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Chechen clans and clan-structures: definitions, types, classifications and the need for further research

WORKING PAPER for the planned publication:

**Violence-values, Combat-stresses, Grievances and other Conflict
Motivations among (Sub-)Clans through its own Armed Formations
and other Armed Groups in the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasus
and the Balkans:**

**Honourable and Brutal Violence in and around Chechnya, Kosovo
and Nagorno Karabakh**

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Introduction

This paper¹ analyses behavioural and cultural violence-patterns by combatants, as individuals and participants in armed groups based on (sub-)clan and other group identities and loyalties, in the post-Communist conflicts of Chechnya (1994-1996, 1999-present), Kosovo (1997-1999) and Nagorno Karabakh (1988-1994), and their

¹ A part of this paper was presented at the International Conference “Shirvan, Arran, and Azerbaijan: Historical-Cultural Retrospective”, 1-2 November 2013, Yerevan, Armenia, organised by the Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies of Yerevan State University, and the Armenian Association for Academic Partnership and Support (ARMACAD).

aftermaths in present times. I try to ascertain and explain – both qualitatively and quantitatively – the intermittent, persistent and/or increasing *brutalities* i.e. violations of local and/or international violence-norms – or the (surprising?) maintenance of these norms (*non-brutalities*) – in the combat units of the Chechen, Armenian and Kosovar ‘rebels’ and those of their Russian, Azeri and Serbian enemies. Some of the findings of my ongoing research on the validity of my *Brutalisation* theory², with its variables *violence-values* (my composite term) on proper and improper violence; *conflict-inducing motivations* (grievances, avarices, interests and ideologies) that bring about i.e. cause or trigger the conflict; *combat-stresses* like fear, fatigue and rage resulting from or leading to trauma’s (and hypothetically to brutalities as well); and *conflict-induced motivations* (grievances, avarices, interest and ideologies) that happen by, through and during the conflict, can be found in my “How to Feud and Rebel” Series presently being published in *Iran and the Caucasus* (Brill).³

Arguably, most traditional societies conform to a predominant religion, state, emperor, nation, ethnicity, or to a predominant collection of *tribes* i.e. kin groups without residential unity (‘ethnic’ if with perceived common ancestry); *clans* i.e. kin groups with residential unity; multi-clan or other mixed groups with residential unity and self-identification in hamlets, villages, towns or other localities; *extended families*, and *nuclear families*. Louis Dupree asserts that the “key ... is kinship, that reciprocal set of rights and obligations which satisfies and .. limits an individual’s .. role”.⁴ In this paper, I seek to ascertain whether each of the identified, i.e. claimed and/or actual clans, sub-clans, other kin groups or localised ethnic (sub-)groups⁵ among Chechens, Albanians, Armenians, Azeri and other ethnicities in or around Chechnya, Kosovo and Nagorno Karabakh:

- i) exist under the indicated name;
- ii) exist at least ‘formally’ in name (*existent*);
- iii) is really *salient* i.e. vibrant and culturally active, whether according to the asserted or actual other norms, customs and other practices;

² From 2005 till 2013, I have described my brutalisation theory, with some minor modifications, as “a cycle of violence involving four main variables: “*values* on “good” and “bad” violence (variable 1); *grievances* leading to armed conflict (variable 2); *combat stress* leading to atrocities (variable 3); and *new conflict grievances* emanating from such atrocities (variable 4), spawning counter-atrocities and eventually hardening or debasing the original violence-values (the cycle returns to the first variable)”: C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ *Iran and the Caucasus* Vol.14 No.2, November 2010, p.332. Yet since then, I have widened and reformulated the theory’s variables, so as to more equally represent different motivations as explanations of brutal behaviour, taken from or inspired by diverse theories propounding particular kinds of motivations as the primary causes of such behaviour.

³ See C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ *Iran and the Caucasus* Vol.14 No.2, November 2010, pp.331-65; ‘2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.15 Nos.1-2, June 2011, pp.234-73; ‘3. Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, pp.225-45; ‘4. Conflict Motivations among the Chechens and Albanians’ (forthcoming).

⁴ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* Oxford Pakistan Paperbacks Oxford/London: Oxford University Press, 1997 ed. (Princeton University Press, 1973, 1978, 1980), pp.181; pp.183-92 on kinship typology (yet no clear ‘tribe’ definition). NB: perhaps more sources on classic anthropological kinship definitions.

⁵ Scholars generally discern the same social units, but apply different terms (family, clan, tribe, etcetera) for them. Thus most (but not all) scholars define ‘clan’ as the multi-household group with actual or perceived common ancestry.

- iv) has been politically and/or military active prior to and during the armed conflicts in the 1990s and beyond;
- v) if so, has been active in identifiable political and/or military formations, and been involved in fighting and other violence;
- vi) if so, has exhibited identifiable brutality, brutalisation and/or debrutalisation patterns;
- vii) if so, that any particular norms, beliefs, customs and practices of the clan or other group in question account for any of the brutality, brutalisation and/or debrutalisation patterns.

In the first part of the analysis, I seek to determine the extent to which extent (sub-)clan identity and loyalty shape the distinct or discernible combat-units (from platoons to battalions or their equivalents) of each warring party – as opposed to political, secular and/or religious and other ideological or cultural group identities and loyalties.

In the second part of the analysis, I map the violence-patterns during battles, manoeuvres and other events of each major combat-unit, and assessed and categorise these in their degree of respect for, or violation of, local and international norms, including those of humanitarian law (on proper warfare) and human rights. This undertaking presents a more advancing testing or falsification of my Brutalisation theory. This will probably show that the theory is just partially valid, i.e. characterises only certain factions among the warring parties at certain time periods. Still, the theory's overall validity seems to increase the longer a conflicts lasts (as in Chechnya), with recurrent high-intensity fighting and a clear erosion of local and international norms vis-à-vis the sanctities of the non-combatant and the prisoner of war.

Violence-values, combat-stresses and conflict motivations among Chechen clans through its own armed formations or other armed groups

As I noted in one of my articles in my How to Feud and Rebel Series, “Chechen society lacks hierarchies i.e. classes; competition occurs among clans and other kinship groups instead, and tends to be violent given the martial tradition”.⁶ In the same publication, I observed that due to this inter-clan competition and martial tradition, “youngsters and adults are pressured to excel”, whereby consequent “group expectations lead to potentially brutalising honour-stress among youngsters with fragile self-esteem”.⁷ Therefore, I concluded that:

⁶ C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 3. Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, p.233. Sources: Emil Souleimanov, *An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective* Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/New York/Oxford/etc.: Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp.31-32 (& his notes 20,31,32). Louis J. Luzbetak, *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia: A Contribution to the Study of North Caucasian Ethnology and Customary Law* Studia Instituti Anthropos Vol.3 Vienna/Mödling: St. Gabriel’s Mission Press, 1951, pp.146-47.

⁷ C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 3. Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, p.234 (quotes).

many Chechens, especially those from minor or ‘impure’ clans (including those made up of former slaves), felt compelled to prove their valour in spectacular acts as *smertniki* (suicide fighters) against non-Chechen enemies, Russians in particular. Such violence reveals *double brutalisation*, i.e. discarding of both international and traditional norms: war-traumatised youngsters came to reject customs and adore brute strength.⁸

Still, are there significant differences in behavior and thus brutality (if any) among Chechen armed formations during the wars in the 1990s and the present low-intensity conflict, and do different clan (*gar*, *neqi*) memberships and identities account for (many or any) of these differences? These questions are exceedingly difficult to answer, as little research has been done to directly answer these questions.

The broader patterns of clan distributions and characteristics seem to be generally known. Thus, “inter-clan competition grew together with Chechnya’s population, increasing the number of clans from 59 to a 100 during the first half of the 19th century, and to 170 (100 in mountains, 70 on plains) by the 1990s—mostly due to ambitious sub-clans declaring themselves *teips* or *taips*” (I translate *gar* and *neqi* as “clan” and *teip* as “tribe”).⁹ However, even these general ‘facts’ are contested. Strictly speaking, the “origin of the Chechens and their early history is unknown”.¹⁰ There is no consensus on what civilisation shaped Chechen culture and ethnos, nor on the provenance of Chechnya’s 150 to 170 clans. Some believe they and their mountain democracy were formed thousands of years back; thus Chechen ethnologist Mahomet Mamakaev regarded the *taipa* “an ancient Chechen institution that simply acquired a new name in the 17th century”.¹¹ Others, like ethnologists Yan Chesnov (Russian-Chechen) and Amjad Jaimoukha (Kabardin-Circassian), believe the Chechen clans were established during a seventeenth-century democratic revolution or even as late as the nineteenth century (Broxup-Bennigsen).¹² Some question whether such clans ever existed, or dismiss them and their supposed customs as “mythical social structures” (re)invented by political entrepreneurs: Valery Tishkov opposes Yan Chesnov’s

⁸ C. ten Dam, ‘Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, p.234. Sources: Souleimanov, *An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective* Peter Lang, 2007, pp.22 (his note 7), 24-6, 31 (his note 30). Amjad Jaimoukha, *The Chechens: A handbook* London/New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2005: pp.90,93,134-135

⁹ C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians’ *Iran and the Caucasus* Vol.15 Nos.1-2, June 2011, pp.247-48. As I already noted in the Introduction (note [3]), scholars discern the same social units, but apply different terms (family, clan, tribe) for them. Many use the term *teip* for clans of over fifteen households. *Taip* derives from Arabic *tāifa* (community, group). See further Ibid, p.248, footnotes 15 & 16.

¹⁰ Luzbetak, *Marriage and Family in Caucasia*, 1951, p.22; see pp.195-99,204-6.

¹¹ Christian Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, pp.470-71 (& his note 15). From: Magomet Amaevich Mamakaev, *Chechenskii taip (rod) v period ego razlozheniia* Grozny: Checheno-Ingushskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1973, pp.5-7.

¹² Jaimoukha, *Chechens*, 2005, pp.1.35,83,85-86,94. A. Lieven, *Tombstone of Russian Power*, 1998, pp.333(note 22),339,341 & note 34. Marie Broxup-Bennigsen (ed.), *The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World* Society for Central Asian Studies London: Hurst & Company, 1992, p.4. Souleimanov, *Endless War: Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective* Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag, 2007, pp.21-22 (teyps 30 to 150).

‘primordialist’ take on Chechen identity and history of resistance to the Russians, which so influenced local and Western scholars (D.E. Furman, Gall & De Waal, Lieven): “a constructivist approach is absolutely timely for this research”. Still, both Chesnov and Tishkov agree that the high-lowland distinction among Chechen clans is overly simplistic (here Tishkov appears to recognise the *teip* – or as I would call it, the *gar* or *neqi* – as a reality).¹³

Even so, even current literature on “teips (clans)” seem “to pose more questions than provide answers as to what the contemporary teip really is”, partially because primordialist, often nationalist scholars vaguely describe it as a kin-based tribal unit, while modernist (both pro- and anti-Russian) scholars insist that “ ‘There is no such thing as teip’ ”. Interestingly, modernist nationalists among the Ingush and Chechens, argue that “All these myths about clan structures, Elders, customary law are created in order to construct an image of backward, primitive societies .. who cannot govern themselves and have to be governed by the strong hand of Moscow”.¹⁴ Ironically, as we will see, many founders, proponents and followers of the independent Chechen Republic of Nokhchi (*Noxçiyın Respublika Noxçiyçö*, NRN), also called *Ichkeria* after the south-eastern ‘heartland’ (*ich kerı*: “place over there” in Kumyk) – of which currently only remnants exist in exile in London and elsewhere – (did) believe in these ‘myths’, or at least (did) consider these vital ingredients for creating or maintaining national identity and state-building.


More significantly, Christian Dettmering questions the basic presumptions behind Mamakaev’s highly-structured and hierarchical “Chechen clan model” as reproduced here below. He thus criticises Mamakaev’s belief that Chechen – and Ingush – clans were “political structures with no territorial cohesion” by the 19th century since they “descended to the fertile plains between the Sunzha and the mountains” in the 16th century, but were still powerful political actors opposing the Russian colonisation by armed struggle and other means. In this regard, Mamakaev’s model seems to be based on a widespread 19th-century idea among Russian (and other) colonialists and colonial-minded ethnologists “that ‘stateless’ societies with clan structures were much more difficult to integrate’ into empires”.¹⁵

¹³ Valery Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society* Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2004, pp.4,8,14(1st quote)-15,16(“mythic history”)-17,20,49(2nd quote)-50,55. Tishkov recognises that “neither my cultural nor my geographic identity is neutral” (p.2).

¹⁴ Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya – A fieldwork report’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, pp.453-54 (incl. quotes). Third and last quote from Prof. Arsamakov, rector of Ingush State University, during a conversation with Sokirianskaia in 2002.

¹⁵ Christian Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, pp.469 (3rd quote), 469-70 (1st quote),471 (2nd quote).

Figure 1.1 Simplified schema of Mamakaev’s model



From: Christian Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, p.471, Figure 1.

Original source: Magomet Amaevich Mamakaev, *Chechenskii taip (rod) v period ego razloženiia* (Чеченский Тайп (Род) в Период его Разложения – The Chechen tribe/clan (family) during [its period of] its expansion) Grozny: Checheno–Ingushskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1973.

More to the point here, Dettmering implicitly questions the entire design of Mamakaev’s model – a model followed by some many others scholars (Aroutiunov, Kutlu, etc.)¹⁶ – as a forced, artificial adoption of the pioneering model by American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881) of the Native-American *Iroquois* people, including the transfer of “Morgan’s 23 criteria of an Iroquois clan to the Chechen *taipa*”.¹⁷ Still, it remains unclear to what extent Dettmering precisely follows i.e. agrees (or disagrees) with Mamakaev’s circumscriptions of:

¹⁶ Thus Russian ethnologist Sergei Aroutiunov appears to follow Mamakaev’s model, when he speaks of around 150 “tribal, i.e. teip units” divided into “smaller units, lineages (varisses)” and united into about nine larger tribal units—*tukhums*”; yet Aroutiunov’s other claim that there are also around 150 “kin–neighbor based communities” seems to accord closer to Dettmering’s multi-clan village model: see E. Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya – A fieldwork report’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, p.454 (quotes). Tarik Cemal Kutlu (1944-2004) is a Turkish scholar who translated Mamakaev’s works and published his own works on Chechen culture and history. See e.g. T. C. Kutlu, *Çeçen Direniş Tarihi* (History of the Chechen Resistance) Anka Yayınları: Istanbul, 2005.

¹⁷ Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, p.471. Dettmering presumes that the reader is familiar with Lewis H. Morgan and his pioneering work; consequently, he does not elaborate on Morgan’s work nor

a) extended families – the *dözal* as a “joint extended family of four generations”; the *ca* as “several *dözals*” which “formed the family space around the hearth”; and the *neqe* (line) as “several *cas* and forming a lineage over four to six generations”; and

b) the clans – the *gara* (branch) as the “maximal lineage .. which comprised seven generations”; and the *taipa* as an apparent, yet unspecified ‘super-clan’ with a “common mythic ancestor”.¹⁸ Again, I translate and define *gar* and *neqi* as “clan” and *teip* as “tribe”.

Dettmering does unequivocally reject Mamakaev’s basic assertion that “most *taipanas* were united in nine *tuqumas*” – and asserts instead that the *tuqum* originally meant, and truly existed as, a union between kindred, blood-related (super- or sub-)clans within villages, and was not a multi-clan union or a multi-tribe commune beyond or across the villages. Nor was there a true Chechen ‘nation’ (*qam*) in the sense of a confederation of *tuqumas* under a so-called “*mexk qel*’ (council of the land)” that also “regulated the customary law and traditions”.¹⁹

In one of the rare fieldworks on post-20th-century existence, relevance and nature of clans and other kin-groups in Chechnya and Ingushetia, Ekaterina Sokirianskaia – she lambasts the lack of falsifiable, corroborated theory grounded in “primary fieldwork” in the ongoing “academic and ideological debate” – found two distinct meanings of *teip* (which she translates as “clan”) among Chechen and Ingush communities: 1. “clan, i.e. large kin-group, consisting of hundreds of families”; and 2. “extended family, which includes all the relatives with whom a person maintains kin relations”.²⁰

Sokirianskaia concludes that the *teip*-as-clan (meaning 1) does no longer truly exist as a functioning *social group* due to the breakdown and impracticability of “face-to-face communication” by the destructive impacts of Russian colonisation, Soviet

make any source references. Therefore, I do this to the best of my ability. See eg. Lewis H. Morgan, *League of the Ho-de-no sau-nee or Iroquois* Volumes I & II New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1954 (reprint of Herbert M. Loyd (ed.), New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1901 /Original ed.: Rochester: Sage & Brother, 1851). Elisabeth Tooker, ‘The Structure of the Iroquois League: Lewis H. Morgan’s Research and Observations’ *Ethnohistory* Vol.30 No.3, 1983, pp.141-54.

¹⁸ Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, pp.470-71 (quotes). Apparently, Dettmering does not fully support Mamakaev’s kinship definitions. Thus the “exact distinctions” amongst *dözal*, *ca* and *neqe* “were not very clear” (p.470). Moreover, “Mamakaev used the terms *dözal* and *ca* for the first time and there is no record for these terms in 19th century literature .. Thus it is very difficult to determine the various family functions of entities smaller than the *neqe*” (p.476). Even so, Dettmering does not come up of his own with any explicit, precise, formal definitions of the various possible kinship entities.

¹⁹ Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, pp.471 (2nd quote), 479 (1st quote). The “first time the term *mexk qel* appears in literature is in Mamakaev’s book” (p.481).

²⁰ E. Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya – A fieldwork report’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, pp.455 (1st quote), 456 (2nd quote). She apparently follows the fundamentals of Mamakaev’s model: “There exist over a hundred *teip*-1 groups (allegedly about 150), each uniting tens of lineages (*gar*), subdivided into dozens of extended families (*nek*) consisting of nuclear families (*dozal*)” (p.456).

collectivisation, WWII deportation and post-WWII urbanisation and industrialisation, even though it has remained a symbol of *social identity*, maintained by lineage narratives, burials in the (mythical or factual) village or other location of origin, and (exogamous) intermarriages. In contrast, the teip-as-extended-family (meaning 2) – i.e. the man’s extended family – proves to be highly relevant and salient in Chechen and Ingush societies, especially in rural villages where face-to-face contacts are more easily maintained. Relatives of the extended family are also most important as contacts, patrons and guarantors for finding employment, though neighbors, *virlds* (religious brotherhoods) and friends fulfill these functions as well.²¹

However, I believe that Sokirianskaia overstates her case, by asserting that the teip-as-clan is a “non-existent entity” *everywhere* in Chechen and Ingush society, as if there are no exceptions at all. Actually she does refer to such outliers, when she observes that “in some small teips (up to 300 nuclear families), mostly in Ingushetia, face-to-face communication remains possible” – though “small teips are few”, they *may* have played state-building and policy-making (and military) roles in Chechnya and Ingushetia in the recent past and may still do so in the present day.²² One other reason why she prematurely, and perhaps invalidly, ‘disqualifies’ the main hypothesis – “State building and policy-making in Ingushetia and Chechnya have been shaped by interaction of primordial patterns of social integration, primarily teips (clans)” – is that the results of her study are pioneering and insightful, yet neither exhaustive and conclusive. Her “participant observation and in-depth interviews” in Chechnya and Ingushetia between 2002 and 2005 are significant yet incomplete; by her own admission “certain areas” in Chechnya were “inaccessible” at the time due to continued fighting and military operations there – consequently, “pro-federal groups” were “more accessible to analysis” than anti-federal groups i.e. the rebels.²³

At this stage of my own research, however, I cannot confidently take side in the debate, i.e. support or reject Mamakaev’s presuppositions in his clan-structure model – or take an alternative position.

Incidentally, I would consider the *gara* a clan or at least a sub-clan, rather than an extended family given its apparent size and complexity. And I circumscribe the *kup* as the multi-family (lineage) village commune, while it is probable not certain whether Dettmering defines the *kup* as such a commune as well – despite the fact he closely ties it to the *gara* (as villages were apparently dominated by one such sub-clan or supra-family), as both being territorial “entities that owned the land and distributed it amongst their members”.²⁴ I tend to agree with Dettmering’s critique of the

²¹ Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, pp.456,456(quote)-460.

²² Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, pp.457 (2nd & 3rd quotes), 462 (1st quote).

²³ Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya’, 2005, pp.453 (2nd quote), 462 (1st quote; wording hypothesis slightly different on p.454), 465 (3rd quote). She insists she spoke with a “sufficient number of respondents in different regions of Chechnya” (p.453), but how many and representative were they, and could their responses be so substantial and exhaustive as to have “fully disqualified” (p.462; italics added) the hypothesis regarding the saliency of the teip-as-clan?

²⁴ Dettmering, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, p.476 (including non-defined reference to ‘*kup*’). I succinctly circumscribe the *kup* as a “multi-family (lineage) village commune” in: C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and

widespread assumption that clans, Chechen clans in particular, have had no territorial cohesion in one or more villages or other localities since the 19th century onwards. Yet he seems to use the terms *clan* and *tribe* in the exact reverse sense as I do, when he concludes that the “dominant Chechen entities were the villages, which were united into tribes for defensive reasons and these tribes were not based on blood relationship”.²⁵

While I generally use the classic anthropological distinction between the *tribe* as a kin group without residential unity (‘ethnic’ if with perceived common ancestry) and the *clan* as a kin group with residential unity, Detmerring seems to use the terms in a more multi-faceted way, to consider clans as kin groups with or *without* residential unity, and tribes as *multi-kin or non-kin* groups without or *with* residential unity. In short, Detmerring (convincingly) argues that the village-based and multi-village and/or multi-ethnic territorial ‘tribes’ played a significant military and political role in the 19th century – and 20th century? – rebellions against Russian encroachment, while the *teips* and smaller ‘clans’ were subsumed and divided (eg. between the lowlands and highlands, and across different villages and other settlements) under these territorial arrangements, and played only social and cultural roles.

However, I do wonder whether *teips* (tribes) and *gar* and *neqi* (clans and sub-clans) as I define them may have been, and may still, be distinct and significant political actors within the villages and other settlements (hamlets, towns, etc.), competing with other resident tribes and (sub-)clans in the decision-making bodies of those villages and other settlements. Perhaps Detmerring underestimates, or even has not considered, the dynamics of *intra-village and other territorial competition between resident (sub-)clans and tribes*. The most powerful, respected and/or savvy kin groups may shape decisions and policies in villages and other settlements in which they happen to coexist with other, ‘lesser’, less successful (sub-)clans there – even if formal decision-making in those localities is done by consensus, and supposedly represent unity and common identity in those localities.

Despite the theoretical and interpretative contestations, and rather to counteract minimalist and constructivist views on Chechen clan culture and structure, present-day Chechen nationalists come up with very precise identifications of the names, ethnicities and numbers of clans in Chechnya, like those supporting the apparently defunct but emotionally salient Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On their website, they list – as shown in Tables 1.3.A and 1.4.A – the names of 158 clans (or tribes?) distributed among nine *tukhums* (tribal unions), and 55 non-Tukhum Chechen and non-ethnic Chechen clans residing in the republic, based on the works of just a few yet still authoritative sources: Tarik Cemal Kutlu, and once more, Mahomet Mamakaev.²⁶

Rebel: 2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians’ *Iran and the Caucasus* Vol.15 Nos.1-2, June 2011, p.247. See [and discuss] further Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya – A fieldwork report’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, December 2005, pp.453-67.

²⁵ Dettmerring, ‘Reassessing Chechen and Ingush (*Vainakh*) clan structures in the 19th century’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, p.482.

²⁶ Waynakh Online, www.waynakh.com/eng (first accessed 3-03-2011; last accessed 14-10-2013). Sources: Tarik Cemal Kutlu, *History of the Chechen Resistance* Istanbul, 2005; NB: unsure whether it

We take their claims as a point of departure to answer research questions i to vii (see Introduction). Still, if any other scholars and sources credibly and validly criticise or depart from their claims regarding the identification and salience of (any of) the clans, we will indicate this accordingly.

Unfortunately there appear to be just sparse anecdotal references to and rudimentary analyses of the clan memberships and saliencies of Chechen leaders and ordinary Chechens in the late 20th and early 21st centuries – and even those references tend to contradict and contest each other. Thus General Johar Musayevich Dudaev, just forty-six years old when he was elected head of both the separatist All-National Congress of the Chechen People (*Obshchennatsional'nyi Kongress Chechnskogo Narodna*, OKCh)²⁷ and its armed wing the National Guard at the founding meeting in November 1990, did not seem to have the credentials to become Chechnya's first separatist President in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet eras: Dudaev was a member of the semi-Ingush *yalkhoro* mountain *gar* (clan); moreover, he was married since 1969 to Alla Kulikova, a Russian from Estonia, and continued to exhibit pro-Soviet sentiments and nostalgia.²⁸

However, disagreements on the saliency i.e. political and social strength of a particular clan already become apparent here. To some analysts, the *yalkhoro* clan to which Dudaev belonged was “relatively small and insignificant”²⁹ and hardly respected by hardline Ichkeria nationalists. Dudaev was actually born on 15 April 1944 in the “mountain village of Yalkhoroi” just a “few weeks before the deportations” in south-western Chechnya, yet the *yalkhoro* clan was “an obscure mountain one, .. descended from the semi-Ingush people, the Karabulaks, .. with little influence in Chechnya”.³⁰ To others, however, the clan's members were “renowned for their military genius”.³¹

Nevertheless, Dudaev got his initially ceremonial posts as a compromise figure, whatever the strength, reputation and influence of his clan. Even so, after elections on 27 October 1991 organised by the All-National Congress, Dudaev became the first President of the independent Chechen Republic of Nokhchi (*Noxçiyın Respublika*

concerns an English translation or merely an English rendering of the book's original title: *Çeçen Direniş Tarihi* Anka Yayınları: Istanbul, 2005. Mohamad Mamakayev (Mahomet Mamakaev), *Çeçenskiy tayp v period ega radlojeniya* Grozny, 1973 (transliteration as presented on Waynakh Online). Mamakaev's classic is very hard to get at; it is available in only a few libraries, like the Bodleian Library in Oxford (code 24744e.108). I was able to get a copied version of it from Prof. Victoria Arakelova, the partner of Prof. Garnik Asatrian, at the Yerevan State University, during my latest visit to Armenia to attend a conference in early November 2013 (see downloadable CV at www.ctdamconsultancy.com). (See later: Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, ‘Sufi brotherhoods in the USSR: A historical survey’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.2 No.4, 1983, pp.1-35).

²⁷ Also called ‘Pan-National’, later ‘National’ Congress of the Chechen People(s). Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1998, pp.56-59-60;96-101.

²⁸ General sources: e.g. Ann Sheehy, ‘Crisis in Checheno-Ingushetia’ *RFE/RL Report on the USSR* Vol.3 No.?, 18 Oct 91, pp.30-31 & ‘Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia’ Vol.3 No.46, 15 Nov 91, pp.20-26. See further M. Broxup-Bennigsen, ‘After the Putsch, 1991’, in M. Broxup-Bennigsen (ed.), Broxup-Bennigsen, *North Caucasus Barrier* Hurst & Company, 1992, pp.219-39.

²⁹ A. Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* Yale University Press, 1998, p.58 (without mentioning *yalkhoro* clan explicitly).

³⁰ Carlotta Gall & Thomas De Waal, *Chechnya: A Small Victorious War* London: Pan Books, 1997, pp.83-84.

³¹ Souleimanov, *An Endless War* Peter Lang, 2007, p.83 (“Yalkoroy highland teyp”).

Noxçiyçö, NRN), also called *Ichkeria* after the south-eastern ‘heartland’ (*ich kerî*: “place over there” in Kumyk) already declared by the second All-National Congress on 8-9 June 1991.³² Perhaps by oath he secured the loyalty of his Presidential Guard, even while released criminals and other paramilitaries under then twenty-seven-year-old gangster Beslan Gantemirov, opportunistic founder of an ‘Islamic Path’ party, infiltrated the National Guard and Grozny’s municipal police. The former head of *Chechenstroï* construction company Yaragi Mamadaev, like Gantemirov a member of the apparently powerful *chinkho* clan, became deputy and later acting prime minister after both bankrolled the Congress in its early years.³³ Though Valery Tishkov dismisses Dudaev’s vanguard as a “narrow, ragtag group” of “three to five thousand people” believing in the *teip* (clan) ‘figment’, he affirms that the labor surplus of up to 200,000 jobless, seasonal-work and criminal(ised) youths “became the main reserve for the armed struggle”.³⁴ Unlike state-dependent proletarians i.e. regular-wage earners (mostly Russians), these sub-proletarians with their ‘social capital’ of family and friends became Dudaev’s foot soldiers. This separatist coalition initially “created and led by national intellectuals were able to splinter and overcome the *nomenklatura*, but could not preserve state order”. According to Georgi Derluguian, “family honor, kinship and patronage” were and are part of this social capital, and sub-proletarians most rely on these “traditional .. notions”.³⁵

However, whether these ‘traditional notions’ influenced or even shaped combat units and other armed formations during periods of violent conflict in and around Chechnya, remains unclear or at least highly disputed. Even though Zelimkhan Yandarbiev – a Chechen poet and leading ideologue of the Chechen Revolution, Vice-President of Ichkeria and party leader of Harmony (*Bart*), later renamed the Vainakh Democratic Party – has suggested (implicitly or explicitly?) that “armed groups or squads were organized on a territorial basis throughout the war”, Tishkov did “not trace any special *teip* connections or solidarity in .. critical moments of the armed uprising”.³⁶

Perhaps Tishkov could not find these clan connections in Chechen armed formations, as Dettmering’s theory that neither the *taipanas* or ‘supra-clans’ nor the lower-level clans (*neqe*, *garanäs*), but rather the *multi-clan and non-lineage tribal villages and larger territorial units* were the primary political and military actors in the 19th-

³² Despite both anti- and pro-independence opposition, Dudaev’s (all-)National Congress organised self-styled, separatist presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 October 1991; Dudaev became president with reportedly 85-90% of the votes and nationalist parties won all seats. During 1-2 November, Dudaev and the new parliament reaffirmed Chechnya’s independence. Local Russians, Cossacks and Chechens opposing Dudaev’s Revolution either boycotted or were allegedly barred from the elections: BBC’s Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1250/B1: *Tass* world service (ws), 5 Dec 91.

³³ Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* Yale University Press, 1998, pp.58-59. C. Gall & T. De Waal, *Chechnya: A Small Victorious War* London: Pan Books, 1997, pp.90-91. M. Broxup-Bennigsen, ‘After the Putsch, 1991’, in *North Caucasus Barrier*, pp.222,225-6,230 [NO specific references Mamadaev and Gantemirov: must be from other source(s) – eg. Ann Sheehy].

³⁴ Tishkov, *War-Torn Society*, University of California Press, 2004, pp.13 (1st quote)-14, 41 (2nd quote).

³⁵ Georgi M. Derluguian, *Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography* Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp.132 (2nd quote), 165 (1st quote); see further pp.136,141-54,194,207.

³⁶ Tishkov, *War-Torn Society*, 2004, p.94 (quotes). Yandarbiev’s suggestion or claim of territory-based formation of armed units can apparently be find in his *Chechnya – Bitva za svobodu* (Chechnya – The Struggle [Battle] for Freedom) Lvov, Ukraine, 1996.

century rebellions, may hold true for Chechnya's 20th- and 21st-century rebellions as well. Even so, certain clans from certain villages did form armed formations, or at least dominated or led the village-groups that in turn formed or dominated the armed groups. Tishkov acknowledges this as much, as he extensively cites his guide and cross-reviewer Rustam Kaliev (even though buried in an endnote) on this phenomenon:

There are people from different *teips* living in every village. It is true that armed groups were formed along territorial lines, but *teip* membership also played a part. For example, the Galaizhoiskaya brigade in Yermolovka were practically from one Galai *teip*. In Zakan-Urt, the Chaberloy special regiment, headed by Kurdi Bazhiyev, consisted mainly of Chaberloy *teip* members.³⁷

According to Sokirianskaia, the overall picture of clan saliency in political and/or military formations is mixed, though rather revolves around the *teip*-as-extended-family than *teip*-as-clan, or what we would call the extended-family (*dözal*) or higher sub-clan level(s): among the Vainakhs (mainly Chechens and Ingush), the “political (and in Chechnya also military) unit” with a leading figure “may or may not be formed by the figure’s close kin” as its nucleus. Many a politico-military group is “then manned by the supporters of this [leading] figure, including relatives, neighbours, fellow villagers”. Yet other groups were not based on kin, village and/or neighborhood affiliations – and apparently were so much the weaker for it: thus “Aslan Maskhadov’s political-military grouping was based on shared political ideals rather than kinship and neighbourly relations, which reduced its competitiveness with other groupings”.³⁸

Be as it may, the interplays of ideologies, interests and feuds between (pro-)rebel and (pro-)regime clans sealed the fate of the National Guard and Dudaev’s Revolution. Ahmad Kadyrov, his two sons Zelimkhan and Ramzan, and other members of the *benoy* clan came to oppose Maskhadov’s ‘Ichkeria republic’ – which they once defended in the 1994-96 war – and throw in their lot with Putin’s Russia. They were horrified by the ‘Wahhabi’ take-over of the separatist movement, and sought to reinvigorate traditional Sufi Islam with maximum autonomy of their people inside Russia. Vladimir Putin, who sought to ‘normalise’ Chechnya by co-opting local groups (‘Chechenisation’), orchestrated Ahmad’s election as Chechen President on 5 October 2003. Jihadist separatists killed him with a bomb in May 2004 – only to have his son Ramzan take over the Presidency in March 2007 after stints as deputy-premier and premier. One reason for the Kadyrov family’s power and influence – and the decision by Putin to utilise them – appears simply to be the immense size of the clan they belong to: the *benoy* reportedly “amounts to 15% of the Chechen population”,

³⁷ Tishkov, *War-Torn Society*, 2004, p.235, note 2 (of p.94).

³⁸ Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, p.464 (quotes). She speaks here of the most powerful groups at the highest governing or top-brass levels in Chechnya and Ingushetia; yet her observations also could be true for lower-level political and/or military groupings.

thereby being as large or larger than many a *tukhum* or tribal union, and apparently the largest Chechen clan as well.³⁹

Bibliographical note

Caspar ten Dam (MA political science) worked for the Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), Leiden University, between 1998 and 2002. He wrote confidential reports, like one on the Kosovo conflict for the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in Vienna, Austria. He has been a freelance consultant and independent scholar since then. Presently he is finalising a comparative study on Chechen and Albanian insurgents and the applicability of his own *Brutalisation theory* on their aims and methods of violence. The findings of this study are presently being published as a “How to Feud and Rebel” series in *Iran and the Caucasus* (Brill), for which he hopes to be awarded a PhD at the Institute of History at Leiden University.⁴⁰ Presently he is conducting research on the applicability of the Brutalisation theory on other intractable conflicts, like the one in and on Nagorno Karabakh. Together with Dr. Babak Rezvani and Servet Sahin (MA political science) he has established the *Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics* (first issue: Vol.1 No.1, Spring 2013), an academic journal for analysis and debate within the field of ethnogeopolitics (see www.ethnogeopolitics.org).

Tables (under construction)

Under construction; perhaps data shown on a geographic map rather than in a table.

For the spreadsheet tables: designations of all concepts/variables in ordinal scale, from 0 to 5

0 = unknown/uncertain/unclear

1 = not at all/practically none

2 = to a low degree/a little

3 = to some degree/somewhat/mixed

4 = to a high degree/a lot/very much (so)

5 = to a full, maximum degree/practically or totally (so)

Table 1.1 presents our approximations of Vainakh kinship types, religious-cultural orientations and numbers.

³⁹ See Sokirianskaia, ‘Families and clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya’ *Central Asian Survey* Vol.24 No.4, 2005, p.456 (“Chechen teip ‘benoj’ .. 15% of Chechen population”).

⁴⁰ See C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ *Iran and the Caucasus* Vol.14 No.2, November 2010, pp.331-65; ‘2. Histories, Cultures and Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.15 Nos.1-2, June 2011, pp.234-73; ‘3. Combat-stress and Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, pp.225-45; ‘4. Conflict Grievances among the Chechens and Albanians’ (Vol.17/18, forthcoming).

Table 1.1 Chechen clans: geographic concentrations, religious affiliations, and customs

Chechen highlanders (South Chechnya)	Chechen lowlanders (North Chechnya)	Ingush, 'lowlanders' (mainly Ingushetia)	Other: Kists, Batsis, etc. (Georgia etc.)
<p><i>Tuqums</i> (9-10 tribal groups) { } Chantiy; Cherberloy; Melkhiy (conservative); Nohchimakhoy; Sharoy; Shoatoy; Terloy [Nashkoy] (+ Akkiy: 2/3 all teips)</p> <p><i>Teips</i> (tribes) Nohchimakhoy { } - Benoy/beno(i) ('butt jokes'; p. <i>gar</i>) { } - Tsentaroy/tsentoro ('tough'; p. <i>gar</i>) Batsay (rel. to Batsis) Tarkoy (Targhoy) { } Tyerekhsloi (mountain gars 19th cent.)</p> <p><i>Gars</i> (<i>neqi</i>; clans) Chinkho ('brazen') Gukhoi { }</p>	<p><i>Tuqums</i> * Akkiy</p> <p><i>Teips</i> Akki (or 'Ingush') { } Maistoy; Peshkhoy; Sadoy; Zurzuqoy (single-tribe <i>tuqums</i>)**</p> <p>Tyerekhsloi (pro-R Terek gars 20th cent.; Zavgaev's)</p> <p><i>Gars</i> {p. some high:} Aliroi; Belghatoi; Dattakhoy; Yalkhoi; Elistanzhloi; Enganoi; Ersanoi; Ishtkoi; Karachoi; Kusrhaloi; Makzhoy; Nikhaloi; Ts'entaro; Zandaqoi; Vashandaroi (all these clans or. From single villages).</p>	<p><i>Tuqums</i> (5; 1810: 6) Ghalghay (or 'Ingush') Gvelety (Muslim 1862)</p> <p><i>Teips</i></p> <p><i>Gars</i> Gunoy (or Chechen); <i>Bamat</i> <i>Giray</i> founder</p>	<p><i>Tuqums</i> Qarabulaq [Karabulak] (Orstkhoy/Erstkhoy; non-Kist, non-Batsi: Dudaev's) Vagmaadul { }</p> <p><i>Teips</i></p> <p><i>Gars</i> 30 Dagestani descent: eg. Andiy/Unsurial, Akthoy, Etloy 5 Georgian descent: eg. Charoy, Shoy Russian/Cossack: Arseloy, Orsi Jewish: Zhugtiy (hland) Tati (sub-clan Yalkoroy) Tats: 'Mountain Jews' [Dudaev's clan?], S-Dagestan, N-Azerbaijan</p>

Main source(s): Anna Zelkina, *In Quest for God and Freedom: The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus* London: Hurst & Co., 2000, pp.11, 15-17, 34-35.

Amjad Jaimoukha, *The Chechens: A handbook* London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon/Taylor & Francis Group, 2005, pp.46 (& note 7),84-86 (notes 3 & 10), 89 (& note 15), p.119, note 25; different spellings: ‘Chanti’, ‘Nokchmekhakhoi’, etcetera.

Emil Souleimanov, *An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective* Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/New York/Oxford/etc.: Peter Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp.21-22 (& notes 7, 8: from Y. Chesnov), 25,26 (note 20).

* defunct since the late 19th century as political, decision-making identities.

** : Zelkina defines *tuqum* as ‘rural commune’ that can be *either* single- or multi-tribal.

{ } : uncertain whether within this category. [NB: Table 1.1 is preliminary, still under construction]

Table 1.2 presents our approximations of Albanian kinship types, religious-cultural orientations and numbers.

Table 1.2 Albanian clans: geographic concentrations, religious affiliations and customs

Kosovo (Gegs)	North Albania (Gegs) ‘highlanders’	South Albania (Tosks) ‘lowlanders’	Other (Macedonia, Montenegro etc.)
<p>Tribes (<i>fis</i>)</p> <p>Clans (also transl. <i>fis</i>)</p> <p>Clans or sub-clans (brotherhoods: <i>vëllazëri, mëhallë</i>)</p>	<p>Tribes (also transl. <i>fis</i>) <i>Malësor</i> (highlanders) north of Drin: 19 tribes [clans], most Catholic (1881); 18 tribes by 1939: [Bogë { }] Bytyç**, Drisht, Gash, Has**, Hot(ti)*, Kir, Kastrat(i), Kastriot, (Klementi),(Koçaj), Krasniq**, Lumë***, Mertur, (Pulati), Nikaj (sub-clan: Curraj), Nikç*,Shalë((sub-clans: Abat(i),Bob(i),Lotaj, Penikaj; sub-clan: Theth), Shkrel(i), Selcë*, Shosh [village, sub-clan?], Theth [not sub-clan?], Toplanë [Vukël { }]. (): 1881 tribes</p> <p>South of Drin: 1 large tribe, Catholic: Mirditë; 5 clans: Dibri, Fândi [Fan], Kushneni,</p>	<p>Semi-tribes (<i>fara,gjeri</i>) Non-Tosk: Çam, Lab Semi-clans (also transl. <i>fara, gjeri</i>)</p>	

	Oroshi, Spashi [Spaç]. Other 9 tribes: Berishë,Beshkash,Pukë Dibër [or a Mirditë clan], Kryezez,Kthellë*, Kurbin, Lurë*, Matjë.		
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Sources: Margaret Hasluck, *The Unwritten Law in Albania* J. H. Hutton (ed.) & J. E. Alderson (executor & effective co-editor) London/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954, pp.117-18, 131 (*fis* transl. ‘kin’, yet apparently equivalent to clan),148-49 (Shalë app’y a tribe, *not* a clan), 154-55 (Mat,Curraj,Shosh), 158 (Dibër), 160 (Fan), 163 (Spaç) & back Map ‘The North Albanian Mountains and Tribes’. H. Inalcik, ‘Arnawutluk’ [Albania] in: H. Gibb *et al* (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* Vol. I, 1986 (1960), pp.651-2. Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* London: Papermac/Macmillan Publishers, 1998, pp.14,16-17 (& notes 26,29).

* mixed Catholic-Muslim by the late Ottoman period (18th-19th c.)

** fully or mostly Muslim (with some still Catholic) by the late Ottoman period (18th-19th c.)

*** fully Muslim since the arrivals of the Ottomans (15th c.)

NB: those clans/tribes without asterix(es) have usually been wholly or mostly Catholic (*or* pagan, secular/atheist, Orthodox etc. – verify!) at least since the late Ottoman period.

{ }: uncertain whether within this category. [Table 1.2 is preliminary, still under construction]

NB 2: Was “central Albania” indeed a mainly “non-tribal area”(Hasluck, 1954, p.118)?

NB 3: Were the clans in Kosovo indeed intermingled and without their own, fixed territories, like the clans of the Mirditë tribe (Malcolm, pp.15-16)? Then according to our (Dupree’s) kin definitions, the Kosovar “clans were rather tribes. And were sub-clans like brotherhoods (*vëllazëri*, groups of “blood-related families”) indeed more salient in Kosovo than in northern Albania (“in Kosovo the basic unit of cooperative retribution was not the *fis* [clan] but the family”)?

NB 4: The known data on the numbers, denominations and other characteristics of the Albanian clans seem rather outdated, and confusing given the triple translations of *fis* as ‘tribe’, ‘clan’ or ‘kin’. Perhaps the thirty-plus Albanian *fis* are rather equivalent to the nine Chechen *tukhums* – then the larger number of Albanian ‘sub-clans’ might be closer to the large number of Chechen ‘clans’.

Table 1.2.B Violence(-values) by Albanian (sub-)clans (Table 1.2.A): observations, examples, incidents, sources

Search Google Scholar: ‘[(sub-)clan/tribe] violence clan tribe fis blood revenge gjak inat honour besa kanun’ & other source references

Kosovo (Gegs)	
brotherhoods <i>vëllazëri, mëhallë</i>	
N.Albania (Gegs)	
{Bogë}	
Bytyç	
Drisht	
Gash	
Has	
Hot(ti)	
Kir	
Kastrat(i)	
Kastriot	
(Klementi)	
(Koçaj)	
Krasniq	
Lumë	
Mertur	
(Pulati)	
Nikaj	
- Curraj	
Nikç	
Shalë	
- Abat(i)	
- Bob(i)	
- Lotaj	
- Penikaj	
-- Theth	
Shkrel(i)	
Selcë	
(-Shosh)	
Toplanë	
{Vukël}	
Mirditë (tribe)	
- Dibri	
- Fândi [Fan]	
- Kushneni	
- Oroshi	
- Spashi [Spaç]	
Berishë (tribe)	

Beshkash (ibid)	
Pukë	
Dibër [or Mirditë clan]	
Kryezez	
Kthellë	
Kurbin	
Lurë	
Matjë	
S.Albania (Tosks)	
Semi-tribes/clans <i>fara, gjeri</i>	
Non-Tosk: Çam, Lab	
Other (Macedonia, Montenegro etc.)	

Table 1.3.A Tribal Unions and Clans in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria *

Each column shows clans (or tribes) of each of the nine tukhums (tribal unions): 158 clans

Äkkiy	Myälxiy	Noxĉmăxkaxoy	Terloy	Čantiy	Čebarloy	Šaroy	Šotoy	Erštroy
Barĉaxoy Zhevoy Zogoy Nokkoy Pxarĉoy Pxarĉaxoy Vyäppiy (7 clans)	Byästiy Benastxoy Talĉxoy Kamalxoy Koratxo Keganxoy Mešiy Sakanxoy Teratxoy Čarxoy Erxoy Amxoy Jamxoy- Byästiy Barĉaxoy Dzhjarxoy Yueganxoy (16 clans)	Alaroy Aytksaloy Belgatoy Benoy Biltoy Gordaloy Gendargenoy Gunoy Dattixoy Dišni Zandakhoy Xirxoy Šxoy Kurĉaloy Sesanxoy Singalxoy Xaraĉoy Cjontaroy Čartoy Čermoy Širdi Šuonoy Egašbatoy Elistanzhxoy Enakxaloy Enganoy Ersanoy Yalxoy (28 clans)	Bavloy Bešxoy Bešni Gemeroy Gizxoy Gilšxoy Zheraxoy Kenaxoy Macarxoy Nkaroy Ošniy Sanaxoy Šyuidiy Eltparxoy (14 clans)	Bugaroy Deraxoy Kxokadoy Xaĉaroy Xildexaroy Cjamdoy (6 clans)	Arstxoy Aĉeloy Basoy Begaĉerxoy Bosoy Buni Gulatxoy Day Zhelaškxoy Zürxoy Xaroy Kezenoy Kiri Kuloy Laškaroy Makazhoy Nizheloy Nohĉi-keloy Nuyxoy Osxaroy Rigaxoy Sadoy Salbyuroy Sandaxoy Sikkaxoy Sirxoy Tunduxoy Xarkaloy Xindoy Xoy Cikaroy Čebyaxkinoxoy Čeremaxkxoy (33 clans)	Buti Dunarxoy Zhogjaldoy Kharoy Kaĉexoy Kevaxxoy Kinxoy Kiri Mazuxoy Čerĉixoy Xašalxoy Ximoy Xinuxoy Xixoy Xulandoy Xakmadoy Čeyroy Šikaroy Cesi (19 clans)	Varandoy Vašindaroy Gattoy Gorgaĉxoy Dexestoy Keloy Muskulxoy Myaršoy Nixaloy Pamyatoy Ryaduxoy Sanoy Syattoy Tumsoy Urduyuxoy Xakkoy Xalkeloy Xarsenoy (18 clans)	Jalxoy Jandaloy Belxaroy Bokoy Bulguĉxoy Bielxa- Nekhi Garĉoy Galay Gandaloy Merzhoy Muzhaxoy Muzhgaxoy Örgxoy Fergxoy Xayxaray Yalxaray Ceĉoy (17 clans)

*: Collected by Waynakh Online, www.waynakh.com/eng (accessed 3-03-2011; last accessed 14-10-2013). Sources: Tarik Cemal Kutlu, *History of the Chechen Resistance* Istanbul, 2005; Mohamad Mamakayev, *Čeĉenskiy tayp v period ega radlojeniya* Grozny, 1973.

Dzozal: Nuclear family; Cha (Ts, Äĉa): Residenc[e], Family; Nieqhiy (Niekiy): Stirpes [?] (aul = village, clan); Gar Soy: Tribe [I translate *gar* as ‘clan’]; Tayp (Teip): Clan [I translate *teip* as ‘tribe’]; Tuxum (Tukhum): Tribal Union; Qham (Kam): Nation, Commonweal

Table 1.4.A Non-tribal and non-ethnic Chechen Clans in the Republic of Ichkeria *

Non-Tukhum clans	Clans from diverse nations	Ethnic-Georgian clans	Ethnic-Dagestani clans	{For later: any clans from other sources }
Guxoy Gučingxoy Dzumcoy Mayst Mulkhoy Key Našxoy Pešxoy Xukoy Činxoy (10 clans)	Abzoy (Abkhaz) Arseloy (Russian) Gjebertloy (Kabardian) Zhugtiy (Jewish) Nogjiy (Nogay) Orsi (Russian) Turkoy (Turk) Čerkaziy (Circassian) Gjezloy (Tatar) (9 clans)	Ardaloy Bacoy Ghurzhiy Mexaloy Čartoy Šoy (6 clans)	Jandiy (Andiyçı) Akxšoy Almakxoy Ancadoy Argjanoy Axtoy Börtiy Gjaz-gjumkiy (Lakçı) Gjalgtloy Gjumkiy Danuxoy Zhjay Etloy Kogjatiy Kulinaxoy Kübčiy Khordoy Melardoy Nikotoy Särxoy Sogjattoy Suliy (Avarçı) Tjundalxxoy Tarkxoy (Kumuki) Xjakaroy Judaloy Čjadarxoy Čanaxxoy Čungaroy Šolardoy (30 clans)	

*: Collected by Waynakh Online, www.waynakh.com/eng (first accessed 3-03-2011; last accessed 14-10-2013). Sources: Tarik Cemal Kutlu, *History of the Chechen Resistance* Istanbul, 2005; Mohmad Mamakayev, *Çeçenskiy tayp v period ega radlojeniya* Grozny, 1973.

Dzozal: Nuclear family; Cha (Ts,Äôa): Residenc[e], Family; Nieqhiy (Niekiy): Stirpes [?] (aul = village, clan); Gar Soy: Tribe [I translate *gar* as ‘clan’]; Tayp (Teip): Clan [I translate *teip* as ‘tribe’]; Tuxum (Tukhum): Tribal Union; Qham (Kam): Nation, Commonweal

NB: Total number of clans from tables 1.3.A & 1.3.B: 158 + 55 = 213 clans

Table 1.3.B Violence(-values) by Chechen (sub-)clans (Table 1.3.A) and non-Chechen (sub-)clans in Chechnya (Table 1.4.A): observations, examples, incidents, sources

Search Google Scholar: ‘[(sub-)clan/tribe] violence gar neqi taip blood revenge kanly chir honour gar ezdel nokhcalla adat’ & other source references

Äkkiy (7 clans)	Google, 14-10-2013: www.waynakh.com/eng/chechens/tribal-unions-and-clans/ i.e. source Tables www.kafkasakademi.com .
Barčaxoy	
Zhevoy	
Zogoy	
Nokkoy	
Pxarčoy	
Pxarčaxoy	
Vyäppiy	
Myälxiy (16 clans)	
Byästiy	
Benastxoy	
Talčxoy	
Kamalxoy	
Koratxo	
Keganxoy	
Mešiy	
Sakanxoy	
Teratxoy	
Čarxoy	
Erxoy	
Amxoy	
Jamxoy- Byästiy	
Barčaxoy	
Dzhjarxoy	
Yueganxoy	
Noxčmäxkaxoy (28 clans)	
Alaroy	
Aytkxaloy	
Belgatoy	
Benoy	“Ahmad Kadyrov, his two sons Zelimkhan and Ramzan, and other members of the <i>benoy</i> clan” (sources). NB: <i>benoy</i> “amounts to 15% of the Chechen population” (Sokirianskaia 2005: 456).
Biltoy	
Gordaloy	
Gendargenoy	
Gunoy	
Dattixoy	
Dišni	
Zandakhoy	
Xirxoy	
Šxoy	
Kurčaloy	
Sesanxoy	
Singalxoy	
Xaračoy	
Cjontaroy	
Čartoy	
Čermoy	
Širdi	
Šuonoy	
Egašbatoy	
Elistanzxoy	
Enakxaloy	
Enganoy	
Ersanoy	

Yalxoy	
Terloy (14 clans)	
Bavloy	
Bešxoy	
Bešni	
Gemeroy	
Gizxoy	
Gilšxoy	
Zheraxoy	
Kenaxoy	
Macarxoy	
Nkaroy	
Ošniy	
Sanaxoy	
Šyuidiy	
Eltparxoy	
Čantiy (6 clans)	
Bugaroy	
Deraxoy	
Kxokadoy	
Xačaroy	
Xildexaroy	
Cjamdoy	
Čebarloy (33 clans)	Here? But tribe/tribal union, rather than clan: "In Zakan-Urt, the Chaberloy special regiment, headed by Kurdi Bazhiyev, consisted mainly of Chaberloy teip members" (from R. Kaliev, in Tishkov 2004: 235, note 2 (of p.94)).
Arstxoy	
Ačeloy	
Basoy	
Begačexxoy	
Bosoy	
Buni	
Gulaxoy	
Day	
Zhelaškxoy	
Zürxoy	
Xaroy	
Kezenoy	
Kiri	
Kuloy	
Laškaroy	
Makazhoy	
Nizheloy	
Nohči-keloy	
Nuyxoy	
Osxaroy	
Rigaxoy	
Sadoy	
Salbyuroy	
Sandaxoy	
Sikkaxoy	
Sirxoy	
Tunduxoy	
Xarkaloy	
Xindoy	
Xoy	
Cikaroy	
Čebyaxkinxoy	
Čeremaxxoy	
Šaroy (19 clans)	
Buti	
Dunarxoy	

Zhogjaldoy	
Kharoy	
Kaçexoy	
Kevasxoy	
Kinxoy	
Kiri	
Mazuxoy	
Čerčixoy	
Xašalxoy	
Ximoy	
Xinuxoy	
Xixoy	
Xulandoy	
Xakmadoy	
Čeyroy	
Šikaroy	
Cesi	
Šotoy (18 clans)	
Varandoy	
Vašindaroy	
Gattoy	
Gorgačxoy	
Dexestoy	
Keloy	
Muskulxoy	
Myaršoy	
Nixaloy	
Pamyatoy	
Ryaduxoy	
Sanoy	
Syattoy	
Tumsoy	
Urduyoxoy	
Xakkoy	
Xalkeloy	
Xarsenoy	
Erštroy (17 clans)	
Jalxoy	
Jandaloy	
Belxaroy	
Bokoy	
Bulgučxoy	
Bielxa-Nekhi	
Garčoy	
Galay	Prob. here. "Galaizhoiskaya brigade in Yermolovka .. practically from one Galai teip": from R. Kaliev, in Tishkov 2004: 235, note 2 (of p.94).
Gandaloy	
Merzhoy	
Muzhaxoy	
Muzhgaxoy	
Örgxoy	
Fergxoy	
Xayxaray	
Yalxaroy	Here? Dudaev member semi-Ingush <i>yalkhoro</i> mountain <i>gar</i> (clan): Ann Sheehy: Oct-Nov 91 [check]. See also Lieven 1998: 58 (no expl. mention yalkhoro); Gall & De Waal 1997: 83-84; Souleimanov 2007: 83 ("Yalkoroy highland teyp").
Cečoy	
Non-Chechen clans In Chechnya	
Non-Tukhum (10 clans)	
Guxoy	
Gučingxoy	

Dzumcoy	
Mayst	
Mulkhoy	
Key	
Našxoy	
Pešxoy	
Xukoy	
Činxoy	Here? “Y. Mamadaev, like B. Gantemirov member of .. powerful chinkho clan” (Lieven 1998: 58-59; Gall & De Waal 1997: 90-91).
From diverse nations (9 clans)	
Abzoy (Abkhaz)	
Arseloy (Russian)	
Gjebertloy (Kabardian)	
Zhugtiy (Jewish)	
Nogjiy (Nogay)	
Orsi (Russian)	
Turkoy (Turk)	
Čerkaziy (Circassian)	
Gjezloy (Tatar)	
Ethnic-Georgian (6 clans)	
Ardaloy	
Bacoy	
Ghurzhiy	
Mexaloy	
Čartoy	
Šoy	
Ethnic-Dagestani (30 clans)	
Jandiy (Andiyet)	
Akxšoy	
Almakxoy	
Ancadoy	
Argjanoy	
Axtoy	
Börtiy	
Gjaz-gjumkiy (Lakci)	
Gjalgtloy	
Gjumkiy	
Danuxoy	
Zhjaj	
Etloy	
Kogjatiy	
Kulinaxoy	
Kübčiy	
Khordoy	
Melardoy	
Nikotoy	
Särxoy	
Sogjattoy	
Suliy (Avarci)	
Tjundalxxoy	
Tarkxoy (Kumuki)	
Xjakaroy	
Judaloy	
Cjadarxoy	
Čanakxoy	
Čungaroy	
Šolardoy	
Other (if any):	
Ingush clans [in	

Ingushetia]	
[Ozdo]	“Ingush teip ‘ozdo’ allegedly numbers over 69,000 members” (Sokirianskaia 2005: 456)

The society bodies and names from the smallest to the largest are still exist with its all spiritedness in the Chechens.

1. Dūozal: Nuclear family
2. Cha (Ts’a): Residenc, Family
3. Nieqhiy (Niekiy): Stirpes {?} (aul = village, clan)
4. Gar Soy: Tribe
5. Tayp: Clan
6. Tuxum: Tribal Union
7. Qham (Kam): Nation, Commonweal

Dūozal that nucleus of the family is parents (mother and father). Eight generation relatives which breeding from a mother and father, has names. In the literature, 3th, 4rd and 5th lines are calling generally as yuqharalla, yuqralallaš (category of people, categories of people; community, communites).

Source: www.waynakh.com/eng/chechens/tribal-unions-and-clans/ (acc. 15-10-2013).

Appendix : original tables, without source references

Table 1.2.B Violence(-values) by Albanian (sub-)clans (Table 1.2.A): observations, examples, incidents, sources

Search Google Scholar: ‘[(sub-)clan/tribe] violence clan tribe fis blood revenge gjak inat honour besa kanun’ & other source references

Kosovo (Gegs)	
brotherhoods <i>vëllazëri, mëhallë</i>	
N.Albania (Gegs)	
{Bogë}	
Bytyç	
Drisht	
Gash	
Has	
Hot(ti)	
Kir	
Kastrat(i)	
Kastriot	
(Klementi)	
(Koçaj)	
Krasniq	
Lumë	
Mertur	
(Pulati)	
Nikaj	
- Curraj	
Nikç	
Shalë	
- Abat(i)	
- Bob(i)	
- Lotaj	
- Penikaj	
-- Theth	
Shkrel(i)	
Selcë	
(-Shosh)	
Toplanë	
{Vukël}	
Mirditë (tribe)	
- Dibri	
- Fëndi [Fan]	
- Kushneni	
- Oroshi	
- Spashi [Spaç]	

Berishë (tribe)	
Beshkash (ibid)	
Pukë	
Dibër [or Mirditë clan]	
Kryezez	
Kthellë	
Kurbin	
Lurë	
Matjë	
S.Albania (Tosks)	
Semi-tribes/clans <i>fara, gjeri</i>	
Non-Tosk: Çam, Lab	
Other (Macedonia, Montenegro etc.)	

Table 1.3.B Violence(-values) by Chechen (sub-)clans (Table 1.3.A) and non-Chechen (sub-)clans in Chechnya (Table 1.4.A): observations, examples, incidents, sources

Search Google Scholar: ‘[(sub-)clan/tribe] violence gar neqi taip blood revenge kanly chir honour gar ezdel nokhcalla adat’ & other source references

Äkkiy (7 clans)	
Barčaxoy	
Zhevoy	
Zogoy	
Nokkoy	
Pxarčoy	
Pxarčaxoy	
Vyäppiy	
Myälxiy (16 clans)	
Byästiy	
Benastxoy	
Talčxoy	
Kamalxoy	
Koratxo	
Keganxoy	
Mešiy	
Sakanxoy	
Teratxoy	
Čarxoy	
Erxoy	
Amxoy	
Jamxoy- Byästiy	
Barčaxoy	
Dzhjarxoy	
Yueganxoy	

Noxčmäxkaxoy (28 clans)	
Alaroy	
Aytkxaloy	
Belgatooy	
Benoy	
Biltooy	
Gordaloy	
Gendargenoy	
Gunoy	
Dattixoy	
Dišni	
Zandakhoy	
Xirxoy	
Šxoy	
Kurčaloy	
Sesanxoy	
Singalxoy	
Xaračoy	
Cjontaroy	
Čartoy	
Čermoy	
Širdi	
Šuonoy	
Egašbatoy	
Elistanzxoy	
Enaxxaloy	
Enganoy	
Ersanoy	
Yalxoy	
Terloy (14 clans)	
Bavloy	
Bešxoy	
Bešni	
Gemeroy	
Gizxoy	
Gilšxoy	
Zheraxoy	
Kenaxoy	
Macarxoy	
Nkaroy	
Ošniy	
Sanaxoy	
Šyuidiy	
Eltparxoy	
Čantiy (6 clans)	
Bugaroy	
Deraxoy	
Kxokadoy	
Xačaroy	
Xildexaroy	
Cjamdooy	
Čebarloy (33 clans)	
Arstxoy	
Ačeloy	
Basoy	
Begačexxoy	
Bosoy	
Buni	
Gulatxoy	
Day	
Zhelaškxoy	

Zürxoy	
Xaroy	
Kezenoy	
Kiri	
Kuloy	
Laškaroy	
Makazhoy	
Nizheloy	
Nohči-keloy	
Nuyxoy	
Osxaroy	
Rigaxoy	
Sadoy	
Salbyuroy	
Sandaxoy	
Sikkaxoy	
Sirxoy	
Tunduxoy	
Xarkaloy	
Xindoy	
Xoy	
Cikaroy	
Čebyaxkinxoy	
Čeremaxxoy	
Šaroy (19 clans)	
Buti	
Dunarxoy	
Zhogjaldoy	
Kharoy	
Kaçexoy	
Kevasxoy	
Kinxoy	
Kiri	
Mazuxoy	
Čerčixoy	
Xašalxoy	
Ximoy	
Xinuxoy	
Xixoy	
Xulandoy	
Xakmadoy	
Čeyroy	
Šikaroy	
Cesi	
Šotoy (18 clans)	
Varandoy	
Vašindaroy	
Gattoy	
Gorgaçxoy	
Dexestoy	
Keloy	
Muskulxoy	
Myaršoy	
Nixaloy	
Pamyatoy	
Ryaduxoy	
Sanoy	
Syattoy	
Tumsoy	
Urduyuxoy	
Xakkoy	
Xalkeloy	
Xarsenoy	
Erštroy	

(17 clans)	
Jalxoy	
Jandaloy	
Belxaroy	
Bokoy	
Bulgučxoy	
Bielxa-Nekhi	
Garčoy	
Galay	
Gandaloy	
Merzhoy	
Muzhaxoy	
Muzhgaxoy	
Örgxoy	
Fergxoy	
Xayxaray	
Yalxaroy	
Cečoy	
Non-Chechen clans In Chechnya	
Non-Tukhum (10 clans)	
Guxoy	
Gučingxoy	
Dzumcoy	
Mayst	
Mulkhoy	
Key	
Našxoy	
Pešxoy	
Xukoy	
Činxoy	
From diverse nations (9 clans)	
Abzoy (Abkhaz)	
Arseloy (Russian)	
Gjebertloy (Kabardian)	
Zhugtiy (Jewish)	
Nogjiy (Nogay)	
Orsi (Russian)	
Turkoy (Turk)	
Čerkaziy (Circassian)	
Gjezloy (Tatar)	
Ethnic-Georgian (6 clans)	
Ardaloy	
Bacoy	
Ghurzhiy	
Mexaloy	
Čartoy	
Šoy	
Ethnic-Dagestani (30 clans)	
Jandiy (Andiyıcı)	
Akxšoy	
Almakxoy	
Ancadoy	
Argjanoy	
Axtoy	
Börtiy	
Gjaz-gjumkiy (Lakıcı)	

