹²⁰

However, the most important predictions on Kosovo and Albania have been refuted. Political or higher conflicts in Macedonia due to political or higher conflicts in Albania or Kosovo, or due to infiltration or aggression from those areas, have not occurred. The absence of low intensity conflict in Macedonia due to infection or any other threat from Albania, as predicted, is correct for so far the disturbances in January '97 (an escalation from political tension to political conflict), and the subsequent uprisings in the South in March '97 (an escalation from political conflict to low intensity conflict), have remained a local virus. I have not expected such a spontaneous revolt.

But my main expectation, "big disturbances" in Kosovo leading to either infection, aggression, or a domino-effect on Macedonia resulting in political or higher levels of conflict in the latter, have not materialized. And the expectation of political conflict in Macedonia due to domestic polarization (classified as "Likely" under "Virus") may only be correct if it represents short upsurges in political violence, according the wave pattern displayed in the Conclusion. Continuing disturbances with dozens of casualties have been absent in Macedonia up to now. The other classifications in the 'Infection'-column across the scenario's of political conflict in Table 3.2 may be correct as well, so long as they refer to short upsurges of political conflict in Macedonia. But we need to look further into the domestic situations of Macedonia's neighbors in future research to be more confident about the validity of our predictions. It is also difficult to determine whether our predictions on tensions and conflicts in Macedonia's neighbors due to infections i.e. infiltrations from the Macedonian regime (see Explanation Table 3.2) are valid without further research. However, lower intensity conflict in Kosovo due to infection from Macedonia, predicted as "Possible", has definitely not materialized.

Therefore, we have decided to concentrate exclusively on the developments in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo over the last twelve months. The reasons for this are threefold:

First, we have concentrated on prospects of higher levels of conflict in Macedonia due to developments in Kosovo and Albania in chapter 3, one reason being the fact that "Macedonia's main domestic conflict is intertwined with the Albanian communities abroad"(see section 3.1).

Second, the predictions on Kosovo have been generally refuted, and the predictions on Albania have overlooked the possibility of spontaneous revolts with no significant "spreading of the violence or any other negative aspects to neighboring countries (see Local Virus, Table 3.1). Therefore, detailed but compact analyses of recent developments in Kosovo and Albania would be most interesting, and may give us some leads on the (possible) reasons why most of our main predictions have not happened.

Third, such historical analyses for all neighboring countries of Macedonia would take up too much room for this Epilogue, so we need to make some choices. The first two reasons make it easy for us. Moreover, cursory examination of the available sources has shown that the bilateral relations

between Macedonia and its three non-Albanian neighbors have hardly changed over the last year. On the whole, these relations have been business-like and cooperative, but continue to be burdened by the language issue with Bulgaria, the name issue with Greece, and the Yugoslav succession issue with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. True, if the political protests in Bulgaria and Serbia against the ex-Communist, Socialist regimes in late '96 and early '97 would have been more violent, they may have affected Macedonia's internal stability significantly. In that sense, further analysis of these domestic developments in Bulgaria and Serbia remains advisable.

However, the basic limitations of our case study as outlined in chapter 3 (see pages 62 and 63) remain. Thus our assessments of our predictions are just as preliminary as the predictions. The analysis between 1 February and 1 June 1997 is more cursory and preliminary than between 1 June 1996 and 31 January 1997 (with the exception of Albania), as information from main sources (like BBC's SWB) has been gathered only for the first eight months. For the last four months we have mainly relied upon newspaper and academic articles. If I happen to stumble upon important information beyond 1 June 1997, it will be used. The outer limit for happenings is 1 July 1997.¹²¹

Developments in Macedonia since June 1996

Political tensions in Macedonia continued to rise during the late summer and autumn of 1996. Throughout July, tens of thousands of Albanians demonstrated in Tetovo, Skopje, and elsewhere against the ruling of the Tetovo municipal court that rector Sulejmani, chairman of the Tetovo university Senate Fejziu, PPU-leader Halili, and two others connected to the 'illegal' Tetovo university, should report to the authorities on 22 July to serve their sentences passed on 19 June ranging from four months to a year. Apart from supporting the leaders of this university, some of whom were released on bail on 30 May 1995 (see section 2.1.1), and demanding the nullification of the sentences and the release of all 'political prisoners', these demonstrators chanted their well-known demands for equal (tertiary) education and constitutional status for Albanians. Their grievances were real, and were supported by Human Rights Watch, which reported in late June that the Macedonian government discriminated against Albanians, particularly in the public service sector. But some Albanian demonstrators carried the flag of the Republic of Albania, chanted the Albanian national anthem, and even shouted slogans against the Macedonian state, possibly representing an acute erosion of regime legitimacy (political conflict in the qualitative sense). These demonstrations were supported by the NDP, PDPA, and even the PDP. Members of NDP and PDP also walked out of the parliament during early and mid-July over its refusal to discuss the Tetovo university issue.¹²² NDP-secretary B. Ibrahim announced on 23 July 1996 new protests, until "the Macedonian authorities ... realize that the Albanians are right and that there will be no peace in Macedonia and in neighboring countries without their goodwill".¹²³

These protests were interpreted by ethnic Macedonians as ominous signs of impending interethnic conflict, endangering the fabric of the multi-ethnic state. Leading members of the Association of Macedonian Ethnologists suggested in late July that they considered the protests as dangerous manifestations of Greater Albanian separatism, supposedly fanned by extreme Islamic groups. They and T. Stojanovski, leader of the small Democratic Party of Macedonia (DPM - see Table 1.1.B), voiced their surprise at the government's tolerance toward these protests with all those foreign state symbols (but PDPA-leaders A. Xhateri and M.Thaci were found guilty on 26 October 1996 for carrying the Albanian national flag during a campaign rally just prior to the 1994 elections). Stojanovski even warned on 15 August of a "Pristina-Tirana-Tetovo triangle" of Albanian radicals and extremists, who were using the education issue as a pretext to increase

tensions for their own purposes. Also Gligorov, still the most popular politician with 73.3% support, concluded on 17 December that "various nationalistic radical circles have been identified with the request for an ethnic university". Even the UN Secretary-general warned in his report of 30 September 1996 to the Security Council that "inter-ethnic tensions continue to pose a threat to the country's social fabric, its integration and its long-term stability".¹²⁴

These warnings were understandable but rather alarmist. In my opinion, only a grave political crisis or a humanitarian crisis (see Table I) would really destroy the fabric of the Macedonian state; and such crises are still unlikely even beyond June '97. Remarks by radical and extremist Albanians have led to more political tension and short periods of political conflict in Macedonia, but never to structural escalation i.e. political crisis. And Crvenkovski's government managed once again to ease interethnic tensions by releasing Fejziu from prison on 27 August 1996.

However, such measures were insufficient to significantly lower tensions, let alone arrive at a peaceful situation. First of all, PDP-leader Aliti urged in mid-August his coalition-partners to show political courage and legalize the Tetovo university. He was right: only a fundamental acceptance of equal education and constitutional status for Albanians would settle Macedonian society into the lowest stage of non-conflict.¹²⁵ We already argued for such a conflict resolution in chapter 3. Secondly, other measures contributed to a heightening of tensions, such as the imprisonment of PPU-leader Halimi and M. Halimi (again) on 26 August 1996 after the Appeals Court rejected their appeals. Moreover, the government approved unanimously on 27 August the draft law on territorial division of the republic into 120 municipalities. The final version with 123 municipalities was approved by the Assembly on 12 September 1996; the City of Skopje was added on 13 September as a special 124th 'municipality'. The PDP reluctantly accepted this, but the PDPA vowed to boycott the local elections in mid-November '96 because the territorial division would split up the Albanian vote in western Macedonia (it retracted its boycott-threat later on). The government also decided on 27 August to consider as illegal the decision of Tetovo to hold a referendum on the division of its territory into five new municipalities. The chairman of the Tetovo assembly, S. Aliti, defiantly announced on 30 August that the referendum would go ahead - in accordance with Article 15 of the Law on Local Self-Government. And why were municipalities like Skopje allowed to hold referenda on the same issue, he wondered.¹²⁶

Tensions remained high anyway due to the outbreak of poisoning in early October among hundreds of Albanian children in elementary schools and among dozens of Albanian youngsters and students in secondary schools and universities in and around Tetovo. Despite assurances by the Ministry of Health that toxicological analyses did not produce any signs of poisoning or infectious disease, thousands of Albanians marched into the streets demanding a serious investigation. The Albanian community believed that their sick children were poisoned by ethnic-Macedonian extremists, remembering similar cases of poisoning in Kosovo five years earlier. Their suspicions were confirmed when the Ministry of Internal Affairs admitted in mid-October that it had discovered poisonous capsules in the possession of two extremist groups in the vicinity of Tetovo, which may account for the 1,000 sick children from more than 10 primary and secondary schools in the Tetovo region. The identities of the culprits were not yet disclosed, but the belated investigations helped to dampen the unrest, which was on the verge of becoming really violent. During 10-11 October 1996, crowds in Velika Rjecica and Poraj captured five ethnic Macedonians, including two women, suspected of the poisonings. PDP-leader Aliti and PDPA-politician Dzaferi just managed to rescue the two women from a lynching mob. And an Albanian crowd demolished the Tetovo health center on 16 October.¹²⁷ The October protests were the closest instance of political conflict during 1996 - without, however, leading to any fatalities.

Notwithstanding the protests in July and October '96, the preparations for the local elections proceeded normally. The VMRO-DPNME decided in early September to drop its self-defeating boycott policy, introduced during the parliamentary elections of October '94 (see section 1.2.1), and participate in the upcoming local elections. Its leader Georgievski hoped that the Constitutional Court would approve the request by his party and the Democratic Party (DP) to hold a referendum on 26 September 1996 for new parliamentary elections (rejected by the Assembly). But he indicated that a negative decision by the court would not affect his party's participation in the local elections. On 7 October 1996, VMRO-DPNME, DP, and the Movement for All-Macedonian Action [MAAK]-Conservative Party formed an electoral coalition. The LP led by S. Andov - which had called for new parliamentary elections to be held after 15 September as well - decided to contest the municipal and mayoral seats on its own. Also the PDP and NDP signed a cooperation agreement on 12 October, for joint lists for prefects and councilors only.

The first local elections since Macedonia's independence in 1991, on 17 November (first round) and 1 December 1996 (second round), produced the following official results for 114 of the 124 municipalities (re-votings for the council-seats had to take place in 10 municipalities due to irregularities): the SDAM got 500 council-seats out of the 1,903 seats (of all 124 municipalities); the VMRO-DPNME 321; the PDP 156; the SP 140; the DP 123; the PDPA 107; the LP 104; and the Democratic Party of Turks (DPT) got 36 seats (how many did the MAAK-Conservative Party get?). The final results for the mayor-seats were as follows: the SDAM won 52; the VMRO-DPNME 15; the DP 13; the PDP 13 (one won with NDP's support); the PDPA 7 (three won with NDP's support); the SP 7; and 2 seats for the DPT. Some smaller parties, such as the DPS (Serbian), won 1 mayoral seat each.¹²⁸ The coalition of VMRO-DPNME, DP, and MAAK-Conservative party did well in the big cities; their candidate Risto Penov (DP) even won the mayor-post of Skopje. The VMRO-DPNME derided Gligorov's SDAM as an "agrarian or village party", even though the latter still won the most seats for councils, mayors, and prefects.

A new round of protests took place in January 1997 - this time by ethnic Macedonians. Thousands of Macedonian students, teachers, and other intellectuals took to the streets of Skopje to voice their opposition against the draft Law on the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje, which would allow high school education in the Albanian language. On 14 January 1997, 406 Albanian students from Skopje University signed a declaration denouncing the protests by their fellow students as "incomprehensible and senseless, .. particularly .. for intellectuals, as the [Macedonian] students aspire to be".¹²⁹ Indeed, these protests were a sad manifestation of intolerance and exaggerated fears of Albanian segregationism and separatism through bilingualism. The proposed law on equal education on the tertiary level at colleges and universities was a real attempt at conflict resolution; it would do much to solve the emotive language issue. This intolerance also hardened the stance of the Albanian parties: M. Tairi (PDP) walked out of the Assembly on 23 January, after his proposal to speak in Albanian was rejected (he recalled the 1976 Rules of Procedure which allowed the use of diverse languages in parliament); other Albanian deputies threatened to walk out as well on the same issue. Hopefully, the SDAM's denouncement in mid-January of the Macedonian student protests - it is "untypical to protest against someone's democratic rights" ¹³⁰- will help to retain the PDP's trust in the SDAM's good intentions, and maintain the multi-ethnic government coalition. The law on tertiary education was adopted on 29-30 January 1997, by a majority of 58 deputies (12 voted against, 3 abstained - apparently meeting the quorum), all and only from the SDAM. None of the PDP-deputies supported the bill, because it was a narrow law limited to the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje, not a broad, comprehensive law on tertiary education in minority languages which would have legalized the Tetovo university.

The months from 1 February 1997 onwards show a mixed pattern of decreasing and increasing tensions. On the one hand, interethnic tensions eased by the release of the Tetovo university rector Sulejmani on 1 February 1997, two months before completing his one-year jail term. On the other hand, even the fifth (!) revoting of local elections at two polling stations in Tetovo on 2 February led to fights between PDP- and PDPA-members just like during the fourth revoting-attempt on 19 January. Interethnic tensions remained high as well due to continuing protests by Macedonian students against the tertiary education bill in mid-February. This bill appears to be in trouble, as it has been declared null and void by the Constitutional Court. PDP-leader Aliti even had to counter rumors in mid-February that his party would leave the government, by dramatically outlining PDP's vital role: "It is hard inside the government, but it is even harder outside it, and it is a danger not only to the stability of Macedonia, but at large, to stability in the region".¹³¹

The SDAM-PDP alliance came under further pressure during May '97, when VMRO-DPNME organized protests calling for the resignations of Gligorov and Crvenkovski, and for new elections. The largest protest with 30,000 people took place on 15 May in Skopje. During late May and early June, it managed to organize demonstrations in 35 cities apart from Skopje.¹³³

International organizations became worried about these domestic developments, as shown by statements from the Presidency of the EU on 11 March 1997 and from the Permanent Council of the OSCE on 13 March, and by the report of the new UN-Secretary-General Kofi Annan on UNPREDEP on 12 May. Annan warns that "radical demands have resumed in some ethnic Albanian communities to establish ethically based federalism in the Republic".¹³²

Developments in Kosovo since June 1996

In the second half of 1996, Rugova's DSK and shadow government in Kosovo had hardly any time to comment on developments inside Macedonia. It had to deal with the increasing attacks by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), leading to more repression by Serbia, as shown by the brutal killing of an Albanian, A. Paljukaj, on 27 July 1996, the tenth Albanian victim in 1996. On 2 August 1996, several bombs were thrown at police stations in Podujevo and Pristina; on 28 August three bombs were thrown at a police station in Celopek; on 27 September some bombs were thrown at an army compound in Vucitrn, a police station in Rudnik, and a police checkpoint at Podujevo; on 25 October a policeman and an administrator were killed in Sarkas; on 15 November unidentified persons opened fire on a police station in Irzniq (no casualties); on 26 December F. Belopoj, an ethnic Albanian and supposed 'collaborator', was killed in Besija; on 9 January 1997, M. Seholi, an ethnic Albanian and local party member of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), was killed in Podujevo; and on 16 January R. Papovic, the Serbian rector of Pristina University, and his driver were seriously injured in a car-bomb blast.¹³⁴ The list could go on and on. The KLA claimed responsibility for most of them. As expected, Kosovo has drifted into a political conflict situation since the first terrorist actions by the KLA in February '96.

The Serbian authorities took the threat of the KLA seriously. But its repressive counteractions, such as the usual roundups of Albanian residents near the places of KLA-attacks, only solidified the vicious cycle of violence through tit-for-tat reprisals. The Serbian police arrested A. Klinaku, leader of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (NMLK), and several other NMLK-members on 26 January 1997 on suspicion of involvement with the KLA. But the radical movement may just have been a convenient target. The NMLK rejected the accusation that it was a terrorist organization on 2 February 1997, and dissociated itself publicly from the KLA.¹³⁵

The Democratic League of Kosovo tried to circumvent the 'KLA-factor'. On 31 October 1996, LDK-premier Bukoshi claimed he knew nothing about the KLA - "we are not aware of the

existence of this 'army'" 136- and suggested that Milosevic was behind the terror. But these allegations, that "the Liberation army may actually be a Serbian-backed enterprise, launched to jeopardize the non-violent policy of the Kosovars"(F. Schmidt)¹³⁷, were not supported with proof or reliable indications. Fabian Schmidt rightly points out that the KLA does not seem "at all capable of seriously hurting its enemy, the Serbian police and army" and "has [instead] attacked Serbian police and civilians arbitrarily at their weakest points".¹³⁸ However, I disagree with his (or her) assessment that the KLA is too small and too extreme to become popular among mainstream Albanians. True, the KLA is unlikely to become a "broader guerrilla movement" in the near future - though a recent CIA-report predicts that the KLA could mobilize within 2 or 3 year tens of thousands of (new) supporters to create havoc in Kosovo.¹³⁹ An opinion poll in mid-February '97 shows that 44% of the respondents views KLA's terrorist actions as harmful to the independence movement, but that 37% regards these bombings and assassinations as contributing to a "quicker solving of the Kosovo problem". A typical example is Edmond Hodza, a 21-year old law student killed in late January 1997 by a Serbian anti-terrorism squad. According the Serbian police, he and his two companions were KLA-terrorists. The police may be right: Hodza became frustrated after his father had been fired two years earlier without getting a pension; after his [two] sisters had been dismissed from university; and after his brother had been sentenced in absentia to five years in prison (he fled to Switzerland).¹⁴⁰ Denying KLA's existence, or its potential as a rival, is wishful thinking on LDK's part. The danger of extremization will not go away, despite positive developments such as the signing an accord on the normalization of Albanian education in Kosovo by Milosevic and Rugova on 2 September 1996 (by January '97, it was still not implemented).¹⁴¹ All in all, I agree with Schmidt's general prediction that "it is likely that frustrations will grow and Kosovo will enter a period of long-lasting, low-level conflict".¹⁴²

The Serbian reprisals failed to dampen the conflict in 1997. The frequency of lethal violence appears to be increasing. The KLA claimed responsibility for six attacks during the first five months of 1997, as many as during 1996. Since the first attacks in February '96, at least 17 people, nine Serbs and 8 Albanians, have died by June '97. The state authorities have killed at least as many people during the same period. The brutalities by the Serbian state seem to increase as well. On 25 February 1997, the Albanian B. Restelica was tortured to death. D. Pack, a member of the European Parliament, managed to see the body: it showed signs of torture. Another MEP, J. Swoboda, remarked that "the situation can explode at any moment" given such cruelties.¹⁴³ It has not exploded yet, as I have expected, but the potential for it remains.

Developments in Albania since June 1996

Albania was stable enough during the latter half of 1996 for it to meddle intensely with Macedonia's internal affairs, spoiling the bilateral relations between Tirana and Skopje. The Macedonian government sent a protest note on 6 August 1996, denouncing the resolution by the Albanian parliament to support the Tetovo university, passed just during the July '96 protests in Macedonia. And the Macedonian foreign minister Frckovski said in early September that he considered Tirana's official support for the fundamental demands of Macedonia's Albanians as interference in his country's internal affairs. The Albanian Foreign Ministry responded that his country's intentions were honorable, and that demands like education in one's mother tongue were legitimate and conform international standards; therefore, his government's support of these demands constituted no objectionable interference. Contacts continued between Albanian parties from both countries, such as between DPA-chairman T. Shehu and PDP-chairman Aliti on 6 September 1996.¹⁴⁴ But there seemed to be no return to a policy of infiltration by Berisha's

Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) vis-à-vis Macedonia's Albanian parties, like in the early '90s (see section 1.2.1).

Berisha's 'meddling' in Macedonia's affairs may have been a sign of (over)confidence. The DPA occupied 122 seats in the 140-seat parliament after the questionable May '96 elections (it won 55.5% of the vote), while the main opposition party, the Socialist Party (SP), received only 10 seats while it won 20.4% of the vote. The Socialists declined these seats on 1 July 1996, continuing this boycott until the end of the year. The DPA won 58 of the 64 municipalities and 268 of the 309 communities at the local elections of 20 October 1996. The Council of Europe called the elections essentially free and fair, though the OSCE had withdrawn due to unresolved differences with the Albanian Foreign Ministry about its monitoring role. Nevertheless, "unlike during the parliamentary balloting, the Socialists did not boycott the seats they had won, apparently fearing they might otherwise lose all influence at the local level"(F. Schmidt).¹⁴⁵

However, Berisha's intolerance towards the opposition forces drove some of them toward extremist acts. Albanian police arrested 17 people in late October '96 on suspicion of belonging to the Revenge for Justice. This left-wing terrorist organization was held responsible for the killing of general prison director B. Kaloshi on 26 July 1996, and for dozens of other crimes, including the February '96 bomb blast (see section 3.3) and the bomb blast on 6 November 1996 wrecking the apartment of P. Malini, chairman of the Appeals Court. These arrests were possibly intended to intimidate and discredit the Socialist opposition prior to the local elections: "Even back in February, the government used the supermarket bomb as a pretext to harass and imprison opposition journalists"(F. Schmidt).¹⁴⁶ Fabian Schmidt identifies inat, "spiteful defiance", as one of the main factors of Albania's anti-consensual culture: "Those displaying inat do not acknowledge their mistakes or back down from a situation".¹⁴⁷ This inat has contributed to the extreme polarization of Albanian society.

The Albanian government ignored repeated warnings by the International Monetary Funds (IMF), the Worldbank, and the governor of Albania's Central Bank of the dangers posed by the dubious pyramid-funds, in which hundreds of thousands of poor Albanians had put their life savings - \$ 1 billion dollars altogether - in return for usurious interest. In early November '96, Berisha dismissed these warnings as "highly exaggerated". But one small fund collapsed during the same month, its founder disappearing with \$ 13 million. Many Albanians were worried about the lack of legislative and executive control over the pyramid-schemes, and about persistent rumors of intimate connections between Berisha's DPA and some of these pyramid-funds. But many of them, living in a country with an average personal income of just \$ 690 per year, could not resist the temptation of the outrageously high interest rates offered by the funds on state television (!). Things were bound to go terribly wrong. Two of the seven pyramid-funds, Xhaferi and Phopuli (Vefa, Kamberi, Gjallica, Silva, and Sudeja were the others), collapsed in mid-January 1997, blocking accounts of \$ 300 million for tens of thousands of Albanians. Spontaneous demonstrations erupted in Tirana, and spread to Vlore, Berat, Lushnje, and ten other Southern cities in Albania during 25 and 26 January 1997, burning town halls, police stations, and DPA-headquarters. Foreign minister T. Shehu, trying to calm the crowds in Lushnje on 25 January, had to be rescued by the police and his bodyguards. Shaken, Shehu accused "marxist extremists and segments of the former secret police" of causing the disturbances. But all indications are that the SP and other opposition forces have jumped on the bandwagon of the spontaneous revolt, instead of bringing it about. The demonstrators demanded the returning of their savings and the resignation of Berisha and the government of premier A. Meksi. Berisha promised that part of the savings would be recovered and given back from 5 February onwards, but financial observers were skeptical. The government tried to suppress the

protesters by deploying army units in troublespots. But the rioters felt they had nothing to lose; if things quieted down, they feared secret police of the National Information Service (SHIK) would be able to arrest them. The government arrested 150 people during late January, but this number was too small to scare the crowds. Also dozens of opposition-leaders were arrested by the end of January. But the SP, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and six other opposition parties had mustered enough courage to form a political alliance called the Forum for Democracy on 30 January 1997.¹⁴⁸

In February 1997, the riots turned into an uprising, spreading to Southern cities like Sarande, Gjirokaster, and Fier. Desperate people plundered the enormous stockpiles of arms from the Hoxha period, while the police and army fled one 'rebel city' after another. The North remained by and large loyal to the government, mainly because of the traditional north-south divide and the fact that most policemen, SHIK-members, and state employees had been recruited from Tropoja (Berisha's native town) and other Northern cities. In contrast, the roots of the ex-Communist SP and state apparatus lay mainly in the South. The revolt claimed its first victim on 9 February 1997 in the Southern seaport-city of Vlore, notorious for its smuggling with suspected PDA-involvement: a man died of a heart attack after police fired into the air. Two more people were killed on 10 February in Vlore, which became the center of the revolt after Gjallica (total assets: \$ 500 million) collapsed a week earlier. And on 12 February, a policeman was shot dead in Vlore.¹⁴⁹ The violence spun out of control, despite Berisha's reelection and the declaration of the state of emergency by parliament in early March, and despite the stepping down of Meksi's government and the subsequent accord on 9 March 1997 between the DPA and the opposition to form a broad government under premier Bashkim Fino (SP) and hold early elections in June. On 1 March 1997, nine people, among them six SHIK-officers, were killed in Vlore; several people were killed in several 'rebel cities' during early March by stray bullets from countless kalashnikov-rifles; on 3-4 March, four people were shot dead in Vlore by the army after they refused to hand in their weapons; on 5 March, around 100 army troops withdrew after a first shooting with 400 rebels near Sarande; on 8 March, 120 elite-paratroopers fled from Gjirokaster, after which rebels took control of the city; and on 9 March, five people were killed when rebels took Permet. The list of violence could go on and on.¹⁵⁰

By the end of March, the revolt had become a full-scale civil war, a lower intensity conflict with "open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups". A civil war between the North and South appeared likely: on 11 March 1997, people in the northern towns of Bajram Curri and Kukes looted army depots while the police looked on. Probably, these were Berisha-supporters who wanted to protect themselves against a possible invasion from the South. But a haggard militia was able to reestablish some order in the capital only. Initially, the rebels, a mixture of ordinary civilians and gang members led by retired and defected army officers, opposition-leaders, and local Mafia bosses, were badly organized. But since rebel groups took over from the protesters in Vlore on 28 February, Action Committees of local politicians sprang up everywhere. By Mid-March a National Salvation Committee (NSC) with representatives from eight rebel-cities was formed. But the NSC was still not organized enough to march on Tirana and topple Berisha. Moreover, the official, SP-led opposition had already wrestled important concessions from Berisha, and thus wished to end the anarchy - which had killed 80 and wounded 600 people by then. The SP-leader Fatos Nano - who was jailed in 1993 on dubious embezzlement charges, and was freed on 13 March 1997 when prison doors were opened throughout the country - supported SP-premier Fino's moderate policy.¹⁵¹

Fears within Macedonia of spill-over effects grew with each month the Albanian revolt expanded and escalated. Macedonian foreign minister Frckovski requested to the UN Secretary-General to suspend the reduction of UNPREDEP's strength of around 1050 to around 750 men, as planned for by 30 April 1997 according UNSC Resolution 1082 (1996). The Security Council decided on 9 April (Resolution 1105) to suspend this reduction until the end of the running mandate on 31 May. In his report on UNPREDEP of 12 May, the UN Secretary-General recommended an extension of the mandate for another six months until 30 November, referring the "increasing number of cases of various armed gangs trespassing into the territory of the [Macedonian] Republic".¹⁵² The robust presence of the UN force seemed to have worked:

"the recent uncontrolled looting .. on the Albanian side of the border .. did not spread to communities .. in the immediate border area. .. the refocusing of its [UNPREDEP's] activities along the western border and its reinforced and highly visible community patrols in minority villages along the border during the height of the Albanian crisis had a calming effect .. ." ¹⁵³

Nevertheless, it seems surprising that no extremists from Albania during the anti-Berisha revolt have apparently been able to infect like-minded Albanians in Macedonia with stories, arms, and ideas. Despite the noted crossings of armed gangs, no rebels from Albania have staged or been able to stage an orchestrated campaign of violence in Macedonia. A concerted effort of infiltration (infection) or even aggression (oil-stain) could never have been stopped by UNPREDEP, a small force of 1,000 soldiers consisting primarily of a US task force and a composite Nordic battalion with a limited mandate.¹⁵⁴ But such an effort never happened, simply because the protesters and rebels in Southern Albania were preoccupied with their lost savings, their hatred for Berisha, and with their political future in a post-Berisha period. The nationalistic United Liga of Shkoder (ULS) was strong in the North, and dreamed of a Greater Albania. But the ULS was unable to start a revolt on its own, nor gain the support of the rebels in the South. The Albanian revolt turned out to be a local virus.

The international community sought to contain the Albanian conflict not only through UNPREDEP. On 27 March 1997, the OSCE approved an international force under Italian command to protect humanitarian aid in Albania, secure the vital airports and harbors, and assist outside observers for the parliamentary elections in June. The first paratroops of the 6,000-strong international force for Operation *Alba* (Dawn), dominated by the Italian contingent of 2,500 men, arrived in Durrës and Tirana in mid-April. The *Alba*-force was invited by the Fino government, but its mandate was limited to passive protection of humanitarian supplies and to self-defense.¹⁵⁵ Consequently, it could do little to stop the continuing violence, which killed around 1,800 people between February and July '97. During this period, around 500,000 kalashnikovs, 200,000 automatic and half-automatic guns, and 60,000 pistols were stolen from police- and army-arsenals, which were used in gang warfare, hold ups, blood feuds, and partying (leading to fatal accidents). Only a minor part of the killings were caused by direct violence between pro- and anti-Berisha forces. Some of the worst incidents can hardly be described as instances of political violence: the killing of 16 gang members in Levan on 27 March 1997 by armed residents after the former had murdered the village-head; the drowning of at least 80 Albanian refugees in late March when their old patrol boat collided with an Italian navy vessel (on purpose to scare off other refugees, according survivors); the explosions on 29 April in a munitions depot in tiny Oafe e Shtames, killing 27 people (among them 12 children); etcetera. But the total number of political violence

victims must be well over a 100 for February-July '97 and certainly for the whole of '97 (or for June '96 - June '97) - even if we strictly define such victims as those who are intentionally killed by an opposing group for ideological, ethnic, or purely factional (power-political) reasons. And the violence has all but died down: between 11 and 18 June, 132 people were killed. On 18 June, the OSCE and participants of the Alba-force decided to increase Alba's strength from 6,500 to 7,000 to protect the international monitors and polling stations during the parliamentary elections of 29 June 1997.¹⁵⁶ Thus Albania during the last 12 months easily 'qualifies' for the lower-intensity-conflict category. It may be a local virus, but turns out to be a nasty one.

Conclusions

The stage of conflict in Macedonia appears to have hovered the upper part of political tension during June '96 - June '97, with possibly a flatter and narrower wave pattern. This could mean that short outbursts of violence representing short-lived stages of political conflict have become less likely, but that once they happen again they could be higher 'waves' of conflict, as the base line of the low ends of the wave pattern may have crept upwards.

The sketches of recent developments in Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania give some useful indications of the possible viability of some predictions, but provide no real test of their actual validity. We cannot assess predictions like "political tension from Kosovo"(VL) and "political conflict from Kosovo"(L), with sufficient confidence without further research.¹⁵⁷ This is perhaps the most important limitation of this Postscript, which could be expected (this limitation applies for the other countries bordering Macedonia as well). For instance, our sketch of recent developments in Kosovo shows that it is possible that radical and extremist groups from that region may have contributed to political tensions and conflicts in Macedonia (see the 'Infection'-column in Table 3.2). But we cannot determine from our available sources whether any activists and politicians of the LDK, NMLK, KLA, and other groups have maintained close contacts with the PDP, PDPA, NDP, and other Albanian parties in Macedonia during the last year. Nor can we determine here and now to what degree any such contacts have caused or contributed to (higher) tensions and conflicts in Macedonia.

Notes

Introduction

1. The first week of June 1996 is included in the analysis. It has been difficult to find sources with sufficient information on Macedonia between June 1995 and June 1996. Even academic articles in 1996 - including those of Transition, the magazine of the Open Media Research Institute - describe developments of early 1995, 1994, or even earlier. This is not surprising. Academic research lags one or two years behind: it takes time to analyze past occurrences carefully.

The only main source (found and used) on developments during the last twelve months, apart from the scarce newspaper articles on Macedonia, is the BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) on Central Europe and the Balkans (part 2).

This daily bulletin on radio and television reports (written excerpts) provides us with some crucial information, though the sources are usually local (Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Greek, etc.) channels more or less liable to government influence. Therefore, it has been necessary to read between the lines, as most reports appear rather biased, in favor of the government or their own ethnic group. The BBC monitoring bulletin does not give critical comment on those reports, nor does it present its own.

Finally, the SWB-volume on April 1996 has been missing, so information on this month is rather scarce in chapter 2. Hopefully this gap has not affected our analysis and conclusions too much.

In February 1997, during research for the Epilogue, I found out that this volume was being made by the binder during the summer of '96. I have decided not to use the SWB-volume on April 1996, for two reasons. First, after cursory examination I detected that the missing of this volume has not fundamentally affected our analysis and conclusions. Second, the use of this volume would have tempted me to 'upgrade' and 'check' my analysis with new sources, which could in turn have altered the 'likelihood predictions' shown in Table 3.2.

2. Dennis J. D. Sandole, Paradigm, theories, and metaphors in conflict and conflict resolution: Coherence or confusion? Chapter 1 in: Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Confection resolution theory and practice - integration and application Manchester University Press, 1993 (reprinted in 1994, 1996), p.7.

3. Sandole, Conflict resolution theory and practice (1993), pp.14-15. See note 2.

4. See A. J. Jongman (in collaboration with A. P. Schmid), Leiden University, Contemporary Conflicts - A Global Survey of High- and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes PIOOM Newsletter and Progress REPORT Vol.7 No.1, Winter 1995, p.15 (see also pp.1,14).

5. John W. Burton, Conflict resolution as a political philosophy Chapter 4 in: Sandole & Merwe (eds.), Conflict resolution theory and practice (1993), p.55.

6. Ibid, p.55.

7. Sandole, p.6 (see note 2). His term, manifest conflict process (MCP), is rather awkward: particularly the word 'process' is superfluous.

8. Burton, p.60 (see note 5). See also p.61 on Alternative Dispute Resolution.

9. Sandole, p.13. See also pp.14,20.

10. Burton, p.60.

11. PIOOM Newsletter, Vol.7 No.1, Winter 1995, p.5 (see note 4).

12. See PIOOM Newsletter, Winter 1995, p.6.

13. Ibid, pp.17,16 respectively (see note 4).

14. Ibid, p.6.

15. Sandole, p.7. We do not adopt his composite term, aggressive manifest conflict process (AMCP), for the same reason as given in note 7.

16. For the full definitions of genocide and politicicide, see Prof. Barbara Harff and Prof. Ted Robert Gurr, *Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995* PIOOM Newsletter Vol.7 No.1, Winter 1995, p.24.

17. The first five indicators are taken from PIOOM Newsletter Vol.7 No.1, p.5. The other indicators are taken from the information sheet on the course "Conflict, Conflict Resolution and International Negotiations"(held between 2 April 1996 and 25 June 1996). The Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) is shown in PIOOM Newsletter Vol.7 No.1, p.7. This table is not used in the analysis: the available (collected) sources provide not enough detailed information on international mediation strategies in Macedonia's conflicts to use the concepts and classifications of EWRS.

18. The information provided by this treatise is sufficient to fill in the PIOOM Checklist, except for questions 12, 20, and 21, and possibly also questions 15 and 16. The PIOOM Checklist is developed by the researchers of PIOOM's headquarters at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, the Netherlands.

Chapter 1

19. See Suzanna Van Moyland, *Macedonia - Home But Not Yet Dry* Jane's Intelligence Review Vol.7 No.1, February 1995, pp.65,67. Her article provides some valuable information, but also a lot of confusion. Table 1.1.A is mainly based on a table presented in her article; however, it is unclear whether the PDP is the same one as the one within the SKM-PDP coalition. Gus Xhudo states in his *The Balkan Albanians - Biding Their Time?* (JIR Vol.7 No.5, May1995) that the PDP "was founded in 1991 and led by Nevzat Halili"(p.209), thus after the elections. The Albanian PDP apparently broke away from the League of Communists, but one cannot be sure given the confused presentation by Van Moyland.

Even more confusing is the fact that Van Moyland gives the SRSM 11 seats and the Young Democratic and Progressive Party, a coalition of MDPS and SRSM only 6 seats! Probably, it is the other way round: the SRSM and the MDPS together got 11 seats. Be as it may, she must have made some serious mistakes here. Frustratingly, her article is the only available source with some detailed - but garbled - information on the 1990 elections. But given the apparent mistakes, we have decided to include an explicit warning in Table 1.1.A.

Equally frustrating is Van Moyland's mentioning of "Gligorov's Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) and former Federal Prime Minister Markovic's Alliance of Reform Forces (SRSM)", contradicting her later remark "Kiro Gligorov was re-elected president [in November 1994], and the SRSM he guides gained an overwhelming majority"(p.65). Probably the latter remark contains the mistake, and Gligorov is really the leader of SDA, and the overall leader of the SDA-SRSM alliance. No other source definitely solves this confusion. So I have to make my own interpretations that solve the contradictions, being probably correct.

20. See Duncan M. Perry, *Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?* *Current History* Vol.95 No.599, March 1996, p.114.

21. Usually, I use the English abbreviations of the Macedonian parties, to avoid confusion. An example of such confusion is Robert W. Mickey's Macedonian abbreviation of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, PPD (while in English PDP), while the "People's Democratic Party" in

Table 1.1.B could be abbreviated as PDP!. But most sources call this radical/extreme Albanian party the National Democratic Party (NDP).

See Robert W. Mickey, *Macedonia: Unstable in a Stable Way Transition* Vol.1 No.1, 30 January 1995, pp.38-41.

22. For quotation, see Van Moyland, *Macedonia - Home But Not Yet Dry* (1995), p.65 (see note 19).

23. See on EC's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and on the Judge Badinter Commission: Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union? - An introduction to the European Community* Macmillan 1994, pp.486-487. See also John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict* Adelphi Paper 270, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1992 (study was completed in May 1992), pp.63-64.

24. Perry, *Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?* (1996), p.113 (see note 20).

25. James Pettifer, *The new Macedonian question* International Affairs Vol.68 No.3, 1992, p.480.

26. See Duncan M. Perry, *Republic of Macedonia: On the Road to Stability - Or Destruction?* Transition Vol.1 No.15, 25 August 1995, p.46.

27. *Ibid*, p.46.

28. James Pettifer, *The new Macedonian question* (1992), p.482 (see note 25). See also for historic background, Joris Cammelbeeck, *Griekenland wordt saai zonder Andreas Papandreu* (Greece becomes boring without Andreas Papandreu) *Volkskrant* 24 juni 1996, p.5.

29. David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* London: Victor Gollancz, November 1995, p.75.

30. *Ibid*, p.75.

31. *Ibid*, p.75.

32. At least 90% of the HRVS in Bosnia, particularly "ethnic cleansing" and atrocities in concentration camps, were committed by the extremist Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadzic, according to Amnesty International and other independent sources.

There are also many facts pointing to Belgrade's involvement as an indirect aggressor in the Bosnian war by aiding the Army of the Serbian Republic (ASR), led by general Ratko Mladic. For instance, Dr. Milan Vego stated in 1993 that during 1992, "the former federal army [of Yugoslavia] handed over to the Bosnian Serbs [under Karadzic] 300 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 231 guns (some sources claim as high as 900), 25 combat aircraft and trainers, several dozen Soviet designed surface-to-air missiles, and an estimated 80,000 tons of ammunition." See for this quotation, Milan Vego, *The New Yugoslav Defense Industry - Part I* *Jane's Intelligence Review*, November 1993, p.503.

33. Most information on JNA's withdrawal from Macedonia and on the deployment of UNPROFOR M can be found in: Dr. James Gow and James Pettifer, *Macedonia - Handle with Care* *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 1993, p.387. Other bits of information are taken from the other main sources, particularly the volumes of *Military Balance*.

34. Perry, *Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?* (1995), p.114 (see note 20).

35. The quotation of (part of) Article 48 is from Gus Xhudo, *The Balkan Albanians - Biding Their Time?* *Jane's Intelligence Review* Vol.7 No.5, May 1995, p.210.

36. The quotation of (part of) the preamble of the Macedonian constitution is from Perry, *On the Road to Stability - Or Destruction?* (1995), p.41 (see note 26).

37. Gus Xhudo, *The Balkan Albanians* (1995), p.211 (see note 35).

38. Perry, *On the Road to Stability - Or Destruction?* (1995), p.42.

39. *Ibid*, p.42. Of course, Perry's observation is interpretative, even speculative, as all our four explanations of the government's reluctance to grant Albanians educational autonomy are. But the

Macedonian authorities have been scarce in their public pronouncements and arguments on this sensitive, potentially explosive issue (at least according to our available sources!). Rather, individual politicians like Simovska have commented on this issue which often have angered their Albanian colleagues, sometimes justifiably so.

40. See Frank Westerman, 'De chauvinisten hier bouwen levensgevaarlijke luchtkastelen' - Macedonie wil via erkenning het uitbreken van een Derde Balkanoorlog tussen hongerige buurstaten voorkomen ('The chauvinists build dangerous dream castles' - Macedonia wants through recognition to prevent the outbreak of a Third Balkan War between hungry neighbor-states) *Volkskrant* 19 november 1992, p.4. See on the November '92 riots in Skopje also Van Moyland (1995), p.65, and Xhudo (1995), p.210. Westerman mentions three fatalities, while Xhudo mentions four. I have decided to adopt the latter count, as a fourth demonstrator may have died later on of his wounds in hospital.

41. Marko Milivojevic, The 'Balkan Medellin' *Jane's Intelligence Review* Vol.7 No.2, February 1995, p.68.

42. *Ibid*, pp.68-69.

43. Branko Geroski, *Media Update - Waiting for a Second Chance in Macedonia Transition* Vol.1 No.18, 6 October 1995, p.44.

44. *Ibid*, p.45.

45. See Geroski (1995), p.45 (see section "Hate Speech"). See note 43. Geroski calls the reporting of *Vecer* and other media on the "Albanian paramilitary" case a "classic instance of the media stoking ethnic tensions". But I have my doubts, particularly on his own example of *Vecer*'s revelations: he does not say, or provide evidence, that these revelations were false. Rather, the daily appears to have overcome in this case the tendency toward self-censorship mentioned by Geroski earlier in his article.

46. Milivojevic, The 'Balkan Medellin' (1995), p.68 (see note 41).

47. Robert W. Mickey, *Macedonia: Unstable in a Stable Way Transition* Vol.1 No.1, 30 January 1995, p.38 (see also note 21).

48. The following source is the only (available) one which points to this ironical aspect of the complicated infighting in PDP's January 1994 conference: Karin Veraart, 'Politieke toestand in republiek Macedonie is explosief' ('political situation in republic Macedonia is explosive') *Volkskrant* 16 maart 1994, p.4.

49. Perry, *On the Road to Stability - Or Destruction?* (1995), p.41. Perry gives slightly different numbers than the sources used for Table 1.2. But his are more precise, especially in the larger number of minorities distinguished.

50. Alas, the main sources do not give precise percentages or absolute numbers for the parties at the first round of the 1994 elections. See Mickey, *Macedonia: Unstable in a Stable Way* (1995), p.40 (see note 47); Perry, *On the Road to Stability - Or Destruction?* (1995), p.40; and Van Moyland, p.65.

51. Mickey, p.40.

52. See Perry (1995), p.41 (see his notes 2 and 3).

53. The following sources provide the scarce but valuable information on Bulgaria: James Pettifer, *The new Macedonian question* (1992), pp.477,479,484 (see note 25); Perry, *Macedonia* (1996), pp.113-114; and Westerman, *Volkskrant* 19 november 1992, p.4 (see note 40). See also SWB 25/08/95, p.B2 (see note 1).

54. See Peter Michielsen, *Spanning groeit in Macedonie over 'illegale' universiteit* (Tension grows in Macedonia over 'illegal' university) *NRC Handelsblad* 31 December 1994, p.5. See also Karin

Veraart, Albanese universiteit zaait tweedracht in Macedonie (Albanese university creates division in Macedonia) *Volkskrant* 22 februari 1995, p.4. See further on the Tetovo crisis the main sources.

55. Perry (1995), p.42.

56. *Ibid*, p.42.

57. Van Moyland, p.65. Because of the successful de-escalation of the Tetovo crisis, we stick with Van Moyland's conclusion, even accounting for the fact that she clearly has written the article prior to this crisis' occurrence.

58. The main sources for the "Greek blockade crisis" in 1994 are numerous Dutch newspaper articles. A selection of the most important ones (because there are many) are presented here: Jos Klaassen, Athene sluit aanvoerhaven naar Macedonie (Athens closes import-harbor to Macedonia) *Volkskrant* 17 februari 1994, p.5. Jos Klaassen, EU daagt Griekenland voor Europees Hof (EU brings Greece before European Court) *Volkskrant* 28 maart 1994, p.5. Jos Klaassen, Commissie stelt Athene ultimatum *Volkskrant* 7 april 1994, p.5. F.G. Van Hasselt, Griekse diplomatie probeert nieuwe wegen in te slaan (Greek diplomacy tries new roads) *NRC Handelsblad* 13 mei 1995, p.4.

59. Perry's detailed figures are slightly different from the ones presented in Table 1.2 (and from the figures in the sources used for Table 1.2), but they show the same basic trends. See Perry (1995), p.44.

60. On Serbia's mid-1994 incursions into Macedonia, see, apart from the main sources, the following sources: Frank Westerman, Servie annexeert stiekum stukjes Macedonie (Serbia stealthily annexes little pieces of Macedonia) *Volkskrant* 2 juni 1994, p.5. *NRC Handelsblad*, Grensincidenten en spanningen in Macedonie (Border incidents and tensions in Macedonia) 22 juni 1994, p.5. *And Volkskrant*, Albanezen mijden parlement Skopje (Albanians boycott parliament Skopje) 5 juli 1994.

61. See Perry (1996), p.114.

62. Perry (1995), p.48.

Chapter 2

63. BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) on Central Europe and the Balkans (part 2), Third Series EE/2319, 2 June 1995, pp.C/10-11. SWB is the main source for Macedonia between June 1995 and June 1996 (see note 1). Specific SWB-articles will be mentioned only when we use direct quotations - except in the Epilogue, where the succinct presentation of events necessitates sufficient references toward all the sources used. Other sources (mainly Dutch newspaper articles) will be mentioned at the appropriate places.

64. SWB, EE/2324, 8 June 1995, p.C/10.

65. See Branko Geroski, Media Update - Waiting for a Second Chance in Macedonia Transition Vol.1 No.18, 6 October 1995, p.44 (*ibid* note 43). See also SWB, EE/2319, 2 June 1995, pp.C/11-12.

66. SWB, EE/2353, 12 July 1995, p.C/2.

67. SWB, EE/2355, 14 July 1995, p.C/13.

68. SWB, EE/2391, 25 August 1995, p.B/2.

69. Milivojevic, p.69 (see note 41).

70. See on the assassination attempt against Gligorov, apart from the numerous articles of BBC's SWB, the following Dutch source: *Volkskrant*, Leider Macedonie zwaar gewond door bom (Leader Macedonia seriously wounded by bomb) 4 oktober 1995, p.5.

71. The quotations are from SWB, EE/2430, 10 October 1995, p.A/7.

72. SWB, EE/2427, 6 October 1995, p.B/2.

73. The quotations are from SWB, EE/2427, 6 October 1995, p.A/15.

74. SWB, EE/2428, 7 October 1995, p.B/1.

75. SWB, EE/2451, 3 November 1995, p.B/2.

76. SWB, EE/2343, 30 June 1995, p.B/5.

77. See on the Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia, apart from the main SWB source, the following Dutch sources: NRC Handelsblad, Griekenland en Macedonie verzoenen zich (Greece and Macedonia reconcile) 14 september 1995, p.1; and Peter Michielsen, VS helpen Macedonie en Griekenland drempeel over (US help Macedonia and Greece to overcome their differences) NRC Handelsblad 14 september 1995, p.5.

This breakthrough of conflict resolution between Greece and Macedonia showed that clear-cut and single-minded policies of the US were much more credible and impressive than the vague and inconsistent policies of the EU and UN, who as international regimes had to represent and combine the multiple and diverging interests of their member states.

78. SWB, EE/2413, 20 September 1995, p.A/11.

79. See Bart Rijs, Macedonie dankt zijn vrede aan president Gligorov - Ministaatje tussen vijandige burens is het succes-verhaal van de Balkan (Macedonia owes its peace to president Gligorov - Ministate among hostile neighbours is the succes-story of the Balkans) Volkskrant 20 mei 1996, p.4.

80. The precise, official description of the new Macedonian flag can be found in SWB, EE/2429, 9 October 1995, p.A/23. See also SWB, EE/2418 26 September 1995, p.A/8.

81. The Interim Accord states in Article 23.2 that it "shall remain in force until superseded by a definitive agreement, provided that after seven years either Party may withdraw from this Interim Accord by a written notice, which shall take effect 12 months after its delivery to the other Party". Quotation of the official text is from SWB, EE/2411, 18 September 1995, p.C/18.

Moreover, technical disagreements on how Macedonian citizens (and goods) would travel to Greece and identify themselves, and vice versa, were not definitely solved in numerous negotiation-sessions during October. The main problem was the name 'Republic of Macedonia' on the Macedonian passports; alternative travel documents with the name FYROM were used as a temporary solution. Even the opening of liaison offices in both Athens and Skopje by the end of the year failed to solve these disagreements once and for all.

82. SWB, EE/2496, 29 December 1995, p.A/13.

83. SWB, EE/2383, 16 August 1995, p.C/18.

84. SWB, EE/2361, 21 July 1995, p.C/10.

85. SWB, EE/2608, 10 May 1996, p.A/7. But the April' 96 report of the UN Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Rehn (of the UN Commission for Human Rights) contradicted the claim of Radio Macedonia that the human rights situation was rozy: Tetovo's local police verbally abused, threatened, and intimidated in many other ways the students and teachers of the Albanian university. See SWB, EE/2601, 2 May 1996, p.A/11. This finding was not surprising, as the police had never shown any ability to calm crowds or restraint their own use of violence during the February '95 riots or any other violent incidents. On the contrary, they often fanned the flames of emotion by their rude and repressive behavior.

86. Quotation is from EE/2617, 21 May 1996, p.A/14.

87. SWB, EE/2514, 20 January 1996, p.B/2.

88. Ibid.

89. SWB, EE/2516, 23 January 1996, p.A/15.

90. SWB, EE/2530, 8 February 1996, p.A/8.

91. Ibid.

92. SWB, EE/2543, 23 February 1996, p.A/12. A more extensive presentation of Crvenkovski's speech to parliament can be found in SWB, EE/2545, 26 February, pp.A/17-20. In the latter article, Crvenkovski's quoted remark is translated a bit differently: "There can be no lasting political partnership if one of the partners only participates in sharing the glory and success, without sharing the responsibility for difficulties and problems"(p.A/17).

93. See SWB, EE/2553, 6 March 1996, p.A/10.

94. Protection of ethnic Bulgarians (enveloping quite a lot of people according to these nationalists) in Macedonia was but one of Konstantinov's objectives; the national committee also complained about HRVS against the Bulgarian community in southeastern Serbia, the so-called Western Outlands ceded to Serbia in the 1991 Treaty of Neuilly. See SWB, EE/2525, 2 February 1996, p.B/5.

95. Quotation is from Radio Macedonia; see SWB, EE/2565, 20 March 1996, p.A/11.

96. SWB, EE/2600, B/2. We have not been able to use the SWB-volume on April 1996 (see note 1). So we have only references to events in April from the May volume.

97. SWB, EE/2617, 21 May 1996, A/13.

98. SWB, EE/2617, 21 May 1996, p.A/14. See also SWB, EE/2609, 11 May 1996, p.A/7.

99. Quotation is from SWB, EE/2523, 31 January 1996, p.B/6.

100. SWB, EE/2559, 13 March 1996, p.A/14.

101. Stefan Krause and Stan Markotich, Rump Yugoslavia and Macedonia Deal the Cards of Mutual Recognition Transition Vol.2 No.11, 31 May 1996, p.57.

102. Ibid, p.56.

103. Ibid, p.55.

104. SWB, EE/2624, 29 May 1996, p.A/11.

Chapter 3

105. The PIOOM checklist uses the period of the next 6 months in question 18, and the period of the next 12 months in question 19. See further note 18.

106. In a comparative analysis one could classify the countries with an ordinal scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely), with 0 for the unclear cases. Such a scale is unnecessary for our case study.

107. The predictions with Macedonia as the external actor affecting its surrounding countries are presented in a list as an addition to Table 3.2. Otherwise, a huge extra table would have been required, repeating the list of surrounding countries many times over!

108. The quotation is from SWB, EE/2440, 21 October 1995, p.B/2.

109. See SWB, EE/2416, 23 September 1995, p.A/4.

110. SWB, EE/2541, 21 February 1996, p.A/13. See also SWB, EE/2542, 22 February 1996, p.B/2.

111. SWB, EE/2561, 15 March 1996, p.A/9.

112. SWB, EE/2540, 20 February 1996, p.A/14.

113. Ibid.

114. The OCSCE also decided to withdraw its 50 monitors in protest prior to the second round on 2 June. See Volkskrant, Waarnemers: verkiezingen in Albanie waren oneerlijk (Monitors: elections in Albania were unfair) 29 mei 1996, p.6. See also Bart Rijs, Albanie worstelt met spelregels der democratie (Albania struggles with rules of democracy) Volkskrant 25 mei 1996, p.4; Bart Rijs, Oppositie in Albanie breekt verkiezing af (Opposition in Albania breaks off election [leaves election]) Volkskrant 28 mei 1996, p.5.

115. SWB, EE/2526, 3 February 1996, p.B/1.

116. SWB, EE/2574, 30 March 1996, p.B/4.

117. SWB, EE/2635, 11 June 1996, p.A/11.

Conclusion

118. See Jongman, Contemporary Conflicts - A Global Survey of High- and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes PIOOM Newsletter and Progress REPORT Vol.7 No.1, Winter 1995, World Conflict Map 1994-1995. See also note 4.

119. Also the factors of conflict (de-)escalation listed in Table II have been less useful than expected, simply because they are quite obvious. Comparative analyses between multiple countries using statistical methods can better use these factors, by operationalizing them into quantitative indicators.

Epilogue

120. On hindsight, I would or should have classified some conflict-scenarios a bit differently in July '96, with the information available at that time. For instance, I would (should) have classified the political-conflict scenarios from Bulgaria and Greece as <P for each, or at most P for each, instead of <L for each (see Table 3.2).

121. In contrast to the main body of this doctoral thesis, comments and activities by governments and other political and civic groups from some neighboring countries on Macedonia's domestic issues are treated here as 'external developments' (see last paragraph of Introduction). This is done to 'beef up' the scarce information about Macedonia's neighbours presently available for this postscript - also for the period June 1996 - January 1997.

The difference in analytical depth between June '96 - January '97 and February - May '97 (uptil 1 June 1997) is unavoidable, given the fact that this case study on Macedonia is a doctoral thesis with a deadline. See on the main SWB-source note 1.

122. See SWB, EE/2715, 12 September 1996, p. A/11. The SWB-article is fuzzy about the exact date of the walkout by Albanian parliamentarians (19 July is mentioned, but lateron "the beginning of July"), and about the number of MP's involved: did all representatives of PDP and NDP walk out, or only few of them?

123. SWB, EE/2673, 25 July 1996, p.A/11.

See on the Albanian protests in Macedonia during July 1996 also: EE/2657, 6 July 1996, p.A/9; EE/2667, 18 July 1996, pp.A/9-10; EE/2668, 19 July 1996, p.A/6; EE/2672, 24 July 1996, p.A/9; EE/2676, 29 July 1996, pp.A/14-15; EE/2677, 30 July 1996, pp.A/9-10; EE/2678, 31 July 1996, p.A/10; and EE/2682, 5 August 1996, p.A/17.

See on the Human Rights Watch report, SWB, EE/2654, 3 July 1996, p.A/10.

124. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1058 (1996) Security Council S/1996/819, 30 September 1996, p.2. See on the negative reactions among political and civic groups of ethnic Macedonians against the Albanian protests during the summer of '96: SWB, EE/2674, 26 July 1996, p.A/12; EE/2676, 29 July 1996, p.A/15; EE/2694, 19 August 1996, p.A/17; and EE/2806, 1 January 1997, pp.A/12-13 (see EE/2807, 3 January 1997, p.A/9 on popularity poll).

125. See SWB, EE/2693, 17 August 1996, pp.A/9-11 (erroneously numbered as "EE/1693"). However, Abdurahman Aliti also painted alarming pictures about Macedonia's future if the basic issues were not resolved: the "first option", legalization of the Tetovo university, would be essential to Macedonia's peace and security; otherwise, the "second option", "the path of violence" by angry Albanians with a subsequent "state of emergency", would become a likely scenario - as the only

'option' left to the Macedonian government if it continues to regard the Tetovo university as an illegal one (see p.A/10).

126. See on the controversial (draft) law on territorial division of Macedonia: SWB, EE/2703, 29 August 1996, p.A/15; EE/2704, 30 August 1996, pp.A/11-12; EE/2705, 31 August 1996, pp.A/16-17; EE/2706, 2 September 1996, p.A/13; EE/2717, 14 September 1996, pp.A/14-15; and EE/2720, 18 September 1996, p.A/15.

127. See on the violent incidents of 10-11 October and 16 October 1996 in Macedonia: SWB, EE/2742, 14 October 1996, p.A/12; and EE/2746, 18 October 1996, p.A/7. These SWB-articles are based on the reportings from the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA, hardly a trustworthy source in general. However, the reportings in case appear to be pretty even-handed and objective, particularly on the positive, moderating role of some Albanian politicians in Macedonia. See note 1 on the disadvantages of the SWB-bulletins as a (main) source.

See further on the poisoning of the Albanian school children during October '96 in Macedonia: SWB, EE/2738, 9 October 1996, p.A/10; EE/2740, 11 October 1996, pp.A/7-8; EE/2741, 12 October 1996, pp.A/7-8; EE/2742, 14 October 1996, p.A/12; and EE/2746, 18 October 1996, p.A/7.

128. See Stefan Krause, *Moving Toward Firmer Ground in Macedonia Transition Vol.3 No.[3]*, 7 February 1997, pp.45-46. Krause uses the same abbreviation for the Party for Democratic Prosperity, "PPD", as Robert W. Mickey (see note 21). The same is true for the abbreviation "PDP" for the National Democratic Party (*ibid*). See also note 19 on the problem of diverging abbreviations by the different sources.

See also on the alliance preparations for the local elections in Macedonia in November '96: SWB, EE/2717, 14 September 1996, p.A/14; EE/2738, 9 October 1996, p.A/10; and EE/2745, 17 October 1996, p.A/7.

See also on the local election results: SWB, EE/2775, 21 November 1996, pp.A/14-15; EE/2780, 27 November 1996, p.A/12; EE/2785, 3 December 1996, p.A/12; and EE/2788, 6 December 1996, pp.A/18-19.

Apparently, the 123 municipalities apart from the city of Skopje are identical to the 123 communes for prefects; so one mayor and one prefect appear to be chosen for each local government.

These SWB-articles only mention the first, incomplete results for 114 of the 124 municipalities; Krause's figures in his 1997 article are too general to compensate for this lack of information. Somehow, I must have missed the subsequent SWB-articles that mention the final and complete results - if they exist.

129. SWB, EE/2819, 17 January 1997, p.A/10 (see also p.A/9). See further on the ethnic-Macedonian protests against the tertiary education bill, and the subsequent (re)actions by the Albanian political parties: SWB, EE/2818, 16 January 1997, p.A/5; EE/2820, 18 January 1997, p.A/11; EE/2828, 28 January 1997, p.A/9; EE/2829, 29 January 1997, p.A/15; and EE/2832, 1 February 1997, p.A/7 (see also EE/2843, p.A/11).

130. See SWB, EE/2820, 18 January 1997, p.A/11 (see note 129).

131. SWB, EE/2843, 14 February 1997, p.A/12 (see also p.A/11). See on election incidents in Tetovo during revoting-attempts: SWB, EE/2824, 23 January 1997, pp.A/11-12; and EE/2835, 5 February 1997, p.A/15. See on other events during February '97: SWB, EE/2833, 3 February 1997, p.A/12; and EE/2847, 19 February 1997, pp.A/10-11.

132. See on the anti-government protests by VMRO-DPNME during May '97: Macedonia News Service (MNS), Protests throughout Macedonia, 2 June 1997; and MNS, IMRO-DPNME held meetings across Macedonia, 2 June 1996. See makedon@tripnet.se (E-mail address).

The available sources have failed to mention the Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM) as the third coalition-partner of the government during June '96 - June '97; it was still a coalition-partner in May '96 (see section 2.2.1). Possibly the SPM has left the government coalition since then, but the sources do not confirm this.

133. Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (pursuant to Council Resolution 1082 (1996)), Security Council S/1997/365, 12 May 1997, p.7.

134. See on the attacks in Kosovo by the KLA during the second half of '96 and the beginning of '97 and related matters: SWB, EE/2677, 30 July 1996, p.A/9; EE/2704, 30 August 1996, p.A/11; EE/2730, 30 September 1996, p.A/9; EE/2754, 28 October 1996, p.A/12; EE/2759, 2 November 1996, p.A/7; EE/2775, 21 November 1996, p.A/14; EE/2815, 13 January 1997, pp.A/15-16; and EE/2819, 17 January 1997, pp.A/7-8. See also Jeremy Druker, Liberation Army of Kosovo Explains Latest Attacks - Excerpts from Speeches, Editorials, and Other Notable Documents Transition Vol.2 No.[?], 6 September 1996, pp.60-61; and Bart Rijs, Albanezen grijpen vaker naar geweld in Kosovo (Albanians use violence more often in Kosovo) Volkskrant 17 januari 1997, p.5.

Some of the village and city names in Kosovo are in Serbo-Croat, others in Albanian, depending on the news source of the SWB-article in question. We mention each place name without indicating whether it is the Serbo-Croat or the Albanian version.

135. See on the arrests of NMLK-members in January '97 and the subsequent reactions: SWB, EE/2829, 29 January 1997, p.A/13; EE/2833, 3 February 1997, p.A/10; and EE/2834, 4 February 1997, p.A/12.

The Interior Ministry clearly believed the NMLK to be the "highest body of the terrorist organization", with the KLA merely as its armed branch.

136. SWB, EE/2760, 4 November 1996, p.A/10.

137. Fabian Schmidt, Conflict brewing in Kosovo Jane's Intelligence Review Vol.8 No.7, July 1996, p.293.

138. Fabian Schmidt, Liberation Army of Kosovo gives itself a bad profile Jane's Intelligence Review Vol.8 No.10, October 1996, p.436 (see also p.437).

139. See Bart Rijs, Kruitvat Kosovo (powderkeg Kosovo) Volkskrant 7 juni 1997, p.7 (Vervolg).

140. Ibid. This article fails to mention how many sisters Edmond's family has, which offence Edmond's brother has supposedly committed, and whether Edmond's companions were killed as well. Edmond Hodza was probably the "unidentified person" killed during a firefight between policemen and three Albanian men on 31 January 1997 according a SWB-article. This article identifies the other two as Z. Pajaziti, a leader of the KLA, and H. Zejnulaku, a KLA-member. They were killed as well. See SWB, EE/2833, 3 February 1997, p.A/10.

See also on the Kosovo opinion poll mentioned: SWB, EE/2847, 19 February 1997, p.A/9.

141. See on the Kosovo education accord: Peter Michielsen, Eerste doorbraak in Kosovo (First breakthrough in Kosovo) NRC Handelsblad 2 september 1996, p.4. See also SWB, EE/2815, 13 January 1997, p.A/16.

142. Fabian Schmidt, Teaching the Wrong Lesson in Kosovo Transition Vol.2 No.14, 12 July 1996, p.39 (see also pp.7-38).

143. See NRC Handelsblad, 'Middeleeuwse foltering' kost leven in Kosovo ('Medieval torture' costs life in Kosovo) NRC Handelsblad 26 februari 1997, p.5. See on the scarce information about the period February-June '97 also the source mentioned in note 139.

144. See on the diplomatic tensions between Tirana and Skopje: SWB, EE/2685, 8 August 1996, p.A/14; and EE/2712, 9 September 1996, pp.B/2-3.

145. Fabian Schmidt, Albania's Democrats Consolidate Power Transition Vol.3 [No?], 7 February 1997, p.48 (see also p.47). See on the (figures of) the May '96 parliamentary elections also Fabian Schmidt, An Old System Blends Into the Present Transition Vol.2 No.18, 6 September 1996, p.53 (see further pp.50-52).

See also SWB, EE/2749, 22 October 1996, pp.B/1-3; EE/2750, 23 October 1996, pp.B/2; EE/2751, 24 October 1996, p.B/1; EE/2753, 26 October 1996, p.B/5; and EE/2762, 6 November 1996, p.B/1.

146. Fabian Schmidt, Albanian police arrests 'terrorists' Jane's Intelligence Review Vol.8 No.12, December 1996, p.532. See also SWB, EE/2765, 9 November 1996, p.B/2.

147. F. Schmidt, An Old System Blends Into the Present (1996), p.52. See note 145.

148. See on the January '97 riots and the collapse of the first pyramid funds in Albania: NRC Handelsblad, Grote vernielingen bij rellen Albanie (Big destructions by riots [in] Albania) NRC Handelsblad 27 januari 1997, p.1; Peter ter Horst, Albanie betaalt rekening riskant gedrag (Albania pays the price for risky behavior) NRC Handelsblad 17 januari 1997, p.5; Volkskrant, Albanie zet leger in tegen betogers (Albania deploys army against protesters) Volkskrant 27 januari 1997, p.1; Philippe Remarque, Albanese president Berisha laat opposanten oppakken (Albanian president orders arrest of opposition members) Volkskrant 30 januari 1997, p.1; Volkskrant, Oppositie Albanie vormt front tegen regering (Opposition Albania forms front against government) Volkskrant 31 januari 1997, p.5; and Phillippe Remarque, 'Beleggers in piramides zijn door ons gered' - President van Albanie heeft de crisis onder controle ('Investors in pyramids are rescued by us' - President of Albania has the crisis under control) Volkskrant 4 februari 1997, p.4.

149. See on the uprising in southern Albania during February '97: Volkskrant, Gevechten tijdens betogingen in Albanie kosten demonstrant leven (Battles during rallies in Albania cost demonstrator [his] life) Volkskrant 10 februari 1997, p.5; Volkskrant, Betogers in Vlore leveren weer slag met oproerpolitie (Demonstrators in Vlore battle again with riotpolice) Volkskrant 11 februari 1997, p.5; NRC, Twee doden bij rellen in Vlore in Albanie (Two deaths at rallies in Vlore in Albania) NRC Handelsblad 11 februari 1997, p.1; and NRC, Politieaanman vermoord in roerige stad Vlore (Policeman murdered in restless city Vlore) NRC Handelsblad 13 februari 1997, p.5.

150. See on the revolt in Albania during early March '97: Volkskrant, Opstand Albanie dreigt in burgeroorlog te ontgaaan (Rebellion Albania could degenerate into civil war) Volkskrant 3 maart 1997, pp.1,5; NRC, Chaos heerst in het zuiden van Albanie (Chaos reigns in the south of Albania) NRC Handelsblad 3 maart 1997, pp.1,5; NRC, Albanie stuurt troepen naar het rebelse zuiden (Albania sends troops to the rebellious south) NRC Handelsblad 4 maart 1997, p.1; Peter Michielsen, Albanie: democratische droom verbleekt (Albania: democratic dream fades away) NRC Handelsblad 4 maart 1997, p.5 (see also other articles); Volkskrant, Militaire confrontatie in zuiden Albanie vooralsnog onbeslist (Military confrontation in south Albania yet undecided) Volkskrant 6 maart 1997, pp.1,5; and NRC, Strijd in Albanie ook na compromis (Fighting in Albania even after compromise) NRC Handelsblad 10 maart 1997, pp.1,5.

151. See on the rebellion in Albania during mid-March '97: Bart Rijs, 'Pas over 50 jaar zullen de rebellen hun wapens inleveren' ('Only after 50 years will the rebels hand over their weapons') Volkskrant 12 maart 1997, p.4 (see also article below); Bart Rijs, Berisha verliest greep op

rebellerend Albanie (Berisha loses grip on rebelling Albania) Volkskrant 14 maart 1997, p.1 (see also a separate article by Rijs on p.4); and Bart Rijs, Burgerwacht herstelt orde in Tirana (Militia restores order in Tirana) Volkskrant 17 maart 1997, p.1.

152. K. Annan, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Security Council S/1997/365, 12 May 1997, p.7. See note 133.

153. Ibid, p.8.

154. On 9 May 1997, UNPREDEP consisted of 1,008 military personnel, 464 of them comprising the Nordic batallion and 494 the US task force (50 Indonesian troops made up the rest); 48 HDQ-observers; 35 military police; and 23 civilians. Figures may vary owing to rotations. The information is from the source mentioned in notes 133 and 152, on pp.9-11 of that source. Compare with the figures in Table 1.3.

155. See on the decionmaking and initial deployment of Operation Alba in Albania: Volksrant, OVSE fiatteert troepenmacht voor Albanie (OSCE approves force for Albania) Volkskrant 28 maart 1997, p.1; Volkskrant, Eerste soldaten van vredesmacht zetten voet in Albanie (First soldiers of peacekeeping-force land in Albania) Volkskrant 12 april 1997, p.5; Jan van der Putten, Operatie Dageraad moet Albanie op de been helpen (Operation Dawn must put Albania back on its feet) Volkskrant 15 april 1997, p.5; and NRC, Troepen in Albanie 'bedreigd' (Troops in Albania 'threatened') NRC Handelsblad 15 april 1997, p.5.

156. See on the violence between February and June '97, and between late March '97 and late June '97: NRC, Bloedbad na overval op dorp Albanie (Bloodbath after raid on village Albania) NRC Handelsblad 28 maart 1997, p.4; Jan van der Putten, Scheepsramp Albanie maakt VN-taak zwaar (Shipping-disaster Albania complicates UN-task) Volkskrant 1 april 1997, p.1 (p.4 missing); NRC, Explosie kost 27 Albanezen het leven (Explosion cost 27 Albanians their life) NRC Handelsblad 1 mei 1997, p.5; NRC, Albanie: chaos eist in week 132 levens (Albania: chaos takes in [one] week 132 lives) NRC Handelsblad 19 juni 1997, p.4; and NRC, Herstel van de orde in Albanie is prioriteit (Restoration of order in Albania is priority) NRC Handelsblad 29 juli 1997, p.4.

157. The predictions of political tension and political conflict in Macedonia due to actions (infiltrations) by Rugova's LDK- shadow government should have been at least a notch lower (L instead of VL; P instead of L; etc.)on closer reflection: the LDK can hardly be described as an extremist movement! Rugova, Hyseni, and other LDK-leaders are radicals, not revolutionaries. In other words, the predictions regarding Macedonia given in July '96 fit better to possible infiltrations by revolutionary groups like the KLA in Macedonia than to any infiltrations by the LDK.

Literature

Most (Dutch) newspaper articles on specific topics are not listed here; they can be found back in the notes. A few examples are put here to show that such sources are used.

BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) - Part 2 Central Europe, the Balkans British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC), Third Series, June 1995 - June 1996.

Boyne, Sean, Albanian communists paying for the past Jane's Intelligence Review Vol.8 No.10, October 1996, pp.438-441.

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